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ABSTRACT 
 
Studies of offshore and maritime incidents (accidents and near-misses) show that 80% or more 
involve human error.  By investigating incidents, we can identify safety problems and take 
corrective actions to prevent future such events.  While many offshore and maritime companies 
have incident investigation programs in place, most fall short in identifying and dealing with 
human errors.  This paper discusses how to incorporate human factors into an incident 
investigation program.  Topics include data collection and analysis and how to determine the 
types of safety interventions appropriate to safeguard against the identified risks.  Examples are 
provided from three organizations that have established their own human factors investigation 
programs. 
 
DISCLAIMER 
 
This document is disseminated under the sponsorship of the Department of Transportation in 
the interest of information exchange.  The United States Government assumes no liability for its 
contents or use thereof.  The United States Government does not endorse products or 
manufacturers.  Trade or manufacturers’ names appear herein solely because they are 
considered essential to the object of this report.  This report does not constitute a standard, 
specification, or regulation. 
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HUMAN FACTORS IN INCIDENT INVESTIGATION AND ANALYSIS 
 
 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Traditionally, incident investigation has focused on hardware issues, such as material failures 
and equipment malfunctions.  In the last fifteen years or so, it has become increasingly evident 
that human factors, rather than hardware factors, are responsible for most of the precursors to 
incidents.  While many offshore and maritime companies have incident investigation programs 
in place, most consider human contributions to incidents only in a superficial way, if at all.  The 
purpose of this paper is to help offshore and maritime companies incorporate human factors 
into their incident investigation programs so that they can identify human causes of incidents 
and determine effective safety interventions to prevent such incidents in the future. 
1.1 Why Study Incidents? 
An “accident” is defined as “an unplanned event or sequence of events that results in 
undesirable consequences” (Center for Chemical Process Safety, 1992, p.327).  Accidents 
represent the proverbial “tip of the iceberg”.  It has been estimated that for every accident, there 
are about 600 near-misses1 (Det Norske Veritas, 1995; Ferguson & Landsburg, 1998; Bea, 
Holdsworth, & Smith, 1997).  Essentially, a near-miss is an accident that almost happened.  
Near-misses and accidents have the same causes, so studying near-misses can help us 
understand safety problems and make corrective changes before an accident takes place.  In 
addition, since near-misses do not result in full-blown casualties, studying near-misses can help 
us learn how to develop early-warning systems to detect when conditions have become “non-
normal” and also show us what steps were taken that avoided the accident.     
Incident2 investigation and analysis – that is, the study of accidents and near-misses – is 
squarely in line with the intent of the International Safety Management (ISM) Code.  ISM 
requires that a company provide for a safe work environment and safe practices in maritime 
operations and establish safeguards against all identified risks.  Incident investigation helps the 
company to identify its risks and to understand the underlying causes of incidents.  This in turn 
helps the company develop safe work practices.   
                                                
1 A “near-miss” is defined as “an extraordinary event that could reasonably have resulted in a negative 
consequence under slightly different circumstances, but actually did not” (Center for Chemical Process 
Safety, 1992, p. 329). 
2 An “incident” is defined as including “all accidents and all near-miss events that did or could cause 
injury, or loss of or damage to property or the environment" (Center for Chemical Process Safety, 1992, 
p. 1). 
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This paper will help you to learn about human error and how it contributes to virtually every 
incident.  This paper will also show you how to establish a human factors incident investigation 
program in your company and how to analyze the data collected so that you can learn from 
incidents and identify how to improve your policies and work practices to achieve a higher level 
of safety.  Examples are provided from three different organizations that have established their 
own human factors investigation programs, sharing “lessons learned” and how the program has 
benefited them.   
1.2 Background from the 1996 International Workshop on Human Factors in Offshore 
Operations 
Studies of accidents and other incidents on offshore platforms have indicated that the vast 
majority of these accidents involve human error.  In fact, about 80% do, and a further 80% of 
these occur during operations (Bea, Holdsworth, & Smith, 1997).  The need to understand and 
control these human errors led to the assemblage of the 1996 International Workshop on 
Human Factors in Offshore Operations.  The 1996 Workshop took a broad look at how Human 
Factors – often called Human and Organizational Factors to underscore the fact that most of 
these errors occur not within the span of control of the frontline operator, but are caused instead 
by decisions, policies, and operating procedures handed down by higher levels of the 
organization – affect every aspect of the offshore industry, from the design and fabrication of 
offshore production facilities, to field operations and maintenance, to management systems for 
improving safety and productivity.  That Workshop laid the groundwork for the current workshop, 
which is delving into more detail on a number of human factors issues, including incident 
investigation and analysis. 
The 1996 Workshop provided some good background material on human error (Bea, 
Holdsworth, & Smith, 1997; Card, 1997; Wenk, 1997), and even provided some tools that can 
be employed for incident investigation (Bea, 1997; Howard, et al., 1997; Kirwan, 1997; Moore, 
et al., 1997; Scient, Gordon, et al., 1997); these papers are heartily commended to the 
interested reader.  The present paper goes into more detail on these topics and focuses the 
discussions on:  the understanding of how human errors arise and contribute to incidents; a 
specific set of tools for representing the events and causes of an incident; dissecting out the 
different levels of human error; analyzing incident data; and using the human error model to 
select the most effective safety interventions.  In short, this paper attempts to provide the reader 
with a “soup to nuts” examination of how to build a successful human factors incident 
investigation program. 
1.3 The Typical Offshore Incident System and How Human Factors Data Can Enrich It 
Thanks, in part, to OSHA and EPA regulations on Process Safety and Risk Management (e.g., 
29 CFR 1910.119 and 40 CFR Part 68) and to the International Safety Management Code, 
many offshore and maritime companies already have an incident investigation program in place.  
These programs often follow well-grounded investigative practices, providing investigation team 
members with training in the basics of incident investigation, gathering and documenting 
evidence, and interviewing techniques.  Many of these companies also keep an incident 
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database and may do frequency and trending analysis.  In short, they have many of the 
elements of a good incident investigation program already in place.  However, where most of 
these programs fall short is in the areas of identifying human factors causes and determining 
how best to correct these problems.   
While a number of companies attempt to consider “operator errors” during incident 
investigations, these operator errors represent only the tip of the human factors iceberg.  As 
described in more detail in Section 2, most human factors causes originate further up the 
organizational chain, taking the form of poor management decisions, inadequate staffing, 
inadequate training, poor workplace design, etc.  Simply identifying the “mistake” an operator 
made, and not “drilling down” to identify the underlying, organizational causes of that mistake, 
will not help to prevent reoccurrences of the incident.  Because most offshore incident 
investigation programs do not have a thorough process for identifying the many types of human 
error, and the various levels of the organizations from which such errors originate, they lack the 
tools with which to make effective, human error-reducing, and thus incident-reducing, changes.   
The remainder of this paper will provide the tools to understand, investigate for, and 
productively solve human error causes of incidents: 
• Section 2 will describe what human error is and how it causes incidents; it will also 
discuss some of the most pervasive types of human error in the maritime and offshore 
industries. 
• Section 3 outlines the keys to building a successful human factors incident investigation 
and analysis program.  It will describe in detail the concept of an organization’s “layers of 
system defenses” against catastrophic events, and how a weakening of these system 
defenses can result in incidents. 
• Section 4 presents the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) – a 
simple to understand and use system for categorizing the types of human errors at each 
layer of system defense.  HFACS has been used successfully in military and other 
industrial applications, and is compatible with maritime and offshore needs. 
• Section 5 walks you through the analysis of an incident.  It introduces Events and Causal 
Factors Charting, a method which first determines the events which occurred in the 
evolving incident (similar to a timeline analysis), and then considers the contributing 
causes to each event.  The combination of Events and Causal Factors Charting, 
followed by an HFACS analysis of the causes, provides a powerful tools for ferreting out 
the underlying human error contributions to an incident. 
• Data analysis is the topic of Section 6.  Several different approaches are introduced, 
allowing companies to go well beyond the simple frequency and trend analysis in 
common usage today.  Proactive, thoughtful data analysis is key to a company’s 
awareness of safety issues and their probable underlying causes. 
• Finding effective safety solutions is discussed in Section 7.  This section takes you from 
the results of your HFACS and data analyses, through focused information-gathering on 
safety problems, to crafting effective interventions.  The “triangle of effectiveness” is a 
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tool that will help you to find the most effective human factors interventions and safety 
solutions. 
• Section 8 presents the “lessons learned” and “success stories” from three organizations 
now involved in human factors incident investigation and analysis.  Their experiences 
can give you a head start with your own program. 
• Section 9 wraps up the paper with a summary of the most important points discussed. 
• The Appendices provide you with sample human factors-related questions to ask during 
an investigation, additional examples of human factors incident investigation 
classification schemes, database elements to capture the non-human factors relevant to 
an investigation, and specific data elements that can help to identify and understand 
three of the most prevalent types of human error in maritime/offshore accidents:  fatigue, 
inadequate communications, and limitations in skill and knowledge. 
When a focus on human error is incorporated into your existing incident investigation, analysis, 
and intervention program (as in Fig. 1), it can produce great benefits for your company, 
including fewer incidents, fewer lost-time accidents, improved employee morale, greater 
productivity, and an overall improvement to the bottom line.   
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Figure 1. Incident Investigation Process. 
(modified from Franklyn, 2000) 
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2.0 HUMAN ERROR3  
Over the last 40 years or so, the shipping industry has focused on improving the structure of 
ships and platforms and improving the reliability of equipment systems in order to reduce 
casualties and increase efficiency and productivity.  Today’s maritime and offshore systems are 
technologically advanced and highly reliable.  Yet, the maritime casualty rate is still high.  The 
reason for this is because ship/offshore structure and system reliability are a relatively small 
part of the safety equation.  The maritime system is a people system, and human errors figure 
prominently in casualty situations.  About 75-96% of marine casualties are caused, at least in 
part, by some form of human error.  Studies have shown that human error contributes to: 
• 84-88% of tanker accidents (Transportation Safety Board of Canada, 1994) 
• 79% of towing vessel groundings (Cormier, 1994) 
• 89-96% of collisions (Bryant, 1991; U.K. P&I Club, 1992) 
• 75% of allisions (Bryant, 1991) 
• 75% of fires and explosions (Bryant, 1991) 
Therefore, if we want to make greater strides towards reducing marine casualties, we must 
begin to focus on the types of human errors that cause casualties.   
One way to identify the types of human errors relevant to the maritime and offshore industries is 
to study incidents and determine how they happen.  Chairman Jim Hall of the National 
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has said that accidents can be viewed as very successful 
events.  What Chairman Hall means by “successful” is that it is actually difficult to create an 
accident (thank goodness!).  Accidents are not usually caused by a single failure or mistake, but 
by the confluence of a whole series, or chain, of errors.  In looking at how accidents happen, it 
is usually possible to trace the development of an accident through a number of discrete events.   
A Dutch study of 100 marine casualties (Wagenaar & Groeneweg, 1987) found that the number 
of causes per accident ranged from 7 to 58, with a median of 234.  Minor things go wrong or little 
mistakes are made which, in and of themselves, may seem innocuous.  However, sometimes 
when these seemingly minor events converge, the result is a casualty.  In the study, human 
error was found to contribute to 96 of the 100 accidents.  In 93 of the accidents, multiple human 
errors were made, usually by two or more people, each of whom made about two errors apiece.  
But here is the most important point:  every human error that was made was determined to be a 
necessary condition for the accident.  That means that if just one of those human errors had not 
occurred, the chain of events would have been broken, and the accident would not have 
happened.  Therefore, if we can find ways to prevent some of these human errors, or at least 
increase the probability that such errors will be noticed and corrected, we can achieve greater 
marine safety and fewer casualties. 
                                                
3 This section is taken from Rothblum (2000). 
4 This means that half the accidents had 7-23 causes and the other half of the accidents had 23-58 
causes. 
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2.1 Types of Human Error 
What do we mean by “human error”?  Human error is sometimes described as being one of the 
following:  an incorrect decision, an improperly performed action, or an improper lack of action 
(inaction).  Probably a better way to explain human error is to provide examples from two real 
marine casualties. 
The first example is the collision of the M/V SANTA CRUZ II and the USCG Cutter CUYAHOGA, 
which occurred on a clear, calm night on the Chesapeake Bay (Perrow, 1984).  Both vessels 
saw each other visually and on radar.  So what could possibly go wrong?  Well, the 
CUYAHOGA turned in front of the SANTA CRUZ II.  In the collision that ensued, 11 Coast 
Guardsmen lost their lives.  What could have caused such a tragedy?  Equipment malfunctions?  
Severe currents?  A buoy off-station?  No, the sole cause was human error.   
There were two primary errors that were made.  The first was on the part of the CUYAHOGA’s 
captain:  he misinterpreted the configuration of the running lights on the SANTA CRUZ II, and 
thus misperceived its size and heading.  When he ordered that fateful turn, he thought he was 
well clear of the other vessel.  The second error was on the part of the crew:  they realized what 
was happening, but failed to inform or question the captain.  They figured the captain’s 
perception of the situation was the same as their own, and that the captain must have had a 
good reason to order the turn.  So they just stood there and let it happen.  Another type of 
human error that may have contributed to the casualty was insufficient manning (notice that this 
is not an error on the part of the captain or crew; rather, it is an error on the part of a 
“management” decision-maker who determined the cutter’s minimum crew size).  The vessel 
was undermanned, and the crew was overworked.  Fatigue and excessive workload may have 
contributed to the captain’s perceptual error and the crew’s unresponsiveness. 
The second example is the grounding of the TORREY CANYON (Perrow, 1984).  Again we 
have clear, calm weather--this time it was a daylight transit of the English Channel.  While 
proceeding through the Scilly Islands, the ship ran aground, spilling 100,000 tons of oil.   
At least four different human errors contributed to this incident.  The first was economic 
pressure, that is, the pressure to keep to schedule (pressure exerted on the master by 
management).  The TORREY CANYON was loaded with cargo and headed for its deep-water 
terminal in Wales.  The shipping agent had contacted the captain to warn him of decreasing 
tides at Milford Haven, the entrance to the terminal.  The captain knew that if he didn’t make the 
next high tide, he might have to wait as much as five days before the water depth would be 
sufficient for the ship to enter.   
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This pressure to keep to schedule was exacerbated by a second factor:  the captain’s vanity 
about his ship’s appearance.  He needed to transfer cargo in order to even out the ship’s draft.  
He could have performed the transfer while underway, but that would have increased the 
probability that he might spill a little oil on the decks and come into port with a “sloppy” ship.  So 
instead, he opted to rush to get past the Scillies and into Milford Haven in order to make the 
transfer, thus increasing the pressure to make good time. 
The third human error in this chain was another poor decision by the master.  He decided, in 
order to save time, to go through the Scilly Islands, instead of around them as originally 
planned.  He made this decision even though he did not have a copy of the Channel Pilot for 
that area, and even though he was not very familiar with the area. 
The final human error was an equipment design error (made by the equipment manufacturer).  
The steering selector switch was in the wrong position:  it had been left on autopilot.  
Unfortunately, the design of the steering selector unit did not give any indication of its setting at 
the helm.  So when the captain ordered a turn into the western channel through the Scillies, the 
helmsman dutifully turned the wheel, but nothing happened.  By the time they figured out the 
problem and got the steering selector back on “manual”, it was too late to make the turn, and 
the TORREY CANYON ran aground. 
As these two examples show, there are many different kinds of human error.  It is important to 
recognize that “human error” encompasses much more than what is commonly called “operator 
error”.  In order to understand what causes human error, we need to consider how humans work 
within the maritime system. 
2.2 The Maritime System:  People, Technology, Environment, and Organizational 
Factors 
As was stated earlier, the maritime system is a people system (Fig. 2).  People interact with 
technology, the environment, and organizational factors.  Sometimes the weak link is with the 
people themselves; but more often the weak link is the way that technological, environmental, or 
organizational factors influence the way people perform.  Let’s look at each of these factors. 
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Figure 2. The Maritime System Is A People System 
 
First, the people.  In the maritime system this could include the ship’s crew, pilots, dock 
workers, Vessel Traffic Service operators, and others.  The performance of these people will be 
dependent on many traits, both innate and learned (Fig. 3).  As human beings, we all have 
certain abilities and limitations.  For example, human beings are great at pattern discrimination 
and recognition.  There isn’t a machine in the world that can interpret a radar screen as well as 
a trained human being can.  On the other hand, we are fairly limited in our memory capacity and 
in our ability to calculate numbers quickly and accurately--machines can do a much better job.  
In addition to these inborn characteristics, human performance is also influenced by the 
knowledge and skills we have acquired, as well as by internal regulators such as motivation and 
alertness.   
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Figure 3. The Maritime System:  People 
 
The design of technology can have a big impact on how people perform (Fig. 4).  For example, 
people come in certain sizes and have limited strength.  So when a piece of equipment meant to 
be used outdoors is designed with data entry keys that are too small and too close together to 
be operated by a gloved hand, or if a cutoff valve is positioned out of easy reach, these designs 
will have a detrimental effect on performance.  Automation is often designed without much 
thought to the information that the user needs to access.  Critical information is sometimes 
either not displayed at all or else displayed in a manner which is not easy to interpret.  Such 
designs can lead to inadequate comprehension of the state of the system and to poor decision 
making. 
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Figure 4. The Maritime System:  Effect of Technology on People 
 
The environment affects performance, too (Fig. 5).  By “environment” we are including not only 
weather and other aspects of the physical work environment (such as lighting, noise, and 
temperature), but also the regulatory and economic climates.  The physical work environment 
directly affects one’s ability to perform.  For example, the human body performs best within a 
fairly restricted temperature range.  Performance will be degraded at temperatures outside that 
range, and fail altogether in extreme temperatures.  High sea states and ship vibrations can 
affect locomotion and manual dexterity, as well as cause stress and fatigue.  Tight economic 
conditions can increase the probability of risk-taking (e.g., making schedule at all costs). 
Finally, organizational factors, both crew organization and company policies, affect human 
performance (Fig. 6).  Crew size and training decisions directly affect crew workload and their 
capabilities to perform safely and effectively.  A strict hierarchical command structure can inhibit 
effective teamwork, whereas free, interactive communications can enhance it.  Work schedules 
which do not provide the individual with regular and sufficient sleep time produce fatigue.  
Company policies with respect to meeting schedules and working safely will directly influence 
the degree of risk-taking behavior and operational safety.   
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Figure 5. The Maritime System:  Effect of Environment on People 
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Figure 6. The Maritime System:  Effect of Organization on People 
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As you can see, while human errors are all too often blamed on “inattention” or “mistakes” on 
the part of the operator, more often than not they are symptomatic of deeper and more 
complicated problems in the total maritime system.  Human errors are generally caused by 
technologies, environments, and organizations which are incompatible in some way with optimal 
human performance.  These incompatible factors “set up” the human operator to make 
mistakes.  So what is to be done to solve this problem?  Traditionally, management has tried 
either to cajole or threaten its personnel into not making errors, as though proper motivation 
could somehow overcome poorly designed management and equipment systems and inborn 
human limitations.  In other words, the human has been expected to adapt to the system.  This 
does not work.  Instead, what needs to be done is to adapt the system to the human.   
The discipline of human factors is devoted to understanding human capabilities and limitations, 
and to applying this information to design equipment, work environments, procedures, and 
policies that are compatible with human abilities.   In this way we can design technology, 
environments, and organizations which will work with people to enhance their performance, 
instead of working against people and degrading their performance.  This kind of human-
centered approach (that is, adapting the system to the human) has many benefits, including 
increased efficiency and effectiveness, decreased errors and incidents, decreased training 
costs, decreased personnel injuries and lost time, and increased morale.   
2.3 Human Factors Issues in the Maritime Industry 
What are some of the most important human factors challenges facing the maritime industry 
today?  A study by the U.S. Coast Guard (1995) found many areas where the industry can 
improve safety and performance through the application of human factors principles.  Below are 
summaries of the “top ten” human factors areas that need to be improved in order to prevent 
casualties.   
2.3.1 Fatigue 
The NTSB has identified fatigue to be an important cross-modal issue, being just as pertinent 
and in need of improvement in the maritime industry as it is in the aviation, rail, and automotive 
industries.  Fatigue has been cited as the “number one” concern of mariners in two different 
studies (Marine Transportation Research Board, 1976; National Research Council, 1990).  It 
was also the most frequently mentioned problem in a recent Coast Guard survey (U.S. Coast 
Guard, 1995).  A recent study has objectively substantiated these anecdotal fears:  in a study of 
critical vessel casualties5 and personnel injuries, it was found that fatigue contributed to 16% of 
the vessel casualties and to 33% of the injuries (McCallum, Raby, & Rothblum, 1996).   
                                                
5 A “critical” vessel casualty was defined as a vessel casualty in which there was significant damage to 
the vessel or property, or in which the safety of the crew was at risk. 
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2.3.2 Inadequate Communications   
Another area for improvement is communications--between shipmates, between masters and 
pilots, ship-to-ship, and ship-to-VTS.  An NTSB report (National Transportation Safety Board, 
1981) stated that 70% of major marine collisions and allisions occurred while a State or federal 
pilot was directing one or both vessels.  Better procedures and training can be designed to 
promote better communications and coordination on and between vessels.  Bridge Resource 
Management (BRM) is a first step towards improvement.    
2.3.3 Inadequate General Technical Knowledge 
In one study, this problem was responsible for 35% of casualties (Wagenaar & Groeneweg, 
1987).  The main contributor to this category was a lack of knowledge of the proper use of 
technology, such as radar.  Mariners often do not understand how the automation works or 
under what set of operating conditions it was designed to work effectively.  The unfortunate 
result is that mariners sometimes make errors in using the equipment or depend on a piece of 
equipment when they should be getting information from alternate sources. 
2.3.4 Inadequate Knowledge of Own Ship Systems   
A frequent contributing factor to marine casualties is inadequate knowledge of own ship 
operations and equipment.  Several studies and casualty reports have warned of the difficulties 
encountered by crews and pilots who are constantly working on ships of different sizes, with 
different equipment, and carrying different cargoes.  The lack of ship-specific knowledge was 
cited as a problem by 78% of the mariners surveyed (National Research Council, 1990).  A 
combination of better training, standardized equipment design, and an overhaul of the present 
method of assigning crew to ships can help solve this problem. 
2.3.5 Poor Design of Automation   
One challenge is to improve the design of shipboard automation.  Poor design pervades almost 
all shipboard automation, leading to collisions from misinterpretation of radar displays, oil spills 
from poorly designed overfill devices, and allisions due to poor design of bow thrusters.  Poor 
equipment design was cited as a causal factor in one-third of major marine casualties 
(Wagenaar & Groeneweg, 1987).  The “fix” is relatively simple:  equipment designers need to 
consider how a given piece of equipment will support the mariner’s task and how that piece of 
equipment will fit into the entire equipment “suite” used by the mariner.  Human factors 
engineering methods and principles are in routine use in other industries to ensure human-
centered equipment design and evaluation.  The maritime industry needs to follow suit.   
2.3.6 Decisions Based on Inadequate Information 
Mariners are charged with making navigation decisions based on all available information.  Too 
often, we have a tendency to rely on either a favored piece of equipment or our memory.  Many 
casualties result from the failure to consult available information (such as that from a radar or an 
echo-sounder).  In other cases, critical information may be lacking or incorrect, leading to 
navigation errors (for example, bridge supports often are not marked, or buoys may be off-
station). 
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2.3.7 Poor Judgement 
Risky decisions can lead to accidents.  This category contained actions that were not consistent 
with prudent seamanship, such as passing too closely, excessive speed, and ignoring potential 
risks. 
2.3.8 Faulty Standards, Policies, or Practices 
This is an oft-cited category and covers a variety of problems.  Included in this category is the 
lack of available, precise, written, and comprehensible operational procedures aboard ship (if 
something goes wrong, and if a well-written manual is not immediately available, a correct and 
timely response is much less likely).  Other problems in this category include management 
policies which encourage risk-taking (like pressure to meet schedules at all costs) and the lack 
of consistent traffic rules from port to port. 
2.3.9 Poor Maintenance   
Published reports (Bryant, 1991; National Research Council, 1990) and survey results (US 
Coast Guard, 1995) expressed concern regarding the poor maintenance of ships.  Poor 
maintenance can result in a dangerous work environment, lack of working backup systems, and 
crew fatigue from the need to make emergency repairs.  Poor maintenance is also a leading 
cause of fires and explosions (Bryant, 1991). 
2.3.10 Hazardous Natural Environment   
The marine environment is not a forgiving one.  Currents, winds, ice, and fog make for 
treacherous working conditions.  When we fail to incorporate these factors into the design of our 
ships, platforms, and equipment, and when we fail to adjust our operations based on hazardous 
environmental conditions, we are at greater risk for casualties. 
These and other human errors underlie almost every maritime incident.  By studying incidents to 
understand their contributing causes, we can learn how to redesign our policies, procedures, 
work environments, and equipment to be more compatible with our human users and, thus, 
bring about improved safety and productivity.  In the next sections we will discuss how to 
develop a human factors incident investigation program for your company. 
 
3.0 BUILDING A HUMAN FACTORS INCIDENT INVESTIGATION PROGRAM 
A well-designed company safety program is multi-faceted.  Health, Safety, and Environment 
(HSE) management, risk assessment and management, behavior based safety management 
(BBSM), quality programs, and project management all play a role in improving safety.  A 
careful Job Hazards Analysis (JHA) or Job Safety Analysis (JSA) can identify work hazards and 
recommend redesigns of equipment and work procedures, as well as associated precautions 
that can prevent accidents.   
Working Group 1 - HFW2002 Page 15 of 141 Houston, Texas 
Human Factors in Incident Investigation and Analysis 
Behavior based safety management and other related processes work hand-in-hand with 
incident investigation to identify potential problems.  Behavior based safety management is a 
proactive process which examines the workplace to identify problems before an incident occurs, 
while incident investigation is a reactive process which identifies workplace and procedural 
hazards that caused an accident or near-miss.  The data from both types of processes should 
be used together to gain the most complete understanding of potential hazards.  The fact that 
both these processes can be used to prevent incidents was underscored by a fatal fall that 
occurred at a construction site.  Just prior to the accident, the company’s BBSM data had 
shown that personnel were not hooking up or using fall protection properly.  The data also 
identified several barriers to the safe behavior, including:  lack of available hook up points; lack 
of available fall protection in high hazard areas; lack of training on proper use of protective 
equipment; unclear procedures; and discomfort associated with wearing harnesses.  By 
collecting these kinds of upstream indicators, a company can correct the situation before an 
incident happens. 
Unfortunately, we’re not always able to foresee and prevent every type of incident that might 
occur. This is what makes incident investigation an important part of the company’s overall 
safety strategy.  An incident investigation and analysis program is essential to understanding 
the underlying, and sometimes hidden, causes of workplace incidents.  Proper identification of 
the true contributors to accidents allows a company to establish workable preventive measures.  
This section discusses how to build a human factors incident investigation program.   
Additional information and publications on human factors and incident investigation in the 
offshore industry are offered on several web sites.  The American Institute of Chemical 
Engineers (http://www.aiche.org) offers two documents, “Guidelines for Investigating Chemical 
Process Incidents” and “International Conference and Workshop of Process Industry Incidents”.  
The U.K.’s Health and Safety Executive (http://www.open.gov.uk/hse/hsehome.htm) has the 
publication “Human and Organisation Factors in Offshore Safety”.  The International Association 
of Oil and Gas Producers (http://www.ogp.org.uk) has a safety incident reporting system and 
incident statistics. 
3.1 Keys to a Successful Human Factors Incident Investigation Program 
Before we jump into the details of how to investigate for human factors causes of incidents, it is 
important to mention a few key factors which will encourage cooperation in incident 
investigations and will promote good data quality.  These key factors are:  an open, fair, 
improvement-seeking culture; an understanding of the purpose and scope of the incident 
investigation program; training for investigators on human factors; a database classification 
scheme (taxonomy) that supports the goals of the incident investigation program; a simple, 
user-friendly way of entering incident data; and feedback to show how incident data have been 
used to improve safety (Hill, Byers, & Rothblum, 1994). 
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3.1.1 An Open, Fair, Improvement-Seeking Culture   
The fundamental purpose of an incident investigation is to understand the circumstances and 
causes of the incident with the aim of improving safety.  We want to understand:  what 
happened; how it happened; why it happened; and, most importantly, what steps can be taken 
to prevent it from happening again.  Only by dispassionately analyzing the incident evolution in 
detail and determining its underlying contributing factors can we design and implement effective 
remedial actions.  It is important to remember that we are not out to attribute blame:  actions 
taken solely to “blame and shame” generally do little to prevent similar incidents from occurring 
in the future.  This is because, as discussed in the previous section, most incidents are not the 
“fault” of a given person; rather, they are indicative of deficiencies within the system.  
Companies whose incident investigations focus on “finger-pointing” (i.e., identifying the person 
who is supposedly “to blame” for the incident) short-circuit their ability to find and understand 
the real causes of the incident.  Only by analyzing and addressing the contributing factors – the 
system deficiencies – that underpin the actions of those directly involved, can we make real 
progress in reducing the frequency of incidents.  Therefore, it is necessary to foster an open 
and trusting environment where personnel feel free to discuss the evolution of an incident 
without fear of unjust reprisal.  If personnel know that the purpose of the investigation is to 
identify how to improve safety, and that the investigation will lead to a fair and objective analysis 
of the incident, they will be much more likely to participate in a candid interview.  Without such a 
supportive environment, involved individuals will be reluctant to cooperate in a full disclosure of 
the events leading to an incident.   
3.1.2 Common Understanding of the Purpose and Scope of the Incident Investigation Program   
The incident investigation program, and the database which supports it, should be constructed 
to accomplish a well-defined purpose.  Program managers need to agree on specific questions 
the program – and, therefore, the incident database – will be expected to answer.  For example, 
a company might wish to focus on reducing maintenance incidents which result in lost time for 
the employee.  Such a program, and its database, would need information on the type of 
maintenance activity being performed, the type of injury sustained (accident) or narrowly 
avoided (near-miss), damage to equipment or workplace, lost time and money due to injury (or 
potential loss, in the case of a near-miss), and causes of the of the (near-) injury (such as poor 
standard operating procedures, insufficient lighting, undermanning, equipment defects, 
inadequate task design, lack of safety policies, etc.).  In contrast, a program focused on 
preventing hazardous material spills/emissions could have a significantly different set of factors 
of interest (such as type of hazmat, regulations violated, location and size of spill, fines and 
clean-up costs; operational activities at time of spill; events and underlying causes leading to 
the spill).  The point here is that the goals of your incident investigation program must drive the 
types of questions you will want to answer, which in turn dictate the types of data you will collect 
during the investigations.   
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A knowledge of the purpose of the database will guide the form the investigation takes and will 
help in determining the appropriate resources to devote to the investigation.  If certain causal 
areas are known to be particularly important, effort will be concentrated in those areas.  
Conversely, if the investigators do not understand the purpose of the program, they will shape 
their investigations around their own biases and areas of expertise, rather than around the goals 
of the program.   
Clear guidance is needed for investigators to know what level of detail is sufficient, and what 
resources are needed to properly fulfill the purpose of their investigations and thoroughly report 
their findings.  In the offshore industry this is often formalized through a “charter” which is 
developed at the beginning of an incident investigation.  The charter identifies the investigation 
team, states the responsibilities of the team, its goals (e.g., to identify causes or to develop 
recommendations), and a timeline for the investigation.  The incident investigators, and all 
personnel, must understand the program goals and how their input will help promote safety 
improvements.  Only then will the investigators know what types of data are important to collect, 
and only then will employees understand why their active cooperation is important.   
3.1.3 Appropriate Training for Incident Investigators   
An incident investigation program rests on the abilities of its investigators.  Incident investigation 
does not come naturally:  it must be trained.  Investigators need background on how incidents 
evolve and the myriad events and attributes which can cause or contribute to the severity of an 
incident.  They need to know how to ask appropriate questions, how to work with uncooperative 
witnesses, how to build an events and causal tree (or other tool to help guide the investigation).  
And, of course, they need to understand the specific goals of the company’s incident 
investigation program.   
Human factors-related information is often overlooked even by seasoned investigators if they 
have not been specifically trained to identify such data.  While it is both natural and expected 
that investigators will use their individual experiences and unique areas of expertise (e.g., 
engineering, navigation, drilling) when conducting investigations, some individuals may not have 
an adequate perspective to search for or recognize human-related causes.  A related problem is 
that if a human factors element is not overlooked entirely, it is often oversimplified.  A single 
“obvious” human-related contributing factor may be identified, such as “inattention”, without 
looking for the root cause (perhaps information overload, as a result of a poor display design).  
As described earlier, many external factors (technology, organization, environment) affect 
human performance, and it takes training for investigators to understand and recognize these 
underlying contributors. 
In the offshore industry, it is fairly common for a company to “charter” an incident investigation 
team when an incident occurs.  These ad hoc team members may include a combination of 
workers, line supervisors, and managers.  It is important to choose a team that will be fair, 
unbiased, and objective.  While team members are usually chosen because of their experience 
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in the area where the incident occurred, they may have little or no background in either incident 
investigation or human factors.  If the team is going to be successful at identifying the 
underlying causes of the incident, then at least some of the team members must have training 
and experience in human factors incident investigation.   
3.1.4 Incident Database Classification Scheme   
The database classification scheme (taxonomy) must be directly linked to the purpose and 
scope of the incident investigation program.  The database elements must match the level of 
detail that is needed to answer the safety-related questions upon which the program goals are 
based.  Too often an incident database is constructed in a haphazard way, with the program 
managers trying to think up data elements without first determining the questions the database 
is meant to answer.  The sad result is a database of little value, which falls far short of 
supporting safety improvements.   
When it comes to human factors information, the database must be compatible with both the 
program goals and the level of knowledge of the investigators.  The terminology used in the 
classification scheme must be well-defined and understood by the investigators.  In some 
cases, tools may be needed to help the investigator determine whether a given human factor is 
related to the incident.   
For example, the term “fatigue” is very hard to define – many of us carry our own beliefs (correct 
or incorrect) as to what fatigue is and how it relates to safety.  In order to obtain reliable and 
valid data on fatigue, it may be useful to determine specific pieces of data the investigator would 
collect and to provide an algorithm that would use these data to determine whether “fatigue” 
played a role in the incident.  An example of this is the Fatigue Index Score being used by the 
U.S. Coast Guard (McCallum, Raby, & Rothblum, 1996; see App. G):  investigators collect the 
number of hours worked and slept in the twenty-four hours preceding the casualty and also 
collect information on fatigue symptoms (e.g., difficulty concentrating, heavy eyelids, desire to 
sit down).  These data are put into an equation which tells the investigator whether fatigue is a 
likely cause, and therefore whether a more extensive investigation needs to be done to 
determine what contributed to the fatigue.  When the classification scheme is based on well-
defined, quantifiable data, it increases the reliability and validity of the human factors causes 
identified (e.g., fatigue), and, more importantly, it keeps the investigator focused on why the 
human factors cause was present (e.g., insufficient sleep due to extended port operations). 
A good database should also be adaptable to the changing needs of the organization.  As the 
organization learns lessons from the incident data, it is probable that additional items or levels 
of detail will be desired from investigations, requiring a modification of the classification scheme 
and database.  One final note:  while a classification scheme is extremely helpful for data 
analysis, it can never capture the flavor of the incident.  Narrative sections are crucial for a full 
understanding of the evolution of the incidents and for capturing important information that just 
does not fit into the taxonomy. 
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3.1.5 Simple Data Entry  
An incident database should reside on a computer system so that data analyses can be 
performed.  It is best to have the investigators enter their own incident data, as a clerk may 
easily misread or misunderstand the investigator’s notes.  The user interface of the database 
needs to be efficient and user-friendly in order to promote data validity and completeness.  
Unfortunately, examples of poor user interfaces abound.  Just as the classification scheme will 
determine the data collected and reported, the computer interface will determine the quality of 
the data entered.  If a certain data field is required to be filled out, it will always be filled out, 
even if the data entered are of questionable quality.  When the computer interface is poorly 
designed the system becomes an obstacle to be overcome, and effort will be focused on just 
getting “something” into the system, rather than spending effort on the veracity and 
completeness of the data entered (Hill, Byers, & Rothblum, 1994).  A good incident database 
must be simple to use, allowing investigators to enter all relevant data easily and completely, 
and allowing them to skip data fields that do not pertain to the case. 
3.1.6 Feedback on Results of the Incident Investigation Program   
Nothing dulls an investigator’s enthusiasm more than to be working hard to capture useful data, 
only to get the feeling that it’s all going down some deep, dark hole.  Feedback is crucial to a 
successful incident investigation program.  Investigators need to see the results of their work.  
And all personnel need to know that the program is not just another “flash in the pan”, but 
something to which management has an on-going commitment.  Publish results of incident 
analyses, make specific incidents the topic of safety meetings, use the results to start 
discussions on how to improve safety, and let personnel know that the new policies going into 
effect were based on lessons learned from incident investigations.  When the use of the incident 
database is made public, investigators will redouble their efforts to collect complete data, and 
personnel will be more likely to cooperate in investigations. 
3.2 Investigating for Human Factors Causes 
Historically, companies and agencies that investigate incidents have overlooked human factors 
causes almost entirely.  Material deficiencies in incidents (for example, equipment malfunction 
or a deficiency in the structural integrity of the vessel or platform) can normally be readily 
identified (e.g., a shaft is broken or there’s a hole in the hull).  However, the real difficulty in 
incident investigation is to answer why these deficiencies occurred, and the answer is usually 
related to human behavior.  For instance, the shaft may have broken because of company 
management decisions, such as cutting back on maintenance, purchasing a less costly (and 
less well-made) piece of equipment, or selecting less-experienced engineers.  Or, the shaft may 
have broken due to poor supervision of operations or maintenance, or due to an error made 
during maintenance, or to someone who used the equipment outside its safe operating range.  
Each of these underlying factors needs to be probed for why it happened, as well (e.g., did the 
company cut back on maintenance to save money or to offload its minimally-manned crew?  
was the equipment operated outside its range due to inexperience or willful violation by the 
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operator?).  Only after the investigator understands the true underlying cause(s) can meaningful 
solutions be developed.  In typical investigations, however, the why is often ignored.   
Another problem with the way most investigations unfold is that individuals are usually targeted 
for either “incompetence” or for “criminal negligence”.  This is particularly true when the 
investigator discovers that a given individual appeared to be responsible for the incident 
because the individual:  had fallen asleep on duty; was under the influence of alcohol or drugs 
on duty; violated a regulation or standard operating procedure; appeared to be inattentive; or 
made an inappropriate decision.  While it is sometimes the case that an individual is 
incompetent or negligent, the investigator should always look for contributing causes or other 
factors underpinning such behavior.  It is often the case that work policies, standard operating 
procedures, and poorly designed jobs or equipment are at the core of the problem.  Sanctioning 
the individual will not solve the problem and only creates a culture of fear and secrecy.  
Discovering the real reasons which underlie a given incident and working to solve the core 
issues will engender trust and openness in the work culture and lead to real improvements in 
safety. 
3.3 How an Incident Evolves 
There are usually multiple causes of an incident, with multiple people and events contributing to 
its evolution.  As mentioned in the Introduction, the accidents studied in detail by Wagenaar and 
Groeneweg (1987) had anywhere from 7 to 58 distinct causes, with 50% of the cases having at 
least 23 causes.  We are often very good at identifying the error most immediately linked to an 
incident.  This is usually an error made by one of the people at the scene of the incident, such 
as that made by the helmsman of the TORREY CANYON when he failed to take the ship off 
automatic pilot in time to make the turn.  We call these “active failures” because they represent 
an action, inaction, or decision that is directly related to the incident.  However, we are often not 
as good at identifying other contributing causes, because many of these contributing causes 
may have occurred days, months, or even years before the incident in question.  We call these 
“latent conditions”, because they are error-inducing states or situations that are lying dormant 
until the proper set of conditions arise which expose their unsafe attributes.  One of the latent 
conditions in the TORREY CANYON incident was the poor design of the steering selector 
switch:  it gave no indication at the helm as to whether steering was set to “manual” or 
“automatic”.  An even more important latent error was management pressure on the master to 
keep to schedule, for that sense of urgency underlay his poor decisions.  In this way the human 
operator is “set up” to make errors because the latent conditions make the system in which he 
works error-inducing rather than error-avoiding. 
James Reason (1990) offered a useful paradigm, often referred to as the “Swiss cheese model,” 
that explains how the many types of contributing factors can converge, resulting in an incident6 
                                                
6 Reason’s work underscores the fact that “human errors” and “human factors” relate to the entire system, 
not just to an individual operator.  The International Ergonomics Association defines human factors as 
being “concerned with the understanding of interactions among humans and other elements of a system.”  
Further, it states that the area of human factors considers the design of “tasks, jobs, products, 
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(Fig. 7).  A company tries to promote safety and prevent catastrophic accidents by putting into 
place layers of system defenses, depicted in the figure below as slices of Swiss cheese.  
Essentially, “system defenses” refers to the safety-related decisions and actions of the entire 
company:  top management, the line supervisors, and the workers.  The Organizational Factors 
layer (slice) represents the defenses put into place by top management.  This level of system 
defenses might include a company culture which puts safety first, and management decisions 
which reinforce safety by providing well-trained employees and well-designed equipment to do 
the job.  The second layer of defenses is the “Supervision” layer.  This refers to the first-line 
supervisor and his or her safety-consciousness as displayed by the operational decisions he or 
she makes.   
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Figure 7. An Accident in the Making 
(after Reason, 1990, as adapted by Wiegmann & Shappell, 1999) 
For example, a good supervisor will ensure that personnel receive the proper training and 
mentoring, that work crews have the necessary skills and work well together, and that safety-
related procedures are used routinely.  The actions and “fitness for duty” of the worker make up 
the third layer of system defenses.  In a safe system, the operator is physically and mentally 
ready to perform and routinely adheres to safe operating practices and procedures.   
                                                                                                                                                          
environments and systems in order to make them compatible with the needs, abilities and limitations of 
people.”  It is crucial to understand that in a human factors incident investigation we are not looking to 
identify a person “at fault”; instead, we are looking primarily for weaknesses in the links between the 
human workers and other parts of the system, such as management policies, equipment design, and 
work environment.   
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These system defenses can slowly erode over time in response to economic pressures, 
increasing demand for products and services, diminishing attention to promoting a safety 
culture, and others.  Each time safety is sacrificed (e.g., by cutting back on preventive 
maintenance or by taking unsafe “shortcuts” in operational tasks), it puts another hole into that 
slice of cheese.  If synergistic reductions in safety occur at all three levels of the system (that is, 
when the “holes” in the Swiss cheese line up), then the system no longer has any inherent 
protections, and it becomes an accident waiting to happen.  All it takes is one mistake (unsafe 
act).   
Here’s an example of how chipping away at system defenses can result in a casualty.  Let’s say 
as a cost-cutting measure, a company decides to decrease the inventory of spare parts on its 
ships (hole in the Organizational Factors slice).  One day the ship develops engine problems 
from clogged fuel injectors and doesn’t have sufficient spare parts (this would be analogous to 
an equipment “precondition”).  The captain, knowing that the company would penalize him if he 
spent money to be towed into port (hole in Supervision, since the captain reports to the 
company),  decides to take a risk and transit on only one engine (Unsafe Act).  That engine 
fails, and the vessel drifts and grounds.   
3.4 Improving Safety through Incident Investigation and Analysis 
Maritime and offshore operations are inherently risky.  Company managers have to weigh often-
competing interests in safety, productivity, profitability, and customer expectations in order to be 
viable.  Sometimes, well-meaning decisions back-fire and cause unanticipated safety problems.  
One way management can keep its finger on the safety pulse of the company is through 
incident investigation and analysis.  As Fig. 8 shows, by thoroughly investigating incidents and 
the human errors that cause them, one can identify the holes in the system defenses and 
develop workable solutions.   
An incident investigation program consists of five components (Fig. 8).  First, the company must 
support the investigation of incidents.  This requires objective investigators with at least a 
minimal amount of training in investigation techniques and a firm understanding of the purpose 
of the investigation and the types of data which must be collected to support the company’s 
objectives.  Second, the company must develop and maintain an incident database.  As 
mentioned earlier, such a database should be computerized for easier analysis.  The database 
must be composed of a set of taxonomies (classification schemes) which will capture the 
incident elements of interest to the company.  The database should also incorporate narrative 
fields so that investigators can explain events and causes in more detail.  Third, the company 
must then support regular analysis of the incidents in the database.  As will be discussed in 
more detail later, analysis allows the company to find patterns common to a group of incidents, 
and allows the determination of how frequently different types of incidents occur and, in the 
case of near-misses, the potential severity of the accident that was avoided.  Such data are very 
helpful in targeting the types of safety problems that the company will want to spend time and 
money to solve.   
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Figure 8. How An Effective Human Factors Incident Investigation Program 
Can Improve Safety 
(Modified from Wiegmann and Shappell, 1999) 
 
The fourth component of a successful incident investigation program is data-driven research.  
Incident investigation will frequently just “skim the surface” of a safety problem.  The value of 
incident investigation and analysis is that it identifies areas of concern.  In most cases, incident 
investigation and analysis will not be sufficient to “solve” the problem.  Solving the problem will 
require getting more information on the policies, standard operating procedures, common work 
practices, equipment and job design, and employee attributes (like training, preparedness, 
physical and mental condition) linked to the activities or situations in which the incidents have 
occurred.  The “research” might take the form of a risk assessment, or it may require the 
collection of additional, detailed information in subsequent investigations of related incidents, or 
perhaps a comparison of current company policies and practices with those employed by other 
companies (“benchmarking”).  Through research, the company gains a more complete 
understanding of all the various contributing factors which drive the incidents of interest.  The 
research might then extend to a comparison of the effectiveness of different prevention 
methods. 
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Finally, the result of the research step is an addition to or a revision of the company’s safety 
program.  Using the concept of “barrier analysis” (Hollnagel, 2000), the company wants to 
understand how safety failures arise and implement “barriers” (such as equipment “shields” to 
protect workers from exposure to potential harm, or procedures which prevent activities known 
to be hazardous) to prevent incidents.  Successful prevention can eliminate certain hazards.  
Other incident causes may not be easily prevented, but there may be ways to mitigate (reduce) 
their consequences.  When a safety program acts on the incident data which contains 
underlying causes, it will be effective. 
3.5 Error Recovery 
Error recovery is an important supplementary safety goal, and will be mentioned briefly here.  
Many offshore companies have a “zero accidents” policy which, while the ultimate safety goal, 
may be difficult to fully attain (Kontogiannis, 1999).  In some industries, systems are being 
developed which focus on preventing the consequences of human error by providing 
opportunities for error recovery (Helmreich, et al., 2000; Sasou & Reason, 1999).   
A framework developed by Kontogiannis (1999) categorizes error recovery according to the 
process used, the outcome, and the stage of performance.  The process is usually either 
detection, explanation, or correction.  For example, if you are using a word processor and 
misspell a word, one option for the spell check function is to merely detect the misspelled word 
and allow the user to decide what, if anything, to do about it.  A different option has the spell 
checker both detect and explain or suggest options for correcting the word.  Some word 
processors are even capable of correction, by automatically detecting and correcting 
misspellings as you type.  Similar detection, explanation, and correction features can be built 
into offshore and maritime systems, either through automation or through procedures. 
Outcomes of the recovery process refer to the state of the system after recovery.  For example, 
an error-detecting system might block the error from happening and return the system to its 
original state prior to the error (this is called backward recovery).  The stage of performance 
relates to the stage in which the error detection was made.  For example, the outcome stage 
would be where an error is detected based on a mismatch between the expected outcomes of a 
process and the outcomes actually observed.  For instance, if there is a low pressure reading 
and the operator erroneously turns the valve in the wrong direction, the outcome will be an even 
lower pressure.  An error detector in the outcome stage would note the discrepancy between 
the present pressure reading and the higher pressure that was intended, and signal the error.   
A simplified version of this framework is being used in a U.K. oil industry research project 
developing a human factors investigation tool (HFIT – see App. C; Gordon, Flin & Mearns, 
2001).  Investigators are asked three questions regarding the possible recovery process of the 
error:  was the error detected (realized or suspected), was it understood why the error occurred, 
and was it corrected (e.g., by modifying an existing plan or developing a new plan)?  How the 
error was detected (e.g., via system feedback, external communications, etc.) is also discussed.  
By including these types of questions into an incident investigation, it may illuminate changes to 
equipment or procedures which may act to prevent such errors in the future.   
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4.0 AN EXAMPLE OF A HUMAN FACTORS TAXONOMY:  HFACS7 
An effective incident database has at its heart a set of classification schemes or taxonomies:  
schemes to classify the type of incident, the type of people involved in the incident, the type of 
platform or vessel involved, the geographical area and weather conditions, the type of 
equipment that failed, the activities occurring at the time of the incident, and of course, the 
human factors causes.  A maritime example with all these components and more is the 
International Maritime Incident Safety System (IMISS; Rothblum, Chaderjian, & Mercier, 2000; 
see App. B).  It is important to understand all of the different types of factors (equipment, 
human, weather, etc.) involved in an incident.  Since the offshore and maritime industries 
already have adequate ways of identifying equipment and other non-human contributions to 
incidents, this section will focus only on the identification and classification of human factors 
causes.   
There are many, many human factors taxonomies that are in use by NASA, the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, the Transportation Safety Board of Canada, the U.K. Marine Accident 
Investigation Branch, and others.  Some of these are listed in Appendix C; they are all useful 
taxonomies.  These taxonomies vary with respect to how they chose to group human factors 
elements, the level of detail they provide, and the level of expertise required on the part of the 
investigator.   
In order to provide an example of a human factors taxonomy and to show how it would be used 
during an investigation, we selected the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System 
(HFACS; Shappell & Wiegmann, 1997a, 2000; Wiegmann & Shappell, 1999) because it is 
relatively easy to learn and use, and because its effectiveness has been demonstrated through 
its use by the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps for aviation accident investigation and analysis.  
This classification scheme, as well as several of the others mentioned, is based on the well-
established human error frameworks of the SHEL model  (Software-Hardware-Environment-
Liveware; Edwards (1972) and Hawkins (1984, 1987) as cited in TSB, 1998), Rasmussen’s 
taxonomy of errors (1987, as cited in TSB, 1998), and Reason’s (1990) “Swiss cheese” model 
of accident causation.   
HFACS seeks to understand all the human-related contributing causes to an incident by 
considering the “holes” in the four layers of system defenses:  unsafe acts, preconditions for 
unsafe acts (unsafe conditions), unsafe supervision, and organizational factors (see Fig. 9).  
The discussion below summarizes some of the types of latent conditions and active failures 
associated with these layers of system defenses.  For more information, please see Shappell & 
Wiegmann (1997a, 2000) or Wiegmann & Shappell (1999). 
                                                
7 The majority of this section has been taken from Shappell & Wiegmann (2000).  For additional 
information about HFACS, or to take a seminar on HFACS, please contact either Dr. Scott Shappell at 
scott_shappell@mmacmail.jccbi.gov and (405) 954-4082, or Dr. Doug Wiegmann at 
dwiegman@uiuc.edu and (217) 244-8637.   
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Figure 9. The Human Factors Classification and Analysis System (HFACS) 
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4.1 HFACS:  Unsafe Acts 
In an incident investigation, the investigator starts with the immediate actions and events 
surrounding the incident and then works backwards to uncover contributing causes.  In terms of 
human errors, those immediately linked to the incident are typically “unsafe acts”.  There are 
two types of unsafe acts:  errors and violations.   
Errors represent the mental and physical activities of individuals that fail to achieve their 
intended outcome; that is, the result of the person’s action was not as expected.  For example, if 
the captain orders “right 20 degrees” when he meant to order “left 20 degrees”, that would be an 
error.  A violation, on the other hand, is when the person’s action reflects a willful disregard for 
standard operating procedures or regulations (even though they probably did not intend to 
cause an incident).  For example, an engineer doing maintenance might decide to “cut corners” 
and not perform a maintenance procedure the way it should be done.  His performance is an 
intentional violation of the correct procedure.  Errors and violations can be further subdivided, as 
shown in Figure 10.  Errors can be decision errors, skill-based errors, or perceptual errors.  
Violations can be routine or exceptional. 
4.1.1 Decision Errors   
The decision error represents an activity or behavior that proceeds as intended, yet the plan 
proves inadequate or inappropriate for the situation.  Often referred to as “honest mistakes,” 
these unsafe acts represent the actions or inactions of individuals whose “hearts are in the right 
place,” but they either did not have the appropriate knowledge or just simply made a poor 
choice.  These types of knowledge-based and rule-based errors have been referred to in 
Reason’s taxonomy as “mistakes” (TSB, 1998). 
Decision errors can result from multiple causes.  For example, a wrong decision can be made if 
the person does not fully understand the situation at hand, misdiagnoses the problem, and 
proceeds to apply the wrong “solution” (because he’s solving the wrong problem).  
Troubleshooting an electrical fault could lead to this type of procedural decision error.  Decision 
errors can also occur if the person does not have sufficient experience to guide his decision, or 
if there is not enough time to fully work through the problem properly before a choice must be 
made (called a choice decision error).  Problem-solving errors can occur when the problem is a 
novel one, requiring the person to reason through it. 
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(modified from Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000, and TSB, 1998) 
 
4.1.2 Skill-based Errors   
Skill-based errors can occur in the execution of skills or procedures that have become so well-
learned that they are performed almost automatically.  Routine maintenance tasks, taking 
navigational bearings, monitoring equipment displays, and other repetitive operations would be 
considered skill-based tasks.  These types of tasks are sometimes performed improperly due to 
a failure of attention or memory.  Consider the hapless soul who locks himself out of the car or 
misses his exit because he was either distracted, in a hurry, or daydreaming.  These are both 
examples of attention failures that commonly occur during highly automatized behavior.  Types 
of attention failures include omitting a step in a procedure, reversing the order of two steps, or 
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doing the right thing at the wrong time.  Attentional deficits can also result in failing to detect a 
problem while monitoring equipment.   
In contrast to attention failures, memory failures often appear as omitted items in a checklist, 
place losing, or forgotten intentions.  Failures in memory can result in forgetting to do a planned 
activity or losing one’s place in a series of tasks.  For example, most of us have experienced 
going to the refrigerator only to forget what we went for.  Likewise, it is not difficult to imagine 
that when under stress during an operational emergency, critical steps in the emergency 
procedures can be missed.  Even when not particularly stressed, individuals can forget to 
complete certain steps within a procedure.   
If one of these types of errors is found during an incident investigation, it is a signal to look 
deeper.  Merely telling an operator to “pay better attention next time” will not solve the problem.  
These types of errors are symptoms of underlying system failures.  Take, for example, the fatal 
accident aboard the RIX HARRIER (MAIB, 1997).  On a July afternoon, the vessel was being 
moored to a jetty on the River Humber.  A mooring rope had been led around a fairlead, which 
was situated on top of the aft bulwark rail.  As the rope tightened, it sprang over the top of the 
fairlead, striking the officer on his right arm and throwing him against the accommodation 
bulkhead.  Neither the officer nor the crew member helping him noticed that the mooring rope 
had been passed inadvertently around the fairlead.  This was an error resulting from lack of 
attention.  The investigation determined that the design of the aft mooring arrangement 
increased the likelihood that such an error would be made.  The investigation also determined 
that, due to the ship’s work schedules, it was likely that the officer and crew member had 
endured days of fragmented sleep and were suffering from chronic fatigue, a state that 
increases the probability of attentional deficits.  So in this case, both a ship design flaw and a 
problem with the ship’s work schedules appeared to contribute to the attentional errors that 
caused the death of the officer.   
4.1.3 Perceptual Errors   
Not unexpectedly, when one’s perception of the world differs from reality, errors can, and often 
do, occur.  Typically, perceptual errors occur when sensory input is degraded, such as 
navigating at night.  Visual illusions, for example, occur when the brain tries to “fill in the gaps” 
and make sense out of sparse information.  In the earlier example of the CGC CUYAHOGA, the 
captain made a perceptual error in his interpretation of the configuration of the running lights on 
the SANTA CRUZ II.  Had he seen the vessel in daylight, there would have been many visual 
cues available to determine the type and heading of the vessel; but at night, with little visual 
information available, it is all too easy to misinterpret.   
Another common type of perceptual error occurs when trying to communicate in a noisy 
environment.  Static over the radio or noise from engines and generators can muffle or degrade 
spoken words and commands.  Again, the brain will attempt to “fill in” what wasn’t heard – often 
based on the listener’s expectations, be they correct or incorrect.  As an example, a ship was 
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transiting restricted waters when the Third Engineer noticed that the lube oil pressure was low.  
He shouted (across a noisy engine room) to a cadet to adjust the pressure.  The cadet 
misunderstood (perception error) and closed the valve, causing the engine to go to dead slow 
and creating a dangerous situation by greatly reducing the ship’s maneuverability in the high-
traffic waterway (McCallum, Raby, Rothblum, Forsythe, Slavich, & Smith, 2000, unpublished).     
4.1.4 Routine Violations   
As discussed above, errors occur when someone is trying to follow the rules and do the right 
thing, but gets an unexpected result.  By contrast, a violation is when someone intentionally 
ignores or “bends” a rule.  Routine violations tend to be habitual by nature and are often 
tolerated by supervision (in the case of not following a standard operating procedure) or by the 
governing authority (in the case of not following a regulation) (Reason, 1990).  Consider, for 
example, the individual who routinely drives 5-10 mph faster than the posted speed limit (a 
routine violation).  Since the police will rarely pull someone over for such a minor infraction, they 
are tolerating the violation and implicitly reinforcing the unsafe behavior.  If the police were to 
crack down on minor speeding, people would be less likely to violate the speed limit.  Therefore, 
if a routine violation is identified during an incident investigation, the investigator must look 
further up the supervisory chain to identify those individuals in authority who are not enforcing 
the rules.   
4.1.5 Exceptional Violations   
Unlike routine violations, exceptional violations appear as isolated departures from authority, not 
necessarily indicative of the individual’s typical behavior pattern nor condoned by management 
(Reason, 1990).  For example, an isolated instance of driving 105 mph in a 55 mph zone is 
considered an exceptional violation.  Note that the violation is not considered “exceptional” 
because of its extreme nature.  Rather, it is considered exceptional because it is neither typical 
of the individual nor condoned by authority.  The fact that such behavior is not typical of the 
individual makes it difficult to predict and deal with exceptional violations. 
4.2 HFACS:  Preconditions for Unsafe Acts 
Although unsafe acts can be linked to the vast majority of incidents, simply focusing on unsafe 
acts is like focusing on a fever without understanding the underlying disease causing it.  Thus, 
investigators must dig deeper into why the unsafe acts took place.  As a first step, it is useful to 
consider any preconditions for unsafe acts.  There are two major subdivisions of unsafe 
conditions (preconditions):  substandard conditions of the operators and the substandard 
practices they commit (Fig. 11).  Substandard conditions are broken down into Adverse Mental 
States, Adverse Physiological States, and Physical/Mental Limitations.  Types of Substandard 
Practices include Crew Resource Mismanagement and Personal Readiness.  Each of these 
subcategories is discussed below.  
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Figure 11. Classification of Preconditions for Unsafe Acts 
(modified from Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000, and TSB, 1998) 
 
4.2.1 Adverse Mental States (Substandard Conditions of Operators)   
Being prepared mentally is critical in nearly every endeavor.  As such, the category of Adverse 
Mental States was created to account for those mental conditions that affect performance.  Key 
examples in the maritime and off-shore industries are loss of situational awareness, 
overconfidence, and complacency.  Predictably, if an individual loses situational awareness, the 
likelihood increases that an error will occur.  In a similar fashion, pernicious attitudes such as 
overconfidence and complacency increase the likelihood that a violation will be committed.  
Clearly then, any framework of human error must account for pre-existing adverse mental states 
in the causal chain of events. 
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4.2.2 Adverse Physiological States (Substandard Conditions of Operators)   
This category refers to those medical or physiological conditions that preclude safe operations.  
For example, illness can have a negative impact on our performance.  Nearly all of us have 
gone to work ill, dosed with over-the-counter medications, and have generally performed 
sufficiently well.  However, the side-effects of antihistamines, and the fatigue and sleep loss that 
often accompany an illness can be detrimental to decision-making.  For example, over-the-
counter antihistamines decrease vigilance, performance on divided attention tasks, and short-
term memory, resulting in a 14% loss of productivity and an increase in errors (Kay, 2000).  
Sleep loss, even in healthy individuals, increases the risk of accidents.  Every April when the 
U.S. “springs ahead” to daylight savings time, there is a significant increase in automobile 
accidents:  and this is from a mere one hour decrease in sleep time (Coren, 1998; Monk, 1980).  
Therefore, it is incumbent upon any safety professional to account for these sometimes subtle 
medical and physiological conditions within the causal chain of events. 
4.2.3 Physical/Mental Limitations (Substandard Conditions of Operators)   
The final substandard condition involves individual physical and mental limitations.  Specifically, 
this category refers to those instances when task or situational requirements exceed the 
capabilities of the operator.  For example, the human visual system is severely limited at night.  
Yet, most people do not take this into account when driving a car at night, and do not slow down 
or take other precautions.  Similarly, there are occasions when the time required to complete a 
task exceeds an individual’s capacity.  Individuals vary widely in their abilities to process and 
respond to information.  It is well documented that if individuals are required to respond quickly 
(i.e., less time is available to consider all the options thoroughly), the probability of making an 
error goes up markedly.  Consequently, it should be no surprise that when faced with the need 
for rapid processing and reaction times, as is the case in emergencies, all forms of errors would 
be exacerbated.   
In addition to the basic sensory and information processing limitations described above, there 
are at least two additional instances of physical and mental limitations that need to be 
addressed, albeit they are often overlooked by most safety professionals.  These limitations 
involve individuals who simply are not compatible with a given job, because they are either 
unsuited physically or they do not possess the aptitude to do it.  For example, some individuals 
simply do not have the physical strength required to operate manual valves or haul heavy 
equipment.  Likewise, not everyone has the mental ability or aptitude for every job.  The difficult 
task for the safety professional is identifying whether physical or mental aptitude might have 
contributed to the incident causal sequence. 
Clearly then, numerous substandard conditions of operators can, and do, lead to the 
commission of unsafe acts.  Nevertheless, there are a number of things that we do to ourselves 
that set up these substandard conditions.  Generally speaking, the substandard practices of 
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operators can be summed up in two categories:  crew resource mismanagement and personal 
readiness. 
4.2.4 Crew Resource Mismanagement (Substandard Practices of Operators)   
Operations in the off-shore and maritime industries depend on good communications and 
teamwork.  Communication and coordination is essential, not just between workers on a given 
task, but between teams working on complementary or coordinated tasks.  On a ship, 
communications may be important between members of the same department (e.g., two 
engineers repairing a piece of equipment, or passing information during a watch relief), between 
departments (the deck officer may need to notify engineering of an upcoming maneuver), 
between ships (for meeting and passing arrangements), and between the ship and other groups 
or authorities such as Vessel Traffic Service, bridge tenders, dock workers, and the vessel 
agent.  The need for communication and coordination is often overlooked, leading to incidents.  
One study of maritime casualties found that a lack of communication contributed to 18% of 
vessel casualties and 28% of personnel injuries (McCallum, Raby, Rothblum, Forsythe, Slavich, 
& Smith, 2000).   
Here’s an example of how such crew resource mismanagement can result in a serious incident.  
A barge was moored to a quarry loading facility by a pull cable that was controlled from the 
facility.  The deckhand on the barge noticed that the pull cable was caught under a deck fitting, 
and walked over to free it.  Before he reached it, a dock worker started the winch to take the 
slack out of the mooring line.  As the cable tightened, it snapped off the fitting and struck the 
deckhand with such force that he required surgery.  In this case, both the deckhand and the 
dock worker should have – but didn’t – alert the other to their plans:  an obvious failure of crew 
coordination.  A serious injury was the unhappy consequence of this lack of crew resource 
management (Rothblum, 2000). 
4.2.5 Personal Readiness (Substandard Practices of Operators)   
In every occupation, people are expected to show up for work ready to perform at optimal 
levels.  Nevertheless, personal readiness failures occur when individuals fail to prepare 
physically, mentally, or physiologically for duty.  For instance, violations of work-rest rules, use 
of intoxicants and certain medications, and participating in exhausting domestic or recreational 
activities prior to reporting for duty can impair performance on the job and can be preconditions 
for unsafe acts.  While some of these maladaptive behaviors may be addressed by rules and 
regulations, most are left up to the judgement of the individual.  It is necessary for the individual 
to understand that some “off-time” activities can be detrimental to subsequent job performance.  
The incident investigator needs to probe for personal readiness and activities that may have 
degraded it. 
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4.3 HFACS:  Unsafe Supervision 
In addition to investigating those causal factors associated directly with the operator, it is 
necessary to trace the possible causal chain of events up the supervisory chain of command 
(Reason, 1990).  It has been estimated that 80% of offshore platform accidents have their 
predominant roots in supervisory and organizational factors (Bea, Holdsworth, & Smith, 1997).  
There are four categories of unsafe supervision:  inadequate supervision, planned inappropriate 
operations, failure to correct a known problem, and supervisory violations (Fig. 12).  Each is 
described briefly below. 
4.3.1 Inadequate Supervision   
The role of any supervisor is to provide the opportunity to succeed.  To do this, the supervisor, 
no matter at what level of operations, must provide guidance, training opportunities, leadership, 
and motivation, as well as the proper role model to be emulated.  Unfortunately, this is not 
always the case.  For example, it is not difficult to conceive of a situation where adequate crew 
resource management training was either not provided, or the opportunity to attend such 
training was not afforded to a particular crew member.  Conceivably, coordinated teamwork 
would be compromised, and if an emergency situation arose, the risk of an error being 
committed would be exacerbated and the potential for an incident would increase markedly.   
In a similar vein, sound professional guidance and oversight is an essential ingredient of any 
successful organization.  While empowering individuals to make decisions and function 
independently is certainly essential, this does not divorce the supervisor from accountability.  
The lack of guidance and oversight has proven to be the breeding ground for many of the 
violations that have crept into the cockpit.  As such, any thorough investigation of incident 
causal factors must consider the role supervision plays (i.e., whether the supervision was 
inappropriate or did not occur at all) in the genesis of human error. 
4.3.2 Planned Inappropriate Operations   
Occasionally, the operational tempo and/or the scheduling of personnel is such that individuals 
are put at unacceptable risk, crew rest is jeopardized, and ultimately performance is adversely 
affected.  Such operations, though arguably unavoidable during emergencies, are unacceptable 
during normal operations.  Therefore, the second category of unsafe supervision, planned 
inappropriate operations, was created to account for these failures. 
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Figure 12. Categories of Unsafe Supervision. 
(modified from Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000) 
 
Take, for example, the issue of improper team complements.  In aviation it is well known that 
when very senior, dictatorial captains are paired with very junior, weak co-pilots, communication 
and coordination problems are likely to occur.  This type of personality mismatch is apt to 
happen in any team environment, and can (and do) contribute to tragic accidents (such as the 
crash of a commercial airliner into the Potomac River shortly after takeoff in 1982).  When team 
member selection is not taken into account, gross perceived differences in authority and 
experience can cause more junior team members to be ignored, effectively eliminating an 
important input to the team as a whole.   
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4.3.3 Failure to Correct a Known Problem   
The third category of known unsafe supervision, Failed to Correct a Known Problem, refers to 
those instances when deficiencies among individuals, equipment, training or other related safety 
areas are “known” to the supervisor, yet are allowed to continue unabated.  For example, a 
given worker might have a reputation for risky behavior or cutting safety margins too closely.  If 
the supervisor knows this and allows the behavior to continue, an incident may be the 
unsurprising consequence.  The failure to correct the behavior, either through remedial training 
or, if necessary, removal from the job, can put the entire operation at risk.  Likewise, the failure 
to consistently correct or discipline inappropriate behavior fosters an unsafe atmosphere and 
promotes the violation of rules.   
4.3.4 Supervisory Violations   
Supervisory violations, on the other hand, are reserved for those instances when existing rules 
and regulations are willfully disregarded by supervisors.  Although relatively rare, supervisors 
have been known occasionally to violate the rules and doctrine when managing their assets.  
For instance, sometimes individuals are assigned to do a task for which they are unqualified, 
either through the lack of sufficient training, or even lacking the appropriate license.  The failure 
to enforce existing rules and regulations or flaunting authority are also violations at the 
supervisory level.  While rare and possibly difficult to identify, such practices are a flagrant 
violation of the rules and invariably set the stage for the tragic sequence of events that 
predictably follow. 
4.4 HFACS:  Organizational Influences 
As noted previously, fallible decisions of upper-level management directly affect supervisory 
practices, as well as the conditions and actions of operators.  Unfortunately, these 
organizational errors often go unnoticed by safety professionals, due in large part to the lack of 
a clear framework from which to investigate them.  Generally speaking, the most elusive of 
latent failures revolve around issues related to resource management, organizational climate, 
and operational processes, as detailed in Figure 13. 
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Figure 13. Organizational Factors Which Contribute to Incidents 
(modified from Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000) 
 
4.4.1 Resource Management   
This category encompasses the realm of corporate-level decision making regarding the 
allocation and maintenance of organizational assets such as human resources (personnel), 
monetary assets, and equipment and facilities.  Generally, corporate decisions about how such 
resources should be managed center around two distinct objectives – the goal of safety and the 
goal of on-time, cost-effective operation.  In times of prosperity, both objectives can be easily 
balanced and satisfied in full.  However, there may also be times of fiscal austerity that demand 
some give and take between the two.  Unfortunately, accident reports show us time and again 
that safety is often the loser in such battles and, as some can attest to very well, safety and 
training are often the first to be cut in organizations having financial difficulties.  If cutbacks in 
such areas are too severe, worker proficiency may suffer, leading to errors and incidents.   
Working Group 1 - HFW2002 Page 38 of 141 Houston, Texas 
Human Factors in Incident Investigation and Analysis 
Excessive cost-cutting could also result in reduced funding for new equipment or may lead to 
the purchase of equipment that is sub-optimal and inadequately designed for the task.  Other 
trickle-down effects include poorly maintained equipment and workspaces, and the failure to 
correct known design flaws in existing equipment.  The result is a scenario involving 
unseasoned, less-skilled workers using poorly maintained equipment under less than desirable 
conditions and schedules.  The ramifications for safety are not hard to imagine. 
4.4.2 Organizational Climate   
Climate refers to a broad class of organizational variables that influence worker performance.  
In general, organizational climate can be viewed as the working atmosphere within the 
organization.  One telltale sign of an organization’s climate is its structure, as reflected in the 
chain-of-command, delegation of authority and responsibility, communication channels, and 
formal accountability for actions.  Just like in the operational arena, communication and 
coordination are vital within an organization.  If management and staff within an organization are 
not communicating, or if no one knows who is in charge, organizational safety clearly suffers 
and incidents do happen (Muchinsky, 1997).   
An organization’s policies and culture are also good indicators of its climate.  Policies are official 
guidelines that direct management’s decisions about such things as hiring and firing, promotion, 
retention, raises, sick leave, drugs and alcohol, overtime, incident investigations, and the use of 
safety equipment.  Culture, on the other hand, refers to the unofficial or unspoken rules, values, 
attitudes, beliefs, and customs of an organization.  Culture is “the way things really get done 
around here.”   
When policies are ill-defined, adversarial, or conflicting, or when they are supplanted by 
unofficial rules and values, confusion abounds within the organization.  Indeed, there are some 
corporate managers who are quick to give “lip service” to official safety policies while in a public 
forum, but then overlook such policies when operating behind the scenes.  Safety is bound to 
suffer under such conditions.   
4.4.3 Organizational Process   
This category refers to corporate decisions and rules that govern the everyday activities within 
an organization, including the establishment and use of standardized operating procedures and 
formal methods for maintaining checks and balances (oversight) between the workforce and 
management.  For example, such factors as operational tempo, time pressures, incentive 
systems, and work schedules are all factors that can adversely affect safety (Fig. 13).  There 
may be instances when those within the upper echelon of an organization determine that it is 
necessary to increase the operational tempo to a point that overextends a supervisor’s staffing 
capabilities.  Therefore, a supervisor may resort to the use of inadequate scheduling procedures 
that jeopardize crew rest and produce sub-optimal crew complements, putting the operation and 
its workers at an increased risk of a mishap.  Organizations should have official procedures in 
place to address such contingencies as well as oversight programs to monitor such risks. 
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Regrettably, not all organizations have these procedures nor do they engage in an active 
process of monitoring operator errors and human factors problems via anonymous reporting 
systems and safety audits.  As such, supervisors and managers are often unaware of the 
problems before an incident occurs.  It is incumbent upon any organization to fervently seek out 
the “holes in the cheese” and plug them up, before they create a window of opportunity for 
catastrophe to strike.   
4.5 The Benefits of Using HFACS 
The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) framework bridges the gap 
between theory and practice by providing investigators with a comprehensive, user-friendly tool 
for identifying and classifying the human causes of incidents.  The system, which is based upon 
Reason’s (1990) model of latent and active failures (Shappell & Wiegmann, 1997a), 
encompasses all aspects of human error, including the conditions of operators and 
organizational failure.  Still, HFACS and any other framework only contribute to an already 
burgeoning list of human error taxonomies (see, for example, Appendix C) if it does not prove 
useful in the operational setting.  In this regard, HACS has recently been employed by the U.S. 
Navy, Marine Corps, Army, Air Force, and Coast Guard for use in aviation accident investigation 
and analysis.  To date, HFACS has been applied to the analysis of human factors data from 
approximately 1,000 military aviation accidents.  Throughout this process, the reliability and 
content validity of HFACS has been repeatedly tested and demonstrated (Shappell & 
Wiegmann, 1997b).  HFACS has also been implemented by other types of organizations; an 
example of its use by the Marine Facilities Division of the California State Lands Commission in 
the investigation of incidents at marine terminals is provided in Section 8 and Appendix E.   
Given that accident/incident databases can be reliably analyzed using HFACS, the next logical 
question is whether anything unique will be identified.  Early indications within the military 
suggest that the HFACS framework has been instrumental in the identification and analysis of 
global human factors safety issues, such as trends in operator proficiency, causes of specific 
accident types, and problems such as failures of crew resource management (Shappell & 
Wiegmann, 2000).  Consequently, the systematic application of HFACS to the analysis of 
human factors accident data has afforded the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps (for which the 
original classification system was developed) the ability to develop objective, data-driven 
intervention strategies.  
Additionally, the HFACS framework and the insights gleaned from database analyses have 
been used to develop innovative incident investigation methods that have enhanced both the 
quantity and quality of the human factors information gathered during incident investigations.  
However, not only are safety professionals better suited to examine human error in the field, but 
using HFACS, they can now track those areas (the “holes in the cheese”) responsible for the 
incidents as well.  Only now is it possible to track the success or failure of specific intervention 
programs designed to reduce specific types of human error and subsequent incidents.  In so 
doing, research investments and safety programs can be either readjusted or reinforced to meet 
the changing needs of safety.   
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5.0 PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER:  INVESTIGATING AN INCIDENT FOR HUMAN FACTORS 
CAUSES 
5.1 Introduction 
As stated earlier, in an incident investigation, the investigator starts with the immediate actions 
and events surrounding the incident and then works backwards to uncover contributing causes.  
Who, where, when, what, and how are all useful questions to get information relevant to the 
incident; but asking why is what will help the investigator “drill down” into the contributing, latent 
conditions that need to be identified and resolved in order to avoid similar incidents in the future.  
Remember from our introductory discussion that it’s not just the people you want to concentrate 
on, but also the ways in which technology, environment, and organizational factors influenced 
human performance.    
5.2 Incident Investigation:  Going Beyond the Obvious 
If we are to learn from an incident, it is very important to go beyond the “obvious” cause and 
ferret out the underlying, contributing causes.  Here’s an example.  During the early hours of a 
November morning, the DOLE AMERICA, a Liberian-registered refrigerated cargo vessel, 
collided with the Nab Tower, a conspicuously-lit, man-made construction in the eastern 
approaches to The Solent off the Isle of Wight (MAIB, 1999).  The ship had left her berth in 
Portsmouth and was proceeding seaward with the Norwegian captain, a Filipino officer, and a 
helmsman on the bridge.  The captain was in charge, and he set a course to pass to the east of 
the tower.  Suddenly, he saw on the starboard bow what he thought was the red portside light of 
a vessel at close range, crossing from starboard to port and presenting an imminent risk of 
collision.  The captain ordered starboard helm before going to the front of the bridge to confirm 
what he thought he had seen.  He then called the officer to join him, and the officer confirmed 
the presence of a red light and reported a second red light to starboard of the first.  The captain 
then ordered hard to starboard helm.  When no further lights were seen ahead, the captain 
ordered hard to port helm, still with the intention of passing to the east of the Nab Tower.  The 
ship struck the tower shortly afterwards.   
The immediate cause of the collision was the master’s inappropriate and unquestioned helm 
order to port (unsafe act – decision error).  However, the following contributing factors were 
important to this casualty: 
• From his position at the front of the bridge, the captain was unaware of the ship’s 
heading and her exact position in relation to the tower (precondition for unsafe act – 
substandard practice – crew resource mismanagement). 
• No discussions took place between the captain and the officer concerning the ship’s 
progress (precondition for unsafe act – substandard practice – crew resource 
mismanagement). 
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• The captain and the officer failed to work as an effective team, probably due, in part, 
to their differing nationality and social backgrounds, and to an autocratic 
management style (precondition for unsafe act – substandard practice – crew 
resource mismanagement and organizational factor – organizational climate). 
• With no dedicated lookout to refer to, the captain called the officer to join him at the 
front of the bridge, thereby removing his only source of navigational information 
(unsafe act – decision error). 
• The ship’s manager provided no specific instructions to its officers regarding 
voluntarily offering relevant information to the captain (organizational factor – 
organizational climate).   
While the immediate cause was the captain’s poor decision making due to inadequate 
information, future avoidance of this type of incident depends on correcting the underlying 
unsafe conditions and organizational factors.  Changing the autocratic management style that 
was in place in this company to one of crew resource management, and training the bridge 
team to operate more effectively by empowering the officer to actively contribute to navigational 
decisions (particularly relevant to a multi-national crew) are keys to preventing such a casualty.  
Had the investigation stopped with the “obvious” cause, the true precursors to this incident 
would have remained hidden, and remedial actions based only on the immediate cause would 
have been ineffective.   
5.3 A Tool for Investigation:  Events and Causal Factors Charting 
Before one can begin identifying the human error causes of an incident, one needs a way to 
represent how an incident happened.  There are a number of tools that can be used to get 
varying levels of detail surrounding the events of an incident and what might have contributed to 
it.  Some of these include timeline analysis, link analysis, barrier analysis, work safety analysis, 
human error HAZOP, and human error analysis.  Most of these can be used either during a 
safety audit (to understand the work conditions and identify risks before an incident occurs) or 
during an incident investigation.  A good introduction to these methods may be found in Kirwan 
(1997).   
Another method that is more directly related to understanding the progression and causes of an 
incident is Events and Causal Factors Charting (Hill & Byers, 1992a).  This method was 
originally developed by the National Transportation Safety Board for the analysis of accident 
investigations.  It highlights the major events in the progression of an incident and also 
associates contributing causes to each event.  “Contributing causes” include not only active and 
latent human errors, but also equipment problems, weather, and anything else which may have 
influenced the events surrounding the incident.  Events and causal factor charting can be 
helpful in organizing and understanding the sequence of events and also in identifying holes or 
inconsistencies in the incident information collected.   
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To illustrate how Events and Causal Factors Charting can be used, let’s take a closer look at 
the TORREY CANYON incident that was introduced in Section 2 (Hill & Byers, 1992b).   
5.3.1 TORREY CANYON  Synopsis 
The Captain of the TORREY CANYON was experienced, careful, and a stickler for details.  The 
TORREY CANYON was traveling from Kuwait to Wales with a cargo of 100,000 tons of oil.  
They were heading for Angle Bay, British Petroleum’s (BP) deep-water terminal on the western 
tip of Wales.  The day before the TORREY CANYON was due to arrive at Angle Bay, the 
captain was contacted by BP’s agent, who told him of impending decreases in the tide at Milford 
Haven, at the entrance to Angle Bay.  He was told that if the TORREY CANYON did not catch 
high tide on the next evening, it would have to wait outside the harbor for most of a week for the 
next tide high enough to get the ship in.  Now, to have a ship of that size sitting idle for five days 
is very expensive, and the captain was determined to reach Milford Haven on time.  This didn’t 
seem to present any problem at the time; to be ready to catch the high tide the next evening the 
TORREY CANYON had to get to Milford Haven and it had to transfer cargo from the midship 
tanks to the fore and aft tanks to even out the ship’s draft.  At sea, the tanker drew 52 feet 4 
inches amidships, but that was too deep to make it into Angle Bay, so they had to shift cargo.  
The captain estimated the transfer would take about four hours and planned to make the 
transfer after they reached Milford Haven.  Still, there seemed to be plenty of time. 
The next morning, the captain asked to be called when the Scilly Islands were sighted.  The 
Scillies are made up of 48 tiny islands and contains a number of submerged large rocks and 
sandbars.  There were 257 shipwrecks there between 1679 and 1933.  The captain was 
intending to sight the Scillies to starboard, pass them to the west and then go into Milford 
Haven.  However, when the Scillies were sighted, and he was called, they were off the port bow.  
Rather than turn and go west around the islands, the captain decided he needed to save time 
and would pass between the Scilly Islands and Land’s End, the southwesternmost tip of 
England.  The passage between Land’s End and the Scillies is divided into two parts by an 
island and each of those parts have further obstructions within them.  The captain decided to 
take the western channel.  He did not have a copy of the Channel Pilot for the region and he 
was not particularly familiar with the area.  The TORREY CANYON was making full speed when 
it met some fishing boats in the channel, which delayed it making a turn.  After taking a bearing 
from the unfamiliar landmarks, the captain realized that he had overshot his turn and the 
channel.  When he ordered hard to port, and the helmsman turned the wheel, nothing 
happened.  The captain realized that the steering selector switch was set incorrectly on 
autopilot, reset it to manual, and the turn to port was begun.  The TORREY CANYON then ran 
into a granite reef so hard that it could not be pulled off.  The Royal Air Force eventually 
bombed the wreck in an effort to burn some of the oil before it washed up on the beaches. 
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During the official inquiry which followed, it was pointed out that the captain had plenty of time to 
get to Milford Haven if he had transferred his cargo while underway8.  The chairman of the 
board of inquiry reportedly stated after the hearing, “He [the captain] didn’t want to dirty his 
deck, to come into port looking sloppy” (Hill & Byers, 1992b).  Perrow (1984, p. 184) points out, 
that as most accidents do, this accident involves many “if only” statements:   
• If only the captain had not forgotten to put the helm on manual, they might have turned 
in time;  
• If only the fishing boats had not been out that day, he could have made his turn earlier;  
• If only he had prudently slowed down once he saw the fishing boats, he could have 
turned more sharply;  
• once deciding to risk going through the Scilly Islands he used a peculiar passage 
through them – if only he had used another passage, it might have been safer (even 
faster). 
We’ll never know precisely why the captain made the decisions he made. 
5.3.2 An Event and Causal Factors Chart of the TORREY CANYON  Incident 
To do an Event and Causal Factors Chart, we begin by determining the major events that 
occurred.  Working backwards from the accident, there are four major events: 
• The TORREY CANYON fails to make its turn in time and runs aground; 
• The captain takes the western channel between the Scilly Islands and Land’s End; 
• The TORREY CANYON goes east of the Scilly Islands; 
• The Scilly Islands are sighted to the NW (port) rather than to the NE (starboard). 
These four events would be placed in boxes (to denote that they are “events”) across the top of 
the page, as shown below in Figure 14.   
                                                
8 This accident occurred years before the Exxon Valdez and the environmental protection legislation that 
followed.  At the time of the TORREY CANYON incident, transferring oil while underway was standard 
operating procedure for many companies. 
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Figure 14. Events and Causal Factors Chart for TORREY CANYON 
Grounding 
(after Hill & Byers, 1992) 
 
Below each event box, we list the perceived causes of the event, depicted as ovals (solid ovals 
for established causes, and dotted ovals for assumed causes).  We “drill down” into the causes 
by asking why.  For example,  when we ask why the TORREY CANYON failed to make the turn 
in time (thereby running aground), we find four different issues:   
• The TORREY CANYON failed to begin its turn in time because there were fishing boats 
in the way; 
• The captain was unfamiliar with the waterway and landmarks, making him late to 
recognize the turning point and initiate the turn; 
• He failed to slow down and was going too fast to make the turn; 
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• The steering selector switch was in the wrong position (autopilot), and by the time it was 
corrected, it was too late to make the turn. 
While the Events and Causal Factors Charting often ends at this point, we want to take it a step 
further for the purpose of determining active and latent human factors causes.  To do this, it is 
helpful to remember the human-system approach discussed in Section 2 (refer to Fig. 2).  
Human errors result not only from errors made by a given person, but, more importantly, human 
errors usually result from suboptimal interactions between people and organizational, 
technological, or environmental factors.  As you drill down seeking contributing causes, keep 
asking yourself the following questions to help you identify human errors: 
• Did some aspect of the involved person contribute to the incident?  (consider 
knowledge, skills, experience, motivation, alertness, physical and mental states, use of 
medicines or drugs, personal problems, etc.) 
• Did some aspect of interpersonal interactions contribute to the incident?  (consider 
communication, definition of roles and responsibilities, experience working as a team, 
autocratic vs. empowered style, etc.) 
• Did some aspect of the interactions between the people and the organization contribute 
to the incident?  (consider training and qualification requirements, crew/team 
complement, work schedules, safety culture, supervision, policies regarding economic 
pressure, etc.) 
• Did some aspect of the interactions between the people and the technology contribute to 
the incident?  (consider equipment layout, whether equipment is designed to do the job, 
how information is provided from the equipment to the user, whether controls can be 
easily operated, whether displays are legible, whether the design obstructs proper 
maintenance, etc.) 
• Did some aspect of the interactions between the people and the environment contribute 
to the incident?  (consider the workplace environment in terms of lighting, noise, 
temperature, vibration, ship motion, fog, snow, etc.; also consider the regulatory and 
economic environment and their impact on job behavior) 
The human-system approach and HFACS are complementary ways of looking at human errors.  
In the human-system approach, we identify the locus of the error.  That is, we determine 
whether the error resulted because of a deficiency in a given person’s actions or decisions, or 
whether there was a poor interaction between multiple people or between people and 
technology, organization, or environment.  HFACS identifies the parts of the company’s 
organization that had the responsibility for preventing the error.  That is, with HFACS we 
determine whether the individual (Preconditions for an Unsafe Act), the line supervisor (Unsafe 
Supervision), and-or management (Organizational Influences) had the responsibility for 
preventing the error.  By identifying the level(s) of the organization that had the responsibility for 
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preventing an incident, we identify the part(s) of the organization where changes must be made 
to solve the human error problems. 
Now let us look again at the Events and Causal Factors Chart of the TORREY CANYON 
grounding and use the human-system approach and HFACS to identify the underlying human 
factors causes of the last event, “Runs aground.”  To do this, we would continue to ask why.  To 
ask why there were fishermen in the way doesn’t get us anywhere with this particular case9. 
Note that the presence of the fishermen is, in fact, an environmental factor that interacts with 
the captain; but since neither the captain nor the company have any control over the presence 
of fishermen, that aspect of the incident is ignored.  The captain did have control over his 
response to the presence of the fishing vessels, and that will be discussed in the third causal 
factor.   
“Drilling down” on the second causal factor, the fact that the captain was unfamiliar with the 
waterway, is more enlightening.  The captain was unfamiliar with the route, because it was not 
the route he had planned to take.  Furthermore, he did not have a copy of the Channel Pilot on 
board, and so could not avail himself of helpful information.  Why did he not have a copy of the 
Channel Pilot, when he had planned to take a nearby route?  While we don’t have the answer to 
this question, it might have involved an error in HFACS Organizational Influences – 
Organizational Process if the company had not established that ships carry information about all 
routes it would transit.  Or, perhaps the company had the policy, but the captain had failed to 
ensure that the document was onboard and available for use; this would be an example of 
Unsafe Supervision – Supervisory Violation.  As you can readily see, depending on who was 
responsible (the company or the captain), the type of corrective action needed would be vastly 
different. 
Asking why the captain failed to slow down when he saw the fishing vessels (which was 
determined by the board of inquiry to be the prudent action to have taken), the probable answer 
is that the captain felt pressured to make good time, and that pressure negatively influenced his 
judgement.  While there’s no question that the captain’s unsafe act (going too fast) was based 
on a decision error, we need to continue to ask why.  Why did the captain feel such a 
compulsion to make good time?  As pointed out in the incident synopsis, had the captain 
missed the evening high tide at Milford Haven, the TORREY CANYON may have had to sit idly 
waiting for several days before the next tide of sufficient depth to allow her to pass.  This 
spawns several issues for further investigation.  Given that the tidal depths at Milford Haven 
were known, why did the company elect to send a tanker that could only get through Milford 
Haven on certain days (i.e., did the company consider lightening the TORREY CANYON’s load 
or sending a different vessel(s) that had a draft more compatible with the tides at Milford 
                                                
9 Although this question is a good one in certain sections of the U.S. where fishing regulations limit fishing 
seasons to only a day or two, causing greatly congested waterways on those days.  Asking why in these 
cases may point out a flaw in the regulations, showing that these regulations need to consider not only 
conservation but waterway mobility, as well. 
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Haven? – potential HFACS Organizational Influences – Resource Management issue)?  If the 
TORREY CANYON had gotten into Milford Haven too late to make the high tide, how would that 
have affected the captain?  Did the company have a policy which would have penalized the 
captain for missing the tide, thus encouraging him to take risks (HFACS: Organizational 
Influences – Organizational Climate)?  Or, perhaps, was this a self-imposed pressure due to the 
captain’s pride at making schedule and resulting in his taking unnecessary risks (Unsafe 
Supervision – Supervisory Violation)?  There is an obvious tension between the pressure to 
make good time and safe navigation.  Depending on how it evolved (organizational policy or 
supervisory deficiency), the appropriate correction will vary. 
Finally, we have the causal factor of the steering selector switch being in the wrong position.  
When we ask why, we will find a procedural issue:  why was the ship on autopilot in a 
hazardous navigating environment?  The answer to this question could be a combination of 
factors such as:  it was put there inadvertently (HFACS: Unsafe Act – Skill-based Error); it was 
put there intentionally to allow the helmsman to do another task (Unsafe Act – Routine 
Violation); or perhaps it was left on autopilot too long, due to inadequate bridge team 
coordination (Precondition – Substandard Practices – Crew Resource Mismanagement).  Using 
the human-system approach, we might ask whether there was a suboptimal interaction between 
the people and the technology.  Specifically, why didn’t the helmsman know that the ship was 
on autopilot?  The answer is that there was no indication of the steering selector setting at the 
helm!  The steering selector control was located where it could not be seen when standing at 
the helm.  Whereas the locus of this error is the interaction between the user and the 
technology, note that the responsibility for the error is at an entirely different level.  On the one 
hand, this is a design error on the part of the equipment manufacturer; however, since the 
company most likely had no control over the manufacturer’s design, this is not a useful avenue 
to pursue.  But on the other hand, this might also be an error on the part of company 
management for selecting and purchasing unsuitable equipment and-or installing it in an 
unsuitable manner (HFACS: Organizational Influences – Resource Management).   
By charting first the primary events that led to the incident, and then by asking why until the 
(many) contributing causes are found, one can establish the reasons why an incident happened 
and trace the layers of responsibility from the individual(s) to the preconditions, to supervisory 
errors, and to unsafe organizational influences.  The combination of Events and Causal Factors 
Charting, the human-system approach, and the Human Factors Analysis and Classification 
System (HFACS) can be a powerful tool for ferreting out the true underlying causes of incidents 
and identifying parts of the system which need to be corrected in order to prevent recurrences of 
similar problems. 
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5.4 The Art of Incident Investigation 
Incident investigation is somewhat of an art.  It takes great skill to build a rapport with and 
interview people associated with the incident10.  It also takes a great deal of knowledge about 
the technical and human factors aspects of the incident to ask the right questions and identify 
the important issues (this is the reason for having investigation teams – no one person is likely 
to have all the requisite skills and knowledge).  Likewise, there is no one method or “best” set of 
questions to ask that will work for all investigations (Appendix H gives a sample of human 
factors questions that could be asked).  It takes experience to spot potential issues and to know 
what avenues of questioning will be most fruitful in a particular incident.  It takes experience and 
skill to hunt for underlying causes and to fit the pieces of the puzzle together.   
Incident investigation is also not a serial endeavor:  it is highly iterative.  As Figure 15 depicts, 
there is a cyclical process of gathering information, organizing it into the sequence of events 
and causes that led up to the incident, and looking for the underlying human factors causes.  
Oftentimes after the initial round of interviews, it will become apparent that the sequence of 
events has missing pieces, or that some of the information appears contradictory.  This 
necessitates additional interviews or re-interviews.  As you begin to feel you understand the 
sequence of events, you may find that you still lack the information to identify the types of 
human errors that were made and the underlying causes of these errors.  More questioning is 
needed.  Sometimes an exploration of the human errors will bring to light that the sequence of 
events is still incomplete.  And so it goes, back and forth, asking questions, organizing data, 
finding holes, and asking more questions, until you can finally produce a set of events, causes, 
and underlying human errors that “hang together” and make a sensible explanation for how the 
incident evolved.  Patience and persistence are two traits of successful investigators!   
In this section we have repeatedly stressed that the good investigator keeps asking “why?”  It is 
useful to consider when to stop asking why.  Asking why is a great tool for identifying underlying 
contributors to the errors that caused the incident.  But if taken to extremes, it can become 
almost absurd.  In general, we want to keep asking why as long as the answer is still something 
that has practical significance to the incident and is under the company’s control to make 
changes11.  In the TORREY CANYON incident, for example, we elected not to consider why 
                                                
10  For a discussion of interviewing techniques, as well as other good material on the collection of 
evidence, see Center for Chemical Process Safety (in preparation). 
11 There are times when we do want to look for causes that are beyond the company’s control.  Some 
incident causes have ramifications for offshore or maritime safety in general and may necessitate 
changes to equipment,  legislation, or codes of practice.  For example, if a regulation appeared to be a 
cause of the incident, then that information needs to be brought to the attention of the appropriate 
authorities so that the regulation can be revised.  In the TORREY CANYON example, the poor design of 
the steering selector mechanism, because it could easily cause similar problems for others, should have 
been discussed with the manufacturer, to prompt a redesign, and reported in industry publications to 
warn others of the hazard.  While the main thrust of this paper is to help companies use human factors 
incident investigation to improve their own safety, we all have the responsibility to share this knowledge in 
order to improve the safety of the industry as a whole. 
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there were so many fishing vessels in the channel, because that was totally out of the control of 
the company.  But we did elect to consider the captain’s response to those fishing vessels (i.e., 
the fact that he did not slow down), because his response is within his (and the company’s) 
control.  There will always be extenuating circumstances.  We need to focus on how the 
company responds to those circumstances in a way that gets the job done safely.   
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Figure 15. The Incident Investigation Process 
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6.0 ANALYZING INCIDENT DATA 
Now that you’ve been running your incident investigation program for awhile, what do you do 
with all those data?  There are many ways to make good use of the data collected from incident 
investigations.  Here are a few ideas. 
6.1 Learning from Individual Incidents   
This is the simplest way to learn from your incident investigation program.  Individual incidents 
can be discussed at safety meetings, allowing personnel to gain an understanding of how 
different incidents evolved and how an accident was avoided.  This type of information sharing 
can stimulate discussion of similar occurrences and potential changes to procedures, policies, 
training, equipment usage, etc. that might help prevent future incidents.   
While case-by-case studies can be beneficial, they have a drawback.  By focusing on a single 
incident, there is no way to know what facets of that incident may represent general problems 
as opposed to things that were unique to that particular incident.  Most companies would rather 
spend their money fixing frequently-occurring problems than smaller, once-in-a-lifetime 
problems.  The way to get a feeling for the importance and the frequency of a problem is 
through data analysis, and several approaches to analysis are discussed below.   
6.2 Identifying High-Risk Activities or Facilities Using Simple Frequency Analysis   
Frequency analysis can be an effective way to identify problem areas on which you need to 
focus.  For example, say an offshore drilling company has three rigs and wants to know whether 
all three have about the same number of incidents.  A simple frequency analysis entails adding 
up the number of incidents reported over a given period of time (e.g., one year) by the crews of 
each rig (Fig. 16).  
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Figure 16. Example of a Frequency Analysis 
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In the example shown in Figure 16, it is obvious that Rig C has reported over twice as many 
incidents as has either Rig A or Rig B.  Looks like Rig C has a problem, right?  Well, not 
necessarily.  You need to go deeper and find out why Rig C has reported more incidents.  
Maybe the crew members on Rig C are very excited about the new incident investigation 
program and are being vigilant for and reporting every incident that arises, while the crews on 
Rigs A and B are only reporting the incidents they consider to be “important” in some respect.  
Or maybe Rig C is larger, does more operations, and has more people working on it than either 
A or B – if Rig C is doing four times the work that is done by either Rig A or B, then C’s true 
incident rate would actually be lower than that on A or B!  This shows the necessity for 
considering how to make an “apples to apples” comparison.  However, if Rigs A, B, and C are 
roughly equivalent in all respects, then C might truly have a safety problem that needs to be 
identified and solved.  One way to look into this in more depth would be to do more frequency 
analyses by type of operation, or by type of equipment used, or by some other relevant factor.  
In this way you can isolate which operations or equipment appear to be related to the higher 
incident rates (for example, perhaps when looking just at Operation X, Rig C’s incident rate is 
the same as that for A and B; but when looking just at Operation Y, Rig C’s incident rate is much 
higher than that for A or B).   
6.3 Looking for Trends   
A simple extension of the frequency analysis discussed above is to compare frequencies over 
time to look for trends in the data.  Perhaps you have made some changes to a standard 
operating procedure to reduce injuries.  Is the new SOP helping?  To find out, you could plot the 
number of injuries in the years prior to the new SOP and compare that to the number of injuries 
since the new SOP was put into place.  Or maybe the SOP has been helpful in reducing certain 
types of injuries but not others.  A plot, like that presented in Figure 17, could help the company 
spot areas of concern.  In this example, most of the injury rates are fairly consistent over the 
four years shown.  However, three injury categories show some interesting changes.  “Struck 
By/Against” and “Slips/Trips/Falls” both show marked decreases.  In this particular case, the 
company had built and put into service 18 new ships in 1996-1999.  The learning curve for 
operating the new ships may have contributed to exaggerated “Struck By/Against” rates in 1998 
and 1999, with the decrease in 2000 showing that the crews had become familiar with the new 
ships.  The decreased rate of slips, trips, and falls is attributed to the company’s purchase of 
new safety shoes (designed for the restaurant industry to keep traction on wet floors) – a 
successful safety intervention!  The third item of interest is the relatively greater rate of injuries 
in the “Chemical Spray” category over the last two years.  This appears to be due to the fact  
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Figure 17. Example of a Trend Analysis 
(Data courtesy of Stolt-Nielsen Transportation Group) 
 
that new crews were hired to man some of the newer ships, and these crew members did not 
have previous experience on a chemical tanker.  Stolt is addressing this problem with an 
intensive training course taught by experienced Captains and Chief Mates, a course which has 
proved very successful in the past.  This type of finding alerts a company to the need for getting 
additional data to understand the contributing causes to such incidents so that productive safety 
interventions can be designed and implemented. 
Frequency and trend analysis are often supplemented with cost data to help a company decide 
where to focus its next safety intervention.  While frequency data tell you how often a given type 
of incident happens, it does not tell you the severity or consequence of the incident.  Therefore, 
it is helpful to combine frequency data with cost (or some other measure of severity) to 
determine which types of incidents are most in need of controls.  For example, Figure 17 shows 
a much higher frequency of slips, trips, and falls than injuries associated with temperature 
extremes.  Going solely by the frequency data, one would assume the slips, trips, and falls are 
more important to control.  However, if most of the slips, trips, and falls have a relatively minor 
consequence (that is, the injury caused is mild), then it may not warrant much attention.  Let’s 
say that on the average, the injury caused to the workers in these slips, trips, and falls is so 
minor that nothing more than first aid is needed and the employee can return immediately to the 
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job.  However, let’s say that the result of the average injury due to extreme temperatures (e.g., 
heat stroke or frostbite) requires hospitalization and one week of lost time.  So even though the 
frequency of the temperature-related incidents is only about a quarter of that due to slips, trips, 
and falls, their severity is much worse.  The “total cost” (frequency x average cost) of the 
temperature-related incidents is much greater than that for the slips, trips, and falls, making the 
reduction of temperature-related incidents a higher priority for the company.   
A word of warning about trend analysis:  just because the data appear to show a trend does not 
necessarily mean there really is a significant trend present.  Data can be highly variable (that is, 
the number of incidents can fluctuate greatly from one time period to the next).  It is not 
uncommon to see rather large changes in the numbers of incidents from year to year.  When 
you are dealing with a small number of data points (e.g., comparing yearly incident frequencies 
from 1999 to 2000), you cannot see the underlying variability.  One way to get a better 
appreciation for the variability is to look at the data by month or by quarter instead of by year.  
The most accurate way to identify true differences in frequencies and establish real trends is by 
using statistical analysis (for example, fitting the data to a linear function (linear regression) and 
determining whether the slope is significantly different from zero).   
Both frequency analysis and looking for trends are ways to identify operational variables that 
may require closer examination.  Notice that while the frequency or trend analysis will show you 
areas of concern, it does not answer the question as to why these differences are occurring.  
Once you’ve isolated the types of activities, operations, or situations of interest, you can use the 
next analysis technique to explore your incidents further. 
6.4 Looking for Similar Incidents   
If each incident report is coded with the type of incident (e.g., oil spill), and the activity during 
which it happened (e.g., filling a tank), one can search the database to identify all the incidents 
which had these features in common.  One immediate advantage to this is it helps to identify 
your high-frequency events.  Another big advantage is that you can now re-read the incident 
narratives and look for other similarities that might lead to the identification of a safety hazard 
that needs to be fixed.  For example, in the case of spills caused by overfilling a tank, it may be 
that an overfill alarm needs to be added, or that the standard operating procedure needs to be 
changed so that the tank is continuously monitored by a crew member, and-or the fill rate 
decreased as the tank gets close to being filled.  This type of analysis is an excellent way to 
identify equipment design flaws and poor operating procedures.  The FAA-sponsored, NASA-
run Aviation Safety Reporting System, has used this method successfully to identify equipment 
defects, runway design problems, and to make improvements to air traffic control protocols.   
6.5 Determining Under What Conditions a Given Error Happens   
In the construction of the incident database, it can be useful to do a risk assessment of various 
operations to identify things that “might” go wrong.  The database can then be used to see 
under what conditions things actually do go wrong.  For example, in a study of communications 
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errors, the types of operations that depend on good communications were identified (e.g., 
vessel navigation with a marine pilot on board requires good communications between the pilot 
and the ship’s bridge team; safe meeting and passing agreements depend on good ship-to-ship 
communications).  The potential need for communication was then tagged in the database by 
answering five simple questions, such as “Was there a pilot navigating?” or “Were there two or 
more vessels involved in this casualty?”.  In analyzing the accident data, it was found that of the 
accidents in which one of these five questions was answered “yes”, 76% of them had a 
communications error as a contributing factor to the accident.  This is a powerful way to identify 
high-risk activities and situations.    
6.6 Looking for Underlying Causes Using Meta-Analysis   
If your incident investigators are adept at asking “why” enough to get to underlying human error 
causes, then you can use your incident database to determine which types of causes may 
precipitate many of your incidents.  To extend the example above of communications-related 
casualties, the incident investigators used a form to identify specific communications problems, 
such as “did not communicate”, “did not send information in a timely manner”, “message was 
interrupted”, “did not interpret the information correctly”, and others.  For each problem 
identified, the investigator went on to consider a list of contributing factors, such as “inadequate 
knowledge of company policies for communications”, “limited English skills or knowledge”, “did 
not operate communications equipment correctly”, “distracted or interrupted by other tasks”, 
“assumed there was no need to communicate”, and others (see App. G for the complete 
communications investigation protocol).   
A frequency analysis of the communication problems showed that the single biggest problem 
was a failure to communicate.  That is, in 68% of the accidents, someone had information that 
could have prevented the accident, but chose not to tell anyone.  These “failure to 
communicate” casualties were isolated and a frequency analysis was done to identify the most 
frequent contributing factors.  While this identified factors such as “incorrect interpretation of the 
situation”, “assumed incorrectly that other party already knows”, and others, it didn’t give a good 
sense of what might be at the crux of these accidents.   
To get a clearer picture of what was going on, a “meta-analysis” was done in which the 
narratives of the different casualties were reviewed and additional characteristics of the 
situations were identified.  The result was the finding that the most common apparent underlying 
cause in 92% of these “failure to communicate” accidents was that the person did not perceive 
a safety threat, either because he had misinterpreted the situation or because he failed to think 
about the ramifications of the situation beyond his own specific job responsibilities (that is, he 
did not consider how his actions might affect other people).  These types of behaviors show a 
deficit in “situation awareness”.  The meta-analysis also showed that in almost half of these 
accidents, there was a second person who did not speak up.  This person perceived the safety 
threat, but assumed it was not his job to say anything (he assumed someone else was aware of 
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the problem and would take care of it).  This failing shows a lack of “ship resource 
management”.  The meta-analysis allows one to go beyond the specific data categories in the 
incident database and to find underlying causes that may tie other, seemingly-disparate causes 
together.  In a sense, a meta-analysis is like putting a puzzle together.  Each database element 
is a piece of the puzzle, but the meta-analysis helps us see how to put the pieces together and 
get greater meaning from them.  In this case, it was the meta-analysis which most effectively 
pointed us at the true underlying problems, suggesting the types of interventions (improvements 
in situation awareness and ship resource management) that would be productive. 
6.7 Identifying Relationships Among Incident Attributes by Statistical Analysis 
Statistics can be used to draw out meaningful relationships among elements of incidents, and 
sometimes they can be used to infer probable cause.  Statistical analysis was used in a couple 
ways in a recent study of fatigue-related accidents (McCallum, Raby, & Rothblum, 1996).  The 
purpose of the research was to understand not only how many marine accidents were related to 
fatigue, but also to look for underlying contributing factors (in other words, what was causing the 
fatigue).  A database was established using scientific literature to identify the questions that 
should be asked (the resulting fatigue investigation questions can be found in App. G).  The 
fatigue investigation was administered during routine casualty investigations, and the database 
was used to find out what attributes were significantly related to fatigue (that is, what data items 
had statistically different values in the fatigue-related accidents compared to accidents that did 
not result from fatigue).  One set of tests looked at the number of hours worked by mariners who 
caused injuries (either to themselves or to another crew member).   
The statistical tests (t-tests) determined that the number of hours on duty at the time of the 
accident, and the number of hours worked in the last 24/48/72 hours were all significantly 
different for the fatigue-related and non-fatigue injury cases.  The averages for each of these 
comparisons are plotted below (Fig. 18).  One must be careful about jumping to causal 
conclusions.  In some cases, the difference seen between two groups may be due to something 
very different than what is being tested (remember our example of the number of incidents 
reported by the different oil rig crews).  However, in this case, the scientific literature supports 
the relationship between long work hours and increasing fatigue.  Therefore, these data were 
taken as strong evidence that an underlying cause of these fatigue-related injuries was long 
work hours. 
Statistical analysis was used a second way in this study.  It was used to consider all the 
different factors that were correlated with fatigue-related accidents and to come up with a quick 
“screening test” for fatigue.  Because the full fatigue investigation took about 40 minutes, it was 
desirable to find a few questions that would indicate whether fatigue appeared to play a role, 
and whether, therefore, the investigator should collect all the fatigue data.  A multiple regression 
analysis was performed to determine which factors were most predictive of fatigue-related 
casualties.  The result was a simple Fatigue Index equation consisting of just three questions 
(the number of hours slept  in the  last 24 hours,  the number of hours worked  in the last 24 hr.,  
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Figure 18. Result of Statistical Analysis of Incident Database Items 
(from McCallum, Raby, & Rothblum, 1996) 
 
and the number of fatigue symptoms experienced by the mariner).   When the data from both 
the fatigue and non-fatigue casualties were put into this equation, it was found to be 80% 
correct in its ability to identify whether a given casualty was fatigue-related or not (the fatigue 
index worksheet is in App. G). 
The purpose of statistical analysis is to determine whether apparent differences in data points 
are just due to the variability of the data or whether they are due to a true underlying difference 
or trend.  For example, in Figure 17, the incidence of “caught between” injuries varies greatly 
over the four years shown.  Is the downward trend from 1999 through 2001 “real”, or is it just a 
matter of the normal variability of the data?  Statistical tests can be used to determine this.  It 
should be noted that just because something turns out to be “statistically significant”, it does not 
necessarily mean that it is “important” or significant in practical terms.  The size of the significant 
difference could be very small.  For example,  Figure 16 compared the number of incidents on 
three drilling rigs.  It might be that the incident rate on Rig B is significantly lower than the rate 
on Rig A.  But since both have a relatively low rate of incidents, from a practical standpoint, the 
difference just isn’t interesting (not worthy of taking action).   
6.8 After the Analysis 
Webster’s Dictionary (G & C Merriam Company, 1973) defines data as, “factual information (as 
measurements or statistics) used as a basis for reasoning, discussion, or calculation.”  The 
operative word is basis.  The analysis of incident data serves as nothing more than a basis or a 
point of departure for discussion, reasoning, and perhaps additional study.  It is not until the 
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data have been pondered, organized, understood, and put into proper context that these bits of 
disparate facts turn into valuable and useful information.  This subsection discusses two areas 
in which one needs to go beyond the data analysis in order to fully understand the data and 
take appropriate action.   
6.8.1 Data-Driven Research:  the Link Between Data Analysis and Solving Safety Problems 
You cannot solve safety problems simply by analyzing incident data.  In general, the analysis of 
incident data will identify a potential problem that then needs to be studied before it can be 
solved.  For example, if you plot your company’s injury data and find that a large percentage of 
the injuries are from slips, trips, and falls, you have identified a problem, but not a solution.  The 
next step would be to investigate further and understand what seems to be causing the slips, 
trips, and falls.  Where do these injuries occur and under what conditions?  Are deck surfaces 
slippery or are stairway treads worn?  Have personnel been provided with proper footwear, and 
if so, are they wearing it?  (You’d be surprised at the number of times companies provide 
personnel protection gear of one sort or another, only to find that employees refuse to use it 
because it’s either uncomfortable or interferes in some way with other aspects of their jobs.  
Protective gear must be designed to be compatible with the workers’ needs and workplace 
tasks.)   
As was discussed earlier (see Fig. 8 in Sec. 3), the analysis of incident data is the precursor to 
data-driven research used to understand the problems identified by the analysis.  “Research” 
may be as simple and low-tech as a discussion with employees and line supervisors to get their 
perceptions of the problems and potential solutions, or it can be as detailed and intensive as a 
full-blown scientific study.  The point is that the analysis of the incident data is a starting point, 
and that it takes follow-up study to understand the genesis of a problem and to devise 
successful safety interventions.   
6.8.2 It May Be Data, But It’s Not Necessarily Telling You Anything 
One final caution:  a database is only as good as the data that are put into it.  If the investigator 
doesn’t ask all the relevant questions, the database cannot, by definition, have the relevant 
data.  This harks back to the recommendations given in Section 3 for building a successful 
incident investigation program.  If the company does not promote an open, fair, and 
improvement-oriented culture, or if there isn’t a common understanding about the scope and 
purpose of the incident investigation, or if the investigators are not appropriately trained, or if the 
incident database is hard to use, the data that populate the incident database may be less than 
accurate and complete.  Obviously, analyses based on such data will be of questionable value 
(“garbage in, garbage out”).   
Even with the best of intentions, things may happen which affect the database.  For example, a 
simple change in policy affecting which incidents will be investigated may result in the 
appearance of a greatly increased (or reduced) incident rate when comparing data from periods 
before and after the policy went into effect.  Let’s say a company decides to forego incident 
investigation on any incident which costs the company less than $10,000.  If there are types of 
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incidents which are predominantly low-cost, the frequency of those incidents will appear to be 
dramatically reduced after the policy takes effect (even though the true frequency of the 
incidents has not changed, or even increased – they just aren’t being investigated anymore).  
Training for investigators may result in a better understanding of the classification scheme (such 
as HFACS) they are using.  While this should result in improved data reliability in the future, it 
may also give the appearance of changes in certain types of incident rates (because some 
incidents may have been misclassified prior to the training).   
Never put blind faith in your incident data analysis:  always be on the lookout for procedural or 
other reasons (unrelated to actual incident rates) that might be affecting the analytic process.  
Keep records of changes made to the database, investigation policy, and investigator training – 
these could be great time-savers in understanding “mysterious” trends.  Keeping records of 
important company policy or procedural changes can also be helpful in understanding changes 
in incident frequencies.  The more you know about changes in the way you do business – both 
in the company at large and in the incident investigation program specifically – the better you 
will be able to differentiate between spurious “trends” and true safety issues.   
6.9 Summary of Analysis Techniques 
Data analysis can be used to identify areas in need of safety interventions.  Oftentimes, data 
analysis shows an interesting trend, but does not give you sufficient information to take action.  
This will require follow-up studies to better define the problems and suggest workable solutions.  
Data analysis can also point out where the database and-or investigation procedures are 
lacking.  For example, you may find out the company has a high rate of slips, trips, and falls – 
but that doesn’t tell you enough about the problem.  The database might need to be modified to 
add information on the types of slips, trips, and falls (e.g., where they occur, what operations 
were in progress, how much lost time resulted), and the incident investigators may need to ask 
additional questions to illuminate the causes of these accidents.  Recall that Figure 8 shows a 
feedback loop from Database Analysis back to Incident Investigation.  Data analysis is a great 
way to learn about the strengths and weaknesses of your investigation methods and database. 
This section has provided examples of ways you can learn from your incident data.  Frequency 
analysis and looking for trends are simple procedures that anyone can do quickly with the aid of 
a spreadsheet application.  Looking for similar incidents and determining conditions which tend 
to be associated with them are fairly simple procedures, although a database with relevant 
index variables is helpful for doing such analyses efficiently.  Statistical analysis, while requiring 
more expertise on the part of the safety analyst, can provide great benefits by finding underlying 
correlations and relationships.  The important thing is not to let your incident data just sit there:  
analyze it and make it work for you. 
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7.0 FINDING SAFETY SOLUTIONS 
Let’s say you’ve collected incident information and run some analyses.  Now you want to 
develop measures to prevent these incidents from recurring.  What do you do?  How do you find 
solutions that will be effective?  Oftentimes, finding effective solutions is elusive.  A study of 
offshore operations in an international oil and gas company demonstrates what can happen 
(Bryden, O’Connor, & Flin, 1998).  This company had an incident investigation program.  The 
database contained information on technical and human factors causes of the incidents and 
suggested remedial actions.  Analysis of the recommended remedial actions showed that only 
10% of them addressed the underlying causes of the incidents, while another 31% addressed 
only direct causes and no underlying causes.  The shocker was that 59% of the recommended 
remedial actions were “quick fixes” which did not address the causes of the incidents at all!  The 
ineffective quick fixes tended to be things such as telling the worker not to do it again, or 
mentioning the danger at the next safety meeting.  A safety program based on trying to motivate 
the worker not to repeat a dangerous action, without taking steps to solve the underlying 
causes, is doomed to failure.   
On the other hand, it is not so surprising that companies might fall into such a “quick fix” trap.  
One might say that the biggest problem with having a successful incident investigation program 
is that now there are data about which management must not only think, but also do something 
constructive!  Perrow put it this way (Perrow, 1986, as quoted by Hollnagel, 2000, p.1): 
Formal accident investigations usually start with an assumption that the operator 
must have failed, and if this attribution can be made, that is the end of serious 
inquiry.  Finding that faulty designs were responsible would entail enormous 
shutdown and retrofitting costs; finding that management was responsible would 
threaten those in charge; but finding that operators were responsible preserves 
the system, with some soporific injunctions about better training. 
Remember Reason’s (1990) Swiss cheese model – each slice of cheese (excluding unsafe 
acts) represents a layer of system defenses.  The fact that incidents are occurring means that 
one or more of these layers of system defenses requires repair:  they are not effective barriers 
to prevent unsafe outcomes.  Hollnagel (2000), like Reason, has suggested that in order to 
prevent incidents, we must go beyond finding a single “root cause” (or making the operator the 
scapegoat, per Perrow) and understand how to improve the barriers (system defenses).  
Barriers can either avert an incident from taking place, or reduce the magnitude of the negative 
consequences (prevention and mitigation, respectively, as depicted in Fig. 8). 
7.1 The Triangle of Effectiveness:  A Guide to Safety Interventions 
Gerry Miller (2000; Miller et al., 1997) adds his voice to those of Reason and Hollnagel in 
decrying the past tendency to place the blame for industrial incidents solely on “operator error”.  
Instead, it is his contention that even the most safety-conscious employee will occasionally 
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initiate unsafe acts at the job site, and that sometimes these acts are encouraged, led, or even 
coerced upon the employee by a variety of factors beyond the employee’s control.  However, 
Miller states that these acts can be prevented, or at least the consequences of the acts 
mitigated, through the application of barriers or safety interventions.  He illustrates this concept 
through his “triangle of effectiveness” (see Fig. 19), which presents eight levels of barriers that 
can be used to prevent or mitigate incidents12.  Starting at the base of the triangle, these eight 
elements are:   
• Policies and culture13 – management policies and corporate culture which promote a 
safe, human-centered work environment;  
• Workplace design – ergonomically-designed and arranged equipment;  
• Environmental control – keeping lighting, temperature, noise, etc. within human-
compatible ranges;  
• Personnel selection – selecting the right people for the job;  
• Training and standard operating procedures (SOPs) – ensuring workers have the 
necessary knowledge and skills to do the job, and that SOPs are correct and 
consistent with best practices;  
• Interpersonal relationships (communication) – the exchange of necessary 
information between team members; 
• Job aids – understandable, easy-to-use task instructions and warning placards; 
• Fitness for duty – ensuring that workers are alert, focused, and capable of safe job 
performance.   
All eight barriers are important, Miller concludes, and must be included in a total behaviorally-
based safety program.  It should be emphasized, however, that the elements at the base of the 
triangle (i.e., policies & culture, workplace design, and environmental control) have the most 
significant impact on safety and should form the backbone of a company’s safety program.  
(Each of these eight barriers will be discussed in more detail in the next section) 
In Reason’s model, these elements (at the base of the triangle) are controlled by the 
“Organizational Factors”  layer of defenses.  When the organization (company management) 
makes poor decisions, such as the selection of equipment which is not designed to support the 
                                                
12 Miller uses this triangle both as a model for accident causation and as a guide to selecting safety 
interventions.  Like Reason’s framework, Miller’s emphasizes the multiplicity of causes of a given incident 
and attributes the causes to the lack or failure of barriers (system defenses in Reason’s jargon).  In this 
paper we have chosen to focus on Miller’s triangle as a means for selecting interventions, since it bridges 
the gap between Reason’s organizational model of system defenses (management – line supervisor – 
worker) and the concrete needs of a shipping or offshore company to select specific means to solve 
identified safety problems.  
13 Miller calls this factor “Management Participation”.  Workshop participants felt “Policies and Culture” 
was a more intuitive label. 
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human operator, that single poor decision has an enormous “trickle down” effect because so 
many operators and operations are affected.  Such poor decisions at the Organizational Factors 
layer very often become latent contributors to incidents.  In a similar fashion, good decisions 
made at the Organizational Factors layer, such as the selection of well-designed equipment (or 
other human-centered decisions contained at the base of the triangle), contribute very positively 
to the safety program, again because of the numbers of people and operations they touch.   
Interventions based solely on elements at the top of the triangle (such as fitness for duty and job 
aids) will have the least impact on workplace safety, and therefore should have a lesser 
emphasis within the company’s safety program.  The factors at the top of the triangle depend 
primarily on the actions of individual workers.  Interventions at this level are on a one-by-one 
basis – a less efficient and less effective way of dealing with safety issues.   
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Figure 19. The “Triangle of Effectiveness” for  
Safety Interventions to Reduce Human Error 
(after Miller, 2000) 
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An example will help to clarify this.  Let’s say Joe needed emergency medical attention because 
he accidentally sheared off one of his fingertips while cutting metal sheeting to make a repair.  
Telling Joe to “be more careful” will not likely have a big impact on safety.  Training all the repair 
crews on the correct procedure for cutting sheet metal will have more of an impact, since more 
of the workforce is made aware of the problem and a way to protect themselves (assuming, of 
course, that supervision and peer pressure encourage and reinforce their behavioral changes).  
But the best way to prevent this type of incident is by having equipment that has been designed 
with a “guard” to prevent one’s fingers from contacting the cutting mechanism (workplace design 
level).   
Hollnagel (2000) points out that the purpose of an incident investigation program is to identify 
barriers (system defenses) that have failed or barriers that were missing which allowed an 
incident to happen.  A good safety intervention program repairs and-or develops as many of 
these barriers as possible.  Miller’s (2000) addition to this line of thinking is that when it is not 
possible to implement all the relevant barriers, selecting those towards the base of the triangle 
will reap better protection than selecting only those towards the tip.  Just as we need to probe 
deeper to find the underlying latent factors which cause incidents, we also want to make safety 
“fixes” and focus our safety program at the deepest levels possible (at the base of the triangle).   
7.2 Relationship Between Reason’s “Slices of Cheese” and the Triangle of 
Effectiveness 
As shown in Figure 20, different layers of system defenses are related to different elements 
within the triangle of effectiveness.  The Organizational Factors layer has the greatest span of 
control, and therefore, the greatest capacity for effective intervention.  Remember that 
“organizational factors” refers to the policies, procedures, and decisions put into place by upper 
management.  Management is usually responsible for designing the procedures and developing 
the work policies implemented by the line supervisors and workers.  As such, this layer of 
system defenses can influence seven of the eight elements within the triangle of effectiveness, 
and is the only layer of defense which can effectively impact the most important lower three 
elements (see top of Fig. 20).   
The Supervision layer of defenses represents the interventions that can be controlled by line 
management.  Note that whereas the organizational factors layer is generally in charge of 
designing and developing policies and procedures, supervisors are responsible for carrying out 
those policies and procedures.  This automatically limits the effectiveness that supervisors can 
exert, since they often cannot change existing policies and procedures, only report back on 
those which may appear to be latent factors in incidents.  The middle section of Figure 20 
displays the types of interventions to which supervisors can contribute.  While they are not 
always directly involved in hiring and firing, line supervisors generally are involved in “personnel 
selection” from the standpoint of assigning people to tasks.  In a similar vein, while they might 
not be involved in training or writing standard operating procedures (SOPs), they are 
responsible for seeing that these are properly carried out.  They may also be the ones who 
recommend workers for remedial or advanced training. 
Working Group 1 - HFW2002 Page 64 of 141 Houston, Texas 
Human Factors in Incident Investigation and Analysis 
The worker has the smallest span of control over safety interventions.  The worker’s level is 
basically contained within the layer of system defense called “Preconditions for Unsafe Acts”.  It 
becomes the worker’s responsibility to adhere to standard operating procedures, learn to use 
equipment properly, communicate clearly, use job aids when needed, and to stay fit for duty.  If, 
for example, a standard operating procedure is deficient or a management work-rest schedule 
causes excessive fatigue on the job, the worker’s span of control is too limited to allow for 
meaningful intervention at that level.  This is why it is so important to look for interventions at the 
base of the triangle, at the organizational factors layer of system defense. 
Now let’s discuss each the intervention elements within the “triangle of effectiveness” and see 
how they relate to the “layers of system defenses”. 
7.2.1 Policies & Culture 
Management policies and corporate culture depend on the active participation of upper 
management in promoting a human-centered work environment and worksite.  As such, policies 
and culture are key to an effective error reduction program:  they are the base on which 
everything else rests.  Management participation should be demonstrated in a variety of ways.  
It should be visible in its support and active encouragement of an open, “safety first” corporate 
culture, where “safety first” is not just a motto but a corporate mission.  An atmosphere that 
provides incentives for personnel to question and improve work environments and standard 
operating procedures shows a caring management philosophy.  Management actions and 
decisions should be human-centered, enabling the best personnel performance.  Examples of 
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Figure 20. Types of Interventions Needed to Plug the “Holes” in the Layers 
of Defenses. 
Different layers of system defenses (“slices of cheese” at left) can be 
bolstered by – and have the power to implement – different sets of 
interventions (unshaded elements in the triangles).  
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how management can demonstrate its commitment to a good employee safety program include 
establishing safe work loads and schedules based on known human physiological limitations 
and requirements (e.g., work-rest cycles); the creation of easily-understood and achievable 
company policies and practices; the establishment and consistent application of rewards (or 
punishments) for compliance (or lack thereof) with company policies; creation of reasonable 
product delivery schedules; providing physical facilities and equipments designed to match 
human capabilities and limitations; insistence on good facility maintenance; and a commitment 
to uncovering the underlying causes of incidents.  By definition, management policies and 
corporate culture are a part of the “Organizational Factors” level of defenses.  Whenever such 
organizational factors (like the examples just given) are discovered during an incident 
investigation, management policies and culture should be considered when designing 
interventions to stop future such incidents.  
 
7.2.2 Workplace Design 
Good, ergonomic workplace design can be extremely effective in reducing incidents.  As 
underscored earlier in this paper, poor design of vessels, platforms, equipment, and work 
environments is an underlying precondition that can “set up” the human operator to make errors.  
In fact, the American Bureau of Shipping states that 88% of shipboard injuries and 50% of 
fatalities are the result of poor design (McCafferty, 2000).  Unfortunately, examples of poor 
design abound in the maritime industry.  As Miller says (2000, p. 7), “You cannot overcome 
human errors induced by poor design of the work place with more training, more manuals or 
written procedures, exhortations to work safer, or threats of punitive actions for job accidents.”   
Good design is not a mystery:  there have been decades of human factors research into a 
plethora of design facets.  Further, there has been considerable experience acquired over the 
past decade in the offshore and shipping industries with applying HFE design criteria to new 
and remodeled facilities.  In addition, well-established and accepted human factors design 
standards and guidance now exist for the maritime industry (ASTM, 1995; American Bureau of 
Shipping [ABS], 1998; ABS, 2001).  In fact, when HFE design principles are introduced at the 
beginning of the design of a facility or system, it can drastically reduce life-cycle costs and 
prevent the need for costly modifications down the road (because it was built right the first time).   
Good workplace design requires proactive management involvement; it is almost always 
beyond the span of control of the workers or line supervision.  Thus, incidents resulting from 
workplace design flaws, even though some may be considered “equipment preconditions”, must 
look to the Organizational Factors layer of the organization for effective safety interventions. 
7.2.3 Environmental Control 
Lack of environmental control is another widespread, latent cause of maritime and offshore 
incidents.  This element of the triangle refers to the work environment:  temperature, humidity, 
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lighting, noise, and vibration.  Human beings have “safe operating ranges” just like equipment.  
Put a human in an environment that is outside his safe operating range, and he becomes an 
accident waiting to happen.  Miller (2000, p.8) relates an all-too-frequent occurrence: 
As just one example, studies have shown that crane accidents are the second 
most frequent cause of injuries and fatalities on offshore platforms in the Gulf of 
Mexico (GOM).  Yet, operator cabs on these cranes are traditionally not 
environmentally controlled.  Some years ago during a visit to an offshore platform 
it was noted ... [that the temperature inside a crane cab was] 122 degrees F.  
With this combination of heat and July GOM humidity is it any wonder that an 
operator error of omission (i.e. the operator did not complete an act that he was 
suppose to have done) occurred that day resulting in damage to the crane and 
platform. 
Emphasizing the importance of proper workplace environments, the American Bureau of 
Shipping (ABS) has prepared human performance-based environmental standards for both 
ships and offshore structures.  These standards will be issued in 2002. 
7.2.4 Personnel Selection 
It has long been recognized that certain jobs require special physical, mental, or social skills not 
possessed by everybody who would like to work in those jobs.  Finding the right people for the 
job is what personnel selection is all about.  As an example, special physical and psychological 
screening tests have been used for at least the last thirty years in the public safety sector to 
screen out those who would not be suitable for the law enforcement or fire safety professions.  If 
a person is selected to work in a job for which he/she is not suited, that can result in an 
increased probability of that person contributing to a workplace accident.   
Personnel selection should consider the personality traits and special abilities needed for a 
given job.  Just because someone has the desire to work in a particular job, or even has spent 
twenty years working elsewhere in the company, that doesn’t necessarily qualify that person for 
the open position.  A given job may have certain physical requirements (e.g., good color vision 
for an electrician, or good visual acuity and depth perception for a crane operator), as well as 
intellectual aptitudes (e.g., good communication skills for a supervisor) and psychological 
requirements (e.g., good judgement and coolness under stress for a ship master or offshore 
installation  manager).   
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As a “barrier” to incidents, personnel selection is active at two different levels.  The 
Organizational Factors level (upper management) usually presides over personnel selection in 
terms of hiring and firing by developing job descriptions and qualifications requirements.  A 
company which takes the quality of its personnel seriously can do much to ensure the right 
people are placed in the right jobs.  The Supervision layer of system defenses also contributes 
significantly in terms of the way personnel are assigned to tasks.  Again, if the supervisor takes 
this job seriously, the right numbers of people, fit for duty, and with the right qualifications can 
be assigned to operational and maintenance duties, helping to ensure safety.   
7.2.5 Training and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)  
Training and SOPs make up the next element in the triangle14.  “More training” has too often 
been management’s sole, knee-jerk remedy to incidents.  As already stated, more training can 
not make up for inattention given to other barriers such as workplace design, environmental 
control, and management policies.  Another frequent limitation to training is that it is assumed 
that someone who is experienced at a given task is therefore qualified to train others.  Such 
training is haphazard, often poorly performed, and usually incomplete.  There are rigorous 
methods (such as Instructional Systems Development) for analyzing tasks, determining 
performance objectives, and training and testing to these objectives (McCallum, Forsythe, 
Smith, Nunnenkamp & Sandberg, 2001).  As automated systems become more prevalent in the 
maritime and offshore industries, thorough training, not just in the task at hand, but also in the 
operational parameters of the equipment, becomes increasingly necessary (Sanquist, et al., 
1996).  In summary, before resorting to training, make sure it really is the answer to the 
problem; and if training is what’s needed, then it’s worth doing right. 
The second part of this element is standard operating procedures.  Many times incidents occur 
not because the worker lacked skills or knowledge, but because the SOP was not designed 
appropriately for the given conditions.  The Training/SOP element acts as a safety intervention 
in all three layers of system defenses (Fig. 20).  At the Organizational Factors layer, the 
responsibility is to institute sufficient training and effective, safe SOPs.  At the Supervision layer, 
the training/SOP defense is to ensure trained personnel are assigned to tasks and that they use 
the SOPs.  At the Preconditions layer, the worker must ensure that he/she has the required 
training to do assigned work and that he/she understands and consistently uses SOPs.  While 
all three layers of system defense are necessary to ensure safe operations, it is clear that a 
“hole” in the Organizational Factors layer (e.g., a decision to provide only the most basic 
training/SOPs, or to shirk the responsibility and place it wholly on supervision’s shoulders) will 
do the most harm, since that “missing barrier” will affect the entire workforce. 
                                                
14 Miller refers to this element just as “training”.  However, a recent study (McCallum, Forsythe, et al., 
2000) notes that many incidents attributed to inadequate knowledge and skills are actually promoted 
through incorrect SOPs, as opposed to insufficient training, per se. 
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A final note on standard operating procedures.  Many of them are written so poorly that 
personnel are unable to use SOPs effectively.  SOPs are important for safe operation, and they 
should be well-written in order to convey the needed information to the users.  A good tutorial on 
writing SOPs is given by Information Mapping15.   
7.2.6 Interpersonal Relationships (Communication) 
Interpersonal relationships (communication) is what makes teams work.  Offshore, shipboard, 
and dockside activities all depend on teamwork.  In earlier times, the Offshore Installation 
Manager or the ship’s Master was the unquestioned authority in a one-way, top-down, chain of 
command (Miller, 2000).  However, most shipping and offshore companies (and many other 
industries, such as aviation and nuclear power) have recognized that “crew resource 
management” is an essential component of safety.  Personnel need to feel empowered to speak 
up, question, and double-check decisions and actions of other team members (including 
supervisors).  Research has shown that when crew members do not communicate effectively, 
accidents result:  28% of personnel injuries and 18% of vessel casualties were related to 
inadequate communications (McCallum, Raby, Rothblum, Forsythe, Slavich & Smith, 2000, 
unpublished).   
In the maritime and offshore environments, poor communications can be caused by factors in 
addition to a lack of crew resource management.  Physical constraints (separating persons who 
need to be together via poor layout of rooms or facilities), inappropriate organizational structure 
which puts too many chains of command between individuals who need to communicate, and 
overloading workers so that they do not have the time to communicate can all contribute to poor 
interpersonal communications.  This is a factor that is often, and mistakenly, overlooked in 
incident investigations. 
Good communication is a safety intervention that must be established at all three layers of 
system defense.  As was the case with Training/SOPs, the Organizational Factors layer must 
lay the foundation by making two-way communication a part of company culture and facilitate it 
through good workplace design and policies.  Supervisors must actively support and encourage 
effective communications within and among teams.  And to keep communications from 
becoming a Precondition for Unsafe Acts, workers need to be involved, responsive members of 
their work teams.   
                                                
15 For more information about seminars by Information Mapping, please see their web site at 
http://www.infomap.com or call (800) INFO MAP (463-6627).   
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7.2.7 Job Aids 
Job aids come in several forms such as hazard identification (warning) signs, operator and 
maintainer manuals, and specific operating procedures.  These can be of help in reducing 
human-induced incidents, especially when learning a new task, performing a task that is done 
infrequently, or completing a job that must be performed in an exact sequence.  However, a 
poorly prepared job aid can lead to incidents rather than prevent them.  Examples of critically 
important job aids found on ships and platforms are the lifeboat launching instructions and the 
operating instructions for manually releasing the fire fighting suppressant system. Unfortunately, 
these safety-critical instructions are typically confusing and difficult to understand (Miller, 2000).     
There is a lot of research available on how to prepare good job aids, instructional placards, and 
warning signs (Curole, McCafferty & McKinney, 1999; Laughery, Wogalter & Young, 1994; 
Wogalter, Young & Laughery, 2001; and seminars by Information Mapping11).  One concept, 
called information mapping (Curole, et al., 1999), utilizes research on the human learning 
process to provide very specific guidelines on how to prepare manuals, procedures, checklists 
and other printed and-or pictorial job aids.  Properly prepared job aids can be a useful barrier to 
the prevention of maritime incidents.  By the same token, poorly-written or missing job aids can 
contribute to incidents and are an important aspect to be considered both during the incident 
investigation and in the preparation of preventive recommendations.   
7.2.8 Fitness for Duty 
Fitness for duty is another term for adverse mental or physiological states that are severe 
enough to reduce the individual’s capacity to perform.  These states can be due to physiological 
conditions of illness or fatigue, or to the use of alcohol or drugs (including over-the-counter 
medications).  These states can also be psychological in nature such as emotional trauma due 
to family or financial problems, or from a neurotic or even psychotic disorder.  If any of these 
things is sufficient to distract or otherwise impact the person’s performance of safety-related 
duties, it can be a definite contributor to an incident.  This is another factor that is often 
overlooked during the incident investigation process, but should receive attention.   
Essentially, fitness for duty is the responsibility of the worker to keep it from becoming a 
precondition.  Line supervisors have a responsibility to ensure that workers are, in fact, fit for 
duty.  This is the one element of the triangle that the Organizational Factors layer doesn’t 
explicitly address (for example, work-rest policies and worksite environment, both of which can 
affect an employee’s physiological and mental fitness for duty, would fall under other triangle 
elements).   
Fitness-for-duty testing is a controversial area.  There are some tests available for determining 
whether a person is under the influence of drugs or alcohol or severely fatigued; however, the 
reliability of most of these tests is a hotly-debated issue.  Some trucking companies have 
successfully used a simulator-type test to ensure a trucker’s driving performance is up to par 
before getting on the road.  Such scientifically-validated and operationally-relevant screening 
techniques have yet to be developed for the maritime and offshore industries.   
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An alternative approach to testing is to implement a crew endurance program (Comperatore, 
Rothblum, Kingsley, Rivera, & Carvalhais, 2001).  This type of program educates personnel as 
to how fitness for duty can affect not only job performance but long-term health and assists 
personnel in controlling the hazards that affect fitness for duty (note that such a program would 
be part of the Policies & Culture and Training/SOP elements of the triangle, not the Fitness for 
Duty element).  Since many of the variables that influence fitness for duty are job-related (e.g., 
fatigue from poorly designed work schedules, or lack of coordination and manual dexterity from 
working in too-cold temperatures), a crew endurance program helps to prevent latent factors at 
all three layers:  organizational factors, supervision, and preconditions for unsafe acts. 
To summarize, the precursor for effective safety solutions is an in-depth analysis of incidents.  
Only by understanding all the latent factors which contributed to an incident can one determine 
what “barriers” would be effective in either averting or reducing the effects of similar incidents in 
the future.  It is helpful to establish “barriers” or interventions within all layers of system 
defenses in order to reduce the likelihood of future incidents.  However, when this is not 
feasible, try to implement interventions in the areas of policies & culture, workplace design, and 
environmental control, as these are often latent factors for many incidents and are usually more 
effective at preventing incidents than interventions towards the tip of the triangle of 
effectiveness.  One last key to successful interventions:  make your safety interventions 
“SMART”; that is, they should be specific, measurable, attainable, reasonable, and timely.   
 
8.0 USER EXPERIENCES WITH STARTING AN INCIDENT INVESTIGATION PROGRAM 
This section provides two examples of agencies which have begun to incorporate human factors 
incident investigations.  Their experiences demonstrate how human factors incident 
investigation is used and provide some “lessons learned”. 
8.1 U.K. Marine Accident Investigation Branch 
8.1.1 Background   
The Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) is an independent division of the United 
Kingdom’s Department for Transport, Local Government and the Regions (DTLR).  The chief 
inspector reports directly to the Secretary of State, and is empowered to investigate marine 
accidents and hazardous incidents occurring onboard or to UK registered ships worldwide, and 
to all other vessels within UK territorial waters.  Each year MAIB receives over 2,000 incidents.  
Presently, about 60 field investigations are undertaken annually by 13 inspectors working 
individually or as a team.  Such field investigations, including the formal report produced, take 
about 10-12 months.  MAIB inspectors also investigate about 550 additional incidents by paper 
and telephone.   
The fundamental purpose of an MAIB investigation is to determine the circumstances and 
causes of an accident or incident with the aim of improving the safety of life at sea and the 
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avoidance of accidents in the future.  It is not the purpose to apportion liability nor to apportion 
blame:  MAIB is not an enforcing authority; that role is taken by the Maritime and Coastguard 
Agency, a totally separate organization within the DTLR.  An MAIB investigation is conducted in 
accordance with the provisions of The UK Merchant Shipping (Accident Reporting and 
Investigation) Regulations 1999, and aims to determine:  what happened; how it happened; why 
it happened; and what can be done to prevent it from happening again.   
8.1.2 Events Leading to Human Factors Investigations   
In the 1980’s the Surveyor General Organization (predecessor of the Maritime and Coastguard 
Agency) commissioned the Tavistock Institute of Human Relations, London, to carry out a 
series of studies on the human element in shipping casualties.  This was done in order to 
understand, and hence reduce, the dangers associated with human frailty in the United 
Kingdom merchant fleet.  This was the first systematic attempt to consider human error in 
shipping casualties in the UK.  Some of the recommendations from the study were that: 
• More attention should be paid to the structure, order, and timing of questions in 
accident investigation. 
• A check-list of human element questions should be developed to help the 
investigator in relating his thoughts to the general body of human factors knowledge. 
• A search for alternative explanations to accidents should be consciously developed.  
This would discourage a pre-occupation with finding a single best explanation, which 
may be counterproductive to revealing the true facts about specific casualties. 
• Regular seminars should be conducted to exchange experiences about casualty 
investigation. 
• A computerized and flexible accident data system should be developed to aid human 
factors research. 
MAIB was set up as a separate organization in July 1989.  It was chartered to investigate 
accidents, keeping this function separate from the Maritime and Coastguard Agency’s 
responsibility for the regulation of ship safety.   
8.1.3 MAIB’s Classification of Human Factors Causes  
MAIB began with a relatively simple taxonomy of human factors, looking mainly at operator error 
and organizational factors.  In 1994, MAIB developed a more comprehensive classification of 
human factors contributions to accidents and incidents.  Based on Reason’s model of accident 
causation, the classification developed aimed to show how active human errors or violations are 
shaped by latent failures.  MAIB currently has six top-level human factors classifications: 
• External bodies liaison (e.g., regulations) 
• Company & organization 
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• Crew factors 
• Equipment 
• Working environment 
• Individual 
There are sub-classifications under each of these headings (see Appendix D for the full 
taxonomy).  The database was designed to encourage the examination of accident context 
either from the individual outwards to the regulatory and policy context, or from the context and 
company inwards to the vessel and the individuals who operate it.  In this way, MAIB increases 
the likelihood of identifying contributing factors at all levels.  Some of these levels may be 
related:  for example, company policy on training may influence skills and knowledge at an 
individual level.  In many cases, there will be unrelated human factors areas which contribute to 
an accident.  All the human factors causes which can be identified from the evidence available 
should be classified.   
8.1.4 Human Factors Training for MAIB Inspectors   
The development of inspector skills and understanding of human factors investigation has been 
an evolutionary process.  The thirteen MAIB inspectors work under one roof in Southampton 
which provides an ideal opportunity to share with each other, on a daily basis, experiences with 
accident investigation.  Initially, MAIB inspectors attended human factors training courses 
provided by the Transportation Safety Board of Canada and by Det Norske Veritas (DNV) in 
Atlanta.  Inspectors were encouraged to attend seminars and lectures on human factors.   
This was an ad-hoc, but to some extent effective, approach to introducing a more formal method 
of human factors investigation.  However, a significant drawback was the difference in 
terminology used by the varying sources of training and guidance.  This hindered investigation 
team effectiveness and made quality assurance of the investigation process and reporting 
difficult and inconsistent. 
To enable a common understanding of human factors investigation, an MAIB training course 
was developed to achieve a more consistent and reliable approach by inspectors to evaluate 
the human factors causes of accidents.  A certain amount of consistency of reporting and data 
input has been achieved, but inconsistency and occasional confusion does sometimes arise.  
MAIB tries to overcome these problems by internal seminars on human factors, regular reviews 
and audits of the investigation process and outcomes, and attendance of the MAIB course.  The 
course content adapts to the changing needs and experience of the inspectors.   
The most recent MAIB course lasted two days and included topics such as:  a general 
introduction to human factors (human performance, teamwork, basic methods, terms, and 
tools); human factors and accident investigation, including models of causation; human error 
and error analysis (such as, what is human error, why does it occur, how is it assessed, 
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performance influencing factors, the SHEL model, preventing errors and violations and 
minimizing the impact of errors, safety management, and safety culture).   
A formal approach to human factors investigation has also highlighted the importance of 
effective interviewing techniques.  Consequently, attendance by all inspectors on an in-house 
interviewing techniques course run by an experienced trainer is mandatory.  Continuous 
development of inspector competence in human factors investigation is also promoted through 
mini-coaching sessions, self-study, and the day-to-day application of MAIB’s formal 
investigation process.  As a result, MAIB now has a team of inspectors competent in the 
investigation and identification of human factors contributors to marine casualties. 
8.1.5 Benefits of MAIB’s Database   
More than 1,000 accidents investigated by MAIB inspectors are recorded in the database.  A 
measure of success of the database is the increasing demand from diverse interests in the 
marine industry.  Excluding MAIB, the main users of the database are the Maritime and 
Coastguard Agency (MCA), university researchers, and consultants, all seeking patterns and 
trends in accident types and causes.  Information in the database has been particularly helpful 
to the MCA who, along with other flag states, is introducing codes of operational inspections 
and risk assessments and certificates of competency based on performance standards.   
The historical information from similar accidents has also proven to be a powerful tool to 
promote MAIB arguments for safety changes.  For example, MAIB analysis has uncovered 
trends in accidents during lifeboat launching and recovery caused by a multiplicity of human 
factors.  The study was able to identify common factors leading to these accidents, and the risks 
associated with lifeboat launching systems, by examining the common problems encountered.  
Operators make mistakes in maintenance and operation of launching equipment because of 
overly complex design and inadequate operator manuals.  Over the years, the size and weight 
of lifeboats and equipment have increased, diminishing the ability of seamen to handle 
launching and recovery operations safely.  The database analyses have allowed MAIB to 
understand the problems and to make safety recommendations.   
8.2 California State Lands Commission, Marine Facilities Division 
8.2.1 Background   
The Marine Facilities Division (MFD) of the California State Lands Commission is 
headquartered in Long Beach, California.  Created in 1990, the MFD is tasked with pollution 
prevention at marine oil terminals.  Towards this end, MFD inspectors monitor activities and 
enforce regulations at 85 marine facilities along the California coast.  Inspectors oversee and 
evaluate the safety of such operations as oil transfers to and from oil tankers and barges and 
make comprehensive inspections of marine oil terminals and pipelines. At a Facility’s request, 
Division Specialists also conduct safety management assessments aimed at identifying 
potential trouble areas in an organization’s defenses against adverse incidents.  
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8.2.2 Initiation of Human Factors Investigations   
MFD specialists and inspectors also investigate oil spills as a means of informing prevention 
strategies. Up until recently, those inquiries identified personnel, organizational, and equipment 
factors as primary or secondary causes of spills, but without clearly distinguishing active failures 
from latent system conditions.  Additionally, it was difficult to capture within the investigation 
framework the multiple factors that often conspired to bring about a single adverse event.  In 
May of 2001, MFD introduced its inspectors to the Human Factors Analysis and Classification 
System (HFACS; Wiegmann & Shappell, 1999) and has begun using that model to support 
inquiries and to analyze system failures that contribute to spills. The HFACS taxonomy was 
selected in part because it is particularly well-suited for prevention, in that it encourages a focus 
on failed system defenses, rather than on individual failures. This allows users of the resulting 
data to address the appropriate system components in devising prevention strategies.   
8.2.3 Adaptations to HFACS   
It was initially clear that MFD needed to extend the tool to cover certain structural and 
mechanical faults as well as environmental conditions in order to cover the spectrum of 
contributors to oil spills.  Note that this is not a deficiency on the part of HFACS:  HFACS was 
intended to guide the human factors portion of an investigation.  Naturally, there will be 
equipment factors, weather factors, and other non-human factors that contribute to many 
casualties and incidents.  It will be necessary for any company to develop its own set of 
classifications to capture these types of problems.  However, MFD observed that most of the 
contributing factors to oil spills were, in fact, human factors, so they found it handy to use 
HFACS as their main classification tool and add the equipment and environmental factors to it. 
Their complete investigation taxonomy is shown in Appendix E (see “HFACS Layer Guides”).  
Equipment factors were appended to the Layer 1 Guide (Unsafe Acts from HFACS) as 
“Structural/Mechanical Damage/Failure”.  This is the equipment analog of an unsafe act, in that 
the damage or failure appears as the immediate cause of an incident (e.g., the oil spill appeared 
to be caused by a damaged valve).  Similarly, equipment and environmental factors were added 
to the Preconditions layer (Layer 2).  Just as “complacency” is an adverse mental state 
(precondition) that can lead to a routine violation (unsafe act) like taking a shortcut that causes 
an incident, substandard equipment design, such as an ambiguous display, can be the 
precondition for an unsafe act (misreading the display and causing an incident).  In this way, 
MFD combined the major oil spill causal factors – both human and non-human – into a single, 
HFACS-like taxonomy.   
Adaptations were made to the human factors taxonomy as well.  HFACS was originally 
developed for aircraft accidents, and thus incorporates certain terminology and causal factors 
related to aviation (such as “hypoxia” and “spatial disorientation”).  These terms were dropped. 
Maritime industry specific terms are captured using event data forms, which require an incident 
specific statement of the actor (an individual or group, or a structure/part) and a situation-
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specific description of the action/inaction or system failure that contributed to the incident. This 
remains an ongoing process. 
8.2.4 Training and Job Aids  
HFACS was introduced to MFD when their human factors analyst took a full-day workshop on 
the topic led by Drs. Wiegmann and Shappell.  He then developed and provided training on 
HFACS to MFD’s inspectors and specialists.  Discussions among MFD staff occur during 
monthly meetings, and along with input from other maritime industry representatives, these 
meetings led to modifications in the taxonomy (discussed above) and to the development of job 
aids.  The job aids used by MFD inspectors are provided in Appendix E. 
New job aids and revisions of existing ones are considered regularly in response to issues that 
arise during monthly meetings. Situation-specific guidance sheets are presently under 
development to guide team members in collecting essential information in response to particular 
circumstances.  Guidance is in a bulleted “If – then” form. For example,  
 If the incident involves turning an incorrect valve,  
 Then   
• photograph the valve and its immediate area;  
• ask about a history of such incidents;  
• ask whether the involved personnel were experienced with the equipment;  
• detail communications leading up to the action.  
The intention of these sheets is to assure that relevant data are collected before they are lost. 
8.2.5 Benefits of Human Factors Investigations  
MFD is less than a year into using the revised HFACS investigation tool, and is still learning 
about the process and making changes to its procedures.  However, an early analysis of six 
incidents shows that inspectors are learning to use the tool.  Of the 21 causal factors identified, 
20 could be completely categorized by the inquiry team – which included marine safety 
inspectors, specialists and a human factors analyst – using HFACS.   
Not surprisingly, inquiry teams were more successful at identifying unsafe acts and 
preconditions than they were at finding problems in other latent factors like unsafe supervision 
and organizational influences.  Team members felt that they had sufficiently considered and 
identified all relevant unsafe acts in five (of the six) incidents, and had identified all the 
preconditions in four of the incidents.  However, teams judged that they had identified all the 
potential types of unsafe supervision in only three of the incidents, and had identified all the 
organizational factors in only one incident.   
There are five issues that may contribute to the difficulty of identifying latent factors.  The first is 
that it can take substantial time and resources (on the parts of both the investigator and those 
being investigated) to dig beneath the surface and unearth latent factors.  Sufficient time is not 
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always available.  Second, when a regulatory body (such as MFD) or an employer is also the 
investigator, the fear of punishment can be a disincentive for those under investigation to fully 
cooperate and help identify latent factors. Third, necessary information may be unavailable, 
either because it is confidential (e.g., personnel records) or unrecoverable (e.g., a momentary 
state of mind, an absent maintenance record). Fourth, organizational influences in particular 
sometimes only become apparent over the course of several incidents rather than in a single 
one. Team members have addressed this through incorporating a structured note rather than 
assigning a contributing factor when they have reason to believe – but not definitive evidence – 
that an organizational factor is among weakened defenses in a particular case. Finally, those 
conducting the inquiry may lack the know-how or experience to ask the appropriate questions. 
This can occur for those with considerable maritime knowledge as well as those with human 
factors knowledge, since for any one investigator that knowledge is likely to be centered around 
particular areas (ship, terminal, company operations, or management), and their ability to 
establish a comfortable rapport with key individuals related to the incident will vary accordingly. 
While there are too few cases yet to allow for meaningful analysis, there have already been 
“lessons learned” that can help commercial companies improve safety.  MFD is starting a 
newsletter as a way of sharing this information with the marine terminal companies.  Another 
benefit from these initial uses of HFACS has been the discovery of an area in which MFD can 
improve its reviews of preventative maintenance programs. Additionally, notes have been 
expanded to capture instances when “outside influences” – factors other than terminal and 
vessel organizations – contribute to incidents. In summary, MFD’s human factors incident 
investigation program has gotten off to a good start and shows promise in discovering how 
marine terminals can change their policies and operations to improve safety and reduce oil 
spills. 
8.3 Stolt-Nielsen Transportation Group 
8.3.1 Background   
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. is one of the world’s leading providers of transportation services for bulk liquid 
chemicals, edible oils, acids, and other specialty liquids.  The company, through its parcel 
tanker, tank container, terminal, rail and barge services, provides integrated transportation for 
its customers.  Stolt-Nielsen Transportation Group owns 72 ships involved in the chemical 
parcel trade:  51 ships in world-wide trade and 21 ships in coastal trade in Europe and the Far 
East.   
Stolt-Nielsen has developed a full International Ship Management (ISM) Quality and Safety 
Program for its ships.  This program is to the highest standards of the industry and is audited by 
three classification societies.  The safety program tracks and investigates all incidents and uses 
statistical process control methods to identify trends.  In turn, this information is used to develop 
training and educational programs designed to reduce risks and losses.  As an industry leader, 
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Stolt-Nielsen also shares its data and benchmarks with other companies through groups such 
as the National Safety Council16.   
8.3.2 Human Factors Incident Investigation   
Stolt-Nielsen has been doing incident investigation for a number of years.  Since it already had 
an ongoing training and Quality Assurance program, the incident investigation program was 
added under the same umbrella at minimal cost to the company.  In 1992, a human factors 
investigation taxonomy was added.  Stolt’s investigation form (see App. F), while simpler than 
those used by MAIB and MFD, has nevertheless proven to help the company detect and correct 
a variety of safety hazards.   
Incident investigation is a combined responsibility of ships’ officers and of Stolt’s Division of 
Marine and Safety Services.  Officers are trained on incident investigation, and other Quality 
Assurance topics, every three years.  Because Stolt’s officers and crew are from around the 
world, training is an expensive undertaking.  All incident forms are sent to the Assistant 
Manager of Marine and Safety Services, who completes the investigation.  By having a single 
person ultimately responsible for the incident data helps to keep the data reliable (consistent 
use of terms and coding).  The major problem with investigating incidents is that the fleet is 
distributed worldwide, making timely and accurate reporting a challenge.  However, persistence 
on the part of the investigator and a shared understanding of the importance of the incident 
program has led to a successful program. 
The Assistant Manager is also responsible for the data analysis, which is a “plus”, since the 
analyst knows the terminology and understands the constraints under which the data were 
collected, which in turn reduces the likelihood that unwarranted data comparisons will be made.  
Stolt analyzes their incident data quarterly, looking both for trends within the company and 
benchmarking their incident rates against those of other shippers that are members of the 
National Safety Council.  “Lessons learned” from incident analyses are disseminated widely 
through the company via Loss Control Bulletins and training programs. 
8.3.3 Benefits of the Incident Database   
Stolt enjoys a lower incident rate than the industry average (Fig. 21), due in large part to its 
attentive tracking of incidents and responsive safety interventions.  Stolt uses frequency 
analysis and analyzes trends over years to identify safety problems and track the success of its 
interventions.  As described in the Analysis section, Stolt had used incidents to determine that 
crew members suffered a high frequency of slips, trips, and falls.  In response, the company 
acquired new safety shoes designed for better traction on wet surfaces.  Follow-up statistics  
                                                
16 The Waterborne Transport Division of the National Safety Council currently keeps safety data that 
members can use for benchmarking.  There are plans to produce guidance and training to help members 
improve their safety analysis and benchmarking capabilities.  For more information, please see their 
website at http://www.waterbornetransport.com  or contact William Boehm by phone at (281) 860-5043 or 
by email at wboehm@stolt.com . 
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Lost Time Injury Rates (Industry vs. Stolt)
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Figure 21. Comparison of Lost Time Injury Rates between Stolt  
and an Industry Average from 1992 through 2000 
This is an example of how Stolt uses incident data to benchmark 
its safety relative to other companies.  (Data courtesy of Stolt-
Nielsen Transportation Group.) 
 
revealed a marked decrease in slips, trips, and falls, which appear to show the success of the 
intervention.   
Another use of incident data is shown in Figure 22, which depicts a comparison of the 
frequencies of various types of injuries (data for the first three quarters of 2001).  As can be 
seen in the graph, injuries to the head and eyes happened most frequently, and these findings 
were supported by data from prior years.  Thus, Stolt has reviewed the types of safety glasses 
and hardhats used by crew members and have identified problems with the current safety 
equipment.  An alternate type of safety glasses is now being tried which hopefully will provide 
better protection.  Regarding hardhats, one of the problems discovered was that current 
hardhats were uncomfortable, and crew members did not wear them consistently.  A new type 
of head protection – a ball cap with a “butcher’s hard cap” inserted inside – is being trialed as a 
result. 
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Analysis of Body Parts Injured
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Figure 22. Number of Incidents as a Function of Body Part Injured. 
(Data from first three quarters of 2001; courtesy of Stolt-
Nielsen Transportation Group.)  This shows how Stolt uses 
incident data to identify safety hazards.   
 
Stolt regards its incident investigation program to be a resounding success.  By using incident 
investigation as a part of its overall Quality Assurance program, Stolt has been able to identify 
and correct safety problems, many of which have human factors causes.  Through a consistent 
focus on incident causes and efforts to remediate those causes, Stolt has achieved lower injury, 
accident, and pollution rates than the industry average.  The company is justifiably proud of its 
safety record. 
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9.0 SUMMARY 
As we have seen, human error (and usually multiple errors made by multiple people and at 
multiple levels of the organization) contributes to the vast majority (over 80%) of marine 
casualties and offshore incidents, making the prevention of human error of paramount 
importance if we wish to reduce the number and severity of maritime and offshore incidents.  
Many types of human errors were described, the majority of which were shown not to be the 
“fault” of the human operator.  Rather, most of these errors tend to occur as a result of 
technologies, work environments, and organizational factors which do not sufficiently consider 
the abilities and limitations of the people who must interact with them, thus “setting up” the 
human operator for failure.   
Human
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Figure 23. Tools for an Effective Incident Investigation Program 
 
Incident investigation that includes an analysis of human error is needed if we are to prevent 
these incidents in the future.  This paper has presented several different tools that can be used 
to perform a human factors incident investigation and to use the resulting data to improve the 
company’s safety program (Fig. 23).  Appendix H presents a selection of human-related 
questions that can be asked to identify potential human error issues.  The human-system 
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approach helps the investigator consider suboptimal interfaces and interactions between 
people, technology, organization, and environment that may have contributed to the incident.   
Reason (1990) created a useful framework for categorizing the types of human error.  His 
“Swiss cheese” model considers not just the unsafe acts of the operator, but also considers 
several layers of system defenses that may need mending if the safety program is to be 
effective:  preconditions for unsafe acts, unsafe supervision, and organizational factors.  
Reason’s model has been captured in the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System 
(HFACS; Shappell & Wiegmann, 1997a, 2000; Wiegmann & Shappell, 1999), an incident 
investigation system which has been used widely and successfully in military and industrial 
incident investigation.  HFACS was presented in this document because it is relatively easy to 
learn and use, and because it has a history of enabling successful safety programs.  HFACS 
can be used by the offshore and maritime industries to supplement existing incident data 
systems with human factors information.  For companies that have not yet begun an incident 
investigation program, additional classification schemes, both for specific human-related errors 
(fatigue, communications, and skills and knowledge) and for non-human incident data (e.g., 
vessel or platform type, activities/operations during which the incident occurred, environmental 
and weather conditions that may have played a role) are provided in the Appendices.  Event 
and Causal Factors Charting was introduced as an additional tool to aid in understanding the 
events that led to an incident and the causal factors that underlie those events.  Used together,  
Event and Causal Factors Charting followed by an HFACS analysis of the causes can provide a 
powerful way to represent the development of an incident and to identify the system failures that 
generated and perpetuated the incident.   
It cannot be overemphasized that a good incident database is only the starting point for a 
successful incident prevention program.  An open, fair, improvement-seeking culture, a common 
understanding of the purpose and scope of the incident investigation program, appropriate 
training for incident investigators, a simple, user-friendly database, and feedback on the results 
of the incident investigation program are all essential elements to the collection of valid and 
complete incident data.  In addition, regular analysis of the incident data is required to identify 
potential problems and to evaluate the results of new safety programs.  Several data analysis 
techniques were summarized that can help companies make the most of their incident data.  As 
was pointed out, one cannot do data analysis blindly – one must consider changes in policies 
and procedures that may have had an effect on the way data were collected and classified.  
Thoughtful analysis will help to distinguish spurious results from real trends that may require 
intervention.  Follow-up studies (“data-driven research”) are usually needed to thoroughly 
understand a given safety issue and determine what types of interventions may be needed. 
Finally, we considered how to select interventions based on the types of system defenses that 
have failed.  By linking Reason’s “Swiss cheese” with Miller’s “triangle of effectiveness”, we 
have a tool for finding the most effective ways to solve safety problems.  While traditional safety 
management seems to focus on reprimanding, cajoling, and “more training”, the triangle of 
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effectiveness shows that these are the least effective ways for reducing incidents.  A safety 
culture must start at the top, and so, too, must the most effective interventions.  Management 
participation, human-centered workplace design, and human-compatible environmental control 
may require more up-front effort than “yet another training course”, but because these elements 
are integral to the safe design and operation of the workplace, they will reap much larger safety 
benefits.  The safety-conscious organization “starts at the top” when developing safety 
interventions to protect its employees, products, and the environment. 
Human errors can be reduced significantly.  Other industries have made tremendous progress 
in controlling human error through careful documentation of incidents, analysis of incident data, 
follow-up studies, and top-down, human-centered interventions.  Indeed, maritime/offshore 
industries can do the same:  the U.K.’s Marine Accident Investigation Branch, California’s 
Marine Facilities Division, and Stolt-Nielsen Transportation Group have all shown that the 
maritime/offshore sector can put human factors incident investigation to effective and profitable 
use.  By using human factors incident investigation to identify weaknesses in our system 
defenses, and by crafting safety interventions through the human-centered design of 
technologies, work environments, and organizations, we can support the human operator and 
foster improved performance and fewer incidents.   
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APPENDIX A.  SAMPLE INCIDENT REPORTING FORM17 
 
 
The first step in learning from incidents is to find out that they happened!  This appendix 
presents a form that can be used by workers to report incidents and near-misses.  If your 
company’s incident database is to contain information from both investigated (i.e., someone 
acts on the information in the reporting form and opens an investigation of the incident) and 
non-investigated (i.e., the reporting form is the only source of information) incidents, it becomes 
important to be able to judge the “goodness” or validity and completeness of the incident data.  
You may want to add a field to your database to show whether the incident was investigated or 
not (or the degree to which it was investigated).  Another example of rating the completeness of 
the incident data is shown in App. E at the bottom of the HFACS Event Data Form.  All these 
incidents are investigated, and the investigators mark whether they believe they were able to do 
a full investigation.   
The reporting form in this appendix was developed for the anonymous reporting of near-misses.  
As such, it requests information about both the incident and the person reporting the incident.  
Information about the reporter is requested in order to infer the likelihood that the reporter has 
experience in the incident context (that is, is the reporter likely to know what correct procedures 
should have been, and would he/she understand the ramifications of the steps that led to the 
incident).  Question 6 seeks to aid the assessment of the reliability of the reported information 
by finding out whether the person who reported it was actually involved in the incident first-hand.  
In this way, one can attempt to weigh the potential value of the information in the incident report.   
                                                
17 based on a prototype of the International Maritime Information Safety System (IMISS; see Rothblum, 
Chaderjian, & Mercier, 2000). 
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Incident Reporting Form 
 
 
Tell us about yourself 
 
1.  In what maritime sector are you involved? 
 deep draft 
 inland 
 off-shore  
 terminal 
 recreational 
 
 other _____________________________ 
 
 
2.  What is your specific job? (e.g., Ordinary 
Seaman, 2nd Asst. Engineer, drilling 
supervisor, dock worker, USCG XO) 
 
 
 
3.  Type of vessel / facility / structure where 
you typically work? (e.g., crude oil tanker, 
tension leg platform, liquid bulk terminal) 
Incident / Potential Hazard 
4.  Type of incident or hazard (e.g., near-collision, 
near-injury; buoy off-station, dangerous work 
practice)  
5.  When did the incident / hazard occur?     
 
Date: ____/____/____      dawn 
           mm / dd  /  yy   daylight 
   dusk 
Time: _________ am/pm   night 
 
        
6.  How were you involved in the incident (or 
discovering the hazard)? 
 directly involved – I was an active participant. 
 indirectly involved – I was at the scene, and 
saw/heard everything that happened. 
 observed from a distance – I did not see/hear 
everything. 
 not involved – I heard about this from 
someone else. 
 other (describe): 
 
7.  Type of vessels, platforms, structures, or 
facilities involved (e.g., lineboat, trawler, 
shipyard, jack-up rig):   
 
 
 
8.  Describe the visibility, weather, and water 
conditions. 
(e.g., overcast, light rain, no wind, river stage 8 
ft. and rising) 
 
 
 
9.  Where did it happen?  (specify the waterway, port, location on ship, etc.): 
 
 
 
10.  What specific operation(s) was occurring at the time of the incident or hazard? (e.g., normal 
bridge/pilothouse watch, normal engineroom watch, cargo transfer operation, ballasting, making tow, 
fishing) 
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11.  Describe what happened.  What were the events which led up to the problem?  How was the 
problem discovered?  What happened next?  (be as specific as possible, and put events in the order 
in which they happened)  For a potential hazard, describe the situation and what could have 
happened.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12.  What do you think caused the incident or contributed to the events surrounding the incident?  
(Consider:  decisions; actions; inactions; information overload; communication; fatigue; drugs or 
alcohol; physical or mental condition; procedures; policies; design of equipment / ship / facility / 
waterway; crew / workers (experience, manning); weather; visibility; equipment failure (why did it 
fail?); maintenance.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13.  What went right?  How was an accident avoided?  (Consider:  corrective actions; contingency 
plans; emergency procedures; luck.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14.  How can we prevent similar incidents (correct the hazard)?  What changes need to be made?  
By whom?    This block is also for describing Lessons Learned, Safety Tips, and Suggestions. 
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APPENDIX B.  DATABASE ITEMS ON GENERAL INCIDENT INFORMATION18 
(to be collected in addition to the human error data) 
 
 
Time, Location, and General Conditions 
 
Date:        /       /      .  
 mm / dd / yy 
 
Month and Year:         /      .  
 mm / yy 
 
Day of Week:  Su  Mo  Tu  We  Th  Fr  Sa 
 
Local Time:                (24-hr clock)    
 
 
Location of vessel/platform/facility 
Port/Harbor 
Terminal 
Pier   
At Anchor  
Restricted waters (marked channel, bay, etc. 
Ocean (≥ 12 nm)  
Coastal (< 12nm) 
Inland waters 
River  
Great Lakes 
Lake 
Bay / Sound / Strait 
 Offshore Platform in State Waters ( <3nm) 
 Offshore Platform in Federal Waters ( >3nm) 
Other ______________________________ 
 
 
Specific Location 
 Lat: _____ 
 Long: ______ 
 Type of Aid to Navigation: _____ 
 Waterbody / Waterway name: __________________________ 
 Port / Harbor name: ____________________________ 
 Water depth _______ ft. 
 Mile Marker_________ 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
18 based on a prototype of the International Maritime Information Safety System (IMISS; see Rothblum, 
Chaderjian, & Mercier, 2000). 
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Light 
 Dawn (morning twilight) 
 Daylight 
 Dusk (evening twilight) 
 Night 
 
Visibility 
 Visibility: ______ nm 
 Clear 
 Cloud cover 
 Fog 
 Other 
 
Weather  
 Calm Thunderstorm 
 Rain Sleet 
 Snow  Hurricane 
 Hail Tornado 
 Waterspout 
 Other ________________________ 
 
 
Water Conditions 
  
 Salinity (fresh/salt) _________ 
  river stage ____ ft. Rising OR Falling 
  Flood stage ____     Above gauge level ___   At gauge level _____ 
  Below gauge level ____    Low gauge level ____ 
 Swells:_______ ft.  OR  sea state  _____  
 Wave height  _______  ft; Wave period_________  sec; Wave Direction ______degrees 
  Current velocity: _________ 
 Current direction__________ 
   Ebb/Flood 
 Tide: Rising/ Falling   Hours since high/low water_______  
 Obstructed/Floating debris: Describe___________________________ 
 Other ________________________ 
 
Wind:    direction: _____     speed: ____ kts.  
 
 
 
Number of vessels involved  _____ 
 
Number of facilities/platforms involved ______ 
 
Number of people involved _____ 
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Vessel activity, Vessel #1 (check all that apply) 
 
Vessel not underway Fishing USCG / Military 
Docked Fishing CG – patrolling 
At anchor Trolling CG – boarding 
Moored Trawling CG – interdiction 
 Longlining CG – transit 
Vessel in port Dive CG – towing 
Docking/undocking Siening CG - setting buoys 
Mooring/Releasing Lines Dragging CG - ice breaking 
Maneuvering Hauling Gear CG – assist 
Shifting dock-to-dock Setting Gear CG - helo ops 
Embark/disembark pilot Setting pots/traps UNREP Ops 
Embark/disem. 
Passengers 
Fish processing 
Other fishing __________ 
Other CG ops _________ 
Other military ops _______ 
Transfer oil/chemicals   
Transfer containers Towing Test & Repair 
Transfer bulk cargo Towing/pushing/hip Testing main engines 
Transfer break bulk Locking Shut-down Engines/Cargo 
Bunkering River upbound Equipment testing 
Tug escort River downbound Deck Machinery 
Break Bulk Cargo Make/break tow Electronics 
Other cargo activity _____ Other towing _________ Maintenance 
Other port activity ______  Repairs 
 Other Commercial 
Activity 
Safety Equipment Test 
Transiting Production (platform) Engine Dept Equipment 
Test 
Channel inbound Logging Deck Equipment Test 
Channel outbound Drilling Crew shift Cargo Monitor Equipment 
Test 
Port inbound Tank cleaning  
Port outbound Ballasting/deballasting Other Vessel Activities 
Open waters transit Lightering Recreational boating 
Great Lakes transit Bunkering/Fueling Evacuation 
Meeting  Prep for extreme event 
(e.g., hurricane) 
Passing/Overtaking Transfer-related Other _______________ 
Crossing Cargo Transfer at Anchor  
Overtaking Diving  
Tug escort Touring  
Other transit _________ Launch Service  
 Other commercial _______  
  
 
Vessel Activity, Vessels #2 and #3 (repeat above) 
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Facility Activity  (check all that apply) 
 
Maintenance Rail Operations VTS operations 
Equipment testing Truck Operations in Yard Bridge opening/closing 
Dry docking Training Workers Lock operations 
Dock loading/unloading Oil Transfer Other activity ________ 
Dock crane operations Dry Bulk Transfer  
Loading Containers Break Bulk Transfer  
Staging Containers Chemical Transfer  
 
 
Incident/Hazard Event  (check all that apply) 
 
Vessel/platform event   
Abandonment Evasive maneuver Loss of electrical power 
Allision Explosion Loss of maneuverability 
Blowout Fire Loss of stability 
Capsize Flooding Material failure 
Collision Fouling Material failure, diving 
Damage to cargo Grounding Set adrift 
Damage to environment Implosion Sinking 
Emergency response  Other ________________ 
   
   
Personnel event   
Amputation Drowning Sprain/strain 
Asphyxiation Electrocution Struck by object 
Broken bone Fall into water Other ________________ 
Burn Paralysis  
Crush Severe bleeding  
Cut Slip/trip/fall  
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Type of Vessel:  Vessel # 1  (check one) 
 
Tank Vessel Passenger USCG / Military 
Petroleum Passenger, small CG cutter 
LNG tanker Passenger, large CG small boat 
Chemical Ferry CG ice breaker 
Other tanker ___________ Casino boat CG buoy tender 
 Cruise ship CG other _____________ 
Freight Vessel  Other military ___________ 
Breakbulk Other Vessels/Platforms  
Bulk, Ore Fishing vessel  Recreational 
Bulk, Grain Fish processor Jet Ski 
Bulk, Other ___________ Offshore supply vessel Sail boat 
Container ship Platform/rig Powerboat 
 Workboat (platform) Other recreational boat ___ 
Tow and Barge MODU  
Towing vessel OBO  
Tow and barge combo Heavy lift  
Barge w/o towboat Dredge  
Tank barge _________ Pilot boat  
Freight barge ________ Other commercial _______  
Other barge _________ HSC [High speed craft]  
Tug escort Hydrographic survey  
Composite Unit Emergency Response  
 
(repeat above for vessels #2 and #3) 
 
Type of Facility:  Facility # 1  (check one) 
 
Cargo Facilities Platforms / Drilling 
Port / pier / dock Offshore, Fixed platform 
Container terminal Jack-up rig 
Liquid Bulk terminal Mobile Oil Production Units 
Solid Bulk with self loading systems Compliant Tower 
Bulk cargo facility Tension Leg Platform 
Break bulk cargo facility Other deep water 
production/drilling facilities 
Oil/chemical facility Lifeboat 
Container facility  
Other cargo facility _______ Other Facilities 
 Designated waterfront facility 
Moorings Shipyard / Dry dock 
Single point moorings Marina 
Multi buoy moorings  VTS 
Offshore moorings Waterfront Facility 
  
  
(repeat above for Facility # 2) 
 
 
Person # 1  (check one) 
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Crew on Deep Draft Ship Crew on Towing Vessel Crew on USCG/Military 
Master Captain/Pilot (towing) 
1st Class operator 
CG Command (CO,XO,EO) 
Chief mate Mate (towing) 
2nd Class Operator 
CG bridge crew 
1 Mate Deckhand CG engineering 
2 Mate Engineer CG other ____________ 
3 Mate Cook Other military _________ 
4 Mate Other towing __________  
AB  Waterway Personnel 
OS Port / Dock Workers Lock Master 
Boatswain Dock/Harbor Master Bridge Tender 
Other Deck ____________ Port Engineer VTS 
Chief Engineer Port Captain Federal Pilot 
1 Asst. Eng. Port Pilot State Pilot 
2 Asst. Eng. Port Safety Rep.  Other Waterway ________ 
3 Asst. Eng. Mooring Master  
QMED/Oiler/Wiper Line Handlers Platform / Rig Crew 
Maintenance Dept. Hose Crew (Hook up) Operations supervisor 
Other Eng. ____________ Hose Watch Logging 
personnel/contractor 
 Terminal Person in Charge Drilling supervisor/engineer 
Chief Steward Longshoreman Platform foreman 
Steward Dock Worker Platform crew 
Chief Cook Gaugers Drilling supervisor/engineer 
Cook Pilot Drill rig personnel 
Purser Docking Pilot Other _____________ 
Waiter Other Port _____________  
Other Deep Draft _______  Other Personnel 
Cadet Shipyard / Inspections Vendor 
Trainee Shipyard worker Agent 
Pumpman Ship chandler Visitor 
Entertainer Government Inspector Passenger 
 Class society inspector Recreational boater 
 Insurer Ship Chandler 
 Surveyor Other _______________ 
 Other ____________  
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Person #1’s Activity at Time of Incident  (check as many as apply) 
 
On-board Activity Platform Crew Activity Military Crew Activity 
Watch / work / OT Drilling operations Watch / work  
Off duty Normal production 
operations 
Off duty 
Navigation watch Crane operations Collateral duty 
Engineering watch Maintenance Navigation watch 
Eng. Maintenance/repair Testing Engineering watch 
Deck maintenance Evacuation Maintenance 
Handling lines Off duty CG boarding team 
Make/break tow Other platform _________  
Load/discharge cargo  CG helo ops 
Load/discharge 
passengers 
Shipyard Crew Activity CG setting ATONs 
Meal prep./serve Dry dock CG launching small boat 
Other on-board ________ Ship repair CG other ____________ 
 Logging Other military _________ 
Facility Crew Activity Other shipyard _________  
Describe __________  Other _____________ 
   
     
 
Person #1’s Impairments  (check as many as apply to incident) 
 
Fatigue Hearing impairment 
Suspected alcohol intoxication Vision impairment 
Suspected drug intoxication Impaired mobility 
Rx/OTC medications Speech impediment 
Illness  Poor or no English 
High stress  
Chronic health condition: __________________  
Psychological condition: __________________  
Other ____________________  
 
 
 
(repeat Person, Activity, and Impairments for Persons # 2, 3, and 4) 
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Equipment Factors  (check as many as apply to the incident) 
 
Vessel Equipment   which 
failed: 
Platform Equipment which 
failed: 
Problem: 
Steering gear Drill rig Inoperable 
Engine Drill equipment (tanks) Operated incorrectly 
Generator Pipelines & valves  
Reefers Crane Cause: 
Radar/ARPA Compressors Lack of maintenance 
Electronic chart Safe shut-down equipment Improper maintenance 
Communications system Gas handling units Design/manufacture error 
Other bridge equipment Hoses Improper use 
Winch Separators Operator error 
Lines Fire detection/control Inadequate training 
Crane Command & Control 
equipment 
Other _________________ 
Electrical O-ring/gasket  
Piping Other platform ________ Location of equipment 
Door/hatch  Bridge 
Sanitation  Engine room 
Anchor/chain Safety & Personal 
Protection Gear 
Deck 
Vent system Firefighting equipment Tanks 
Pump Fire suppression equipment Other ______________ 
Valves Life jackets/preservers  
Remote control/monitoring 
systems 
Life boats 
Cold water immersion suits 
 
Other vsl equip__________ Hearing protection  
 Eye protection  
 Head protection  
 Chemical protection gear  
 Respirators  
 Other safety ___________  
     
    
      
Waterway Factors  (check all that apply) 
 
high/low river stage dangerous crossing 
strong current dangerous traffic scheme 
buoy off-station channel width/depth not as charted 
nav aid not working Narrow channel 
poorly marked waterway dangerous sandbars/shoals 
bridge not marked dangerous port design/layout 
Last Chart Survey of Area  
Where charts corrected for latest 
survey (ship on dock) 
Nav aid not available such as DGPS off air 
Additional permitted activities Severe weather/waves 
Debris in water Other:__________ 
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APPENDIX C.  EXAMPLES OF HUMAN FACTORS TAXONOMIES 
(in alphabetical order by system name) 
 
Incident/Accident System Agency Reference 
Aviation Safety Reporting 
System (ASRS) 
run by NASA for the FAA; used by 
commercial aviation (flight crews, 
ground crews, and air traffic 
control) 
Reynard W.D., Billings C.E., 
Cheaney E.S., & Hardy R.  
(1986).  The Development of the 
NASA Aviation Safety Reporting 
System.  NASA Reference 
Publication 1-1-14.  National 
Aeronautics and Space 
Administration. 
Confidential Hazardous 
Incident Reporting Programme 
(CHIRP) 
Concerted Action Committee on 
Casualty Analysis (European 
Commission) 
Concerted Action Committee on 
Casualty Analysis (1998).  
Confidential Hazardous Incident 
Reporting Programme.  FP4 
Waterborne Transport Tasks 21 
and 36. (draft) 
Human Error Root Cause 
Analysis (HERCA) 
U.S. Dept. of Energy Collopy M.T. & Waters R.M. 
Human Factors Analysis and 
Classification System (HFACS) 
US Navy and Marine aviation Shappell S.A. & Wiegmann D.A.  
(1997)  A human error approach 
to accident investigation:  The 
taxonomy of unsafe operations.  
International J. Aviation 
Psychology, 7(4), 269-291. 
 
Human Factors Checklist, and 
others based on the SHEL-
GEMS models 
International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO); 
Transportation Safety Board (TSB) 
of Canada;  
US Coast Guard; International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) 
ICAO (1993).  Investigation of 
Human Factors in Accidents and 
Incidents.  Human Factors 
Digest No. 7, ICAO Circular 240-
AN/144.  Montreal, Canada:  
Author. 
TSB of Canada (1988).  An 
Integrated Process for 
Investigating Human Factors. 
Montreal: Author.  
International Maritime 
Organization (1998).  Role of the 
Human Element in Maritime 
Casualties.  Maritime Safety 
Committee, 69th Session, 
Agenda Item 13 (MSC/69/13-1).  
London:  Author. 
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Human Factors Investigation 
Tool (HFIT) 
prototype in testing Gordon R., Flin R. & Mearns K. 
(2001).  Designing a Human 
Factors Investigation Tool to 
Improve the Quality of Safety 
Reporting.  Proceedings of the 
Human Factors and Ergonomics 
Society 45th Annual Meeting, 
1519-1523. 
Human Performance 
Investigation Process (HPIP); 
TapRooT (a commercial 
revision of HPIP) 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
and various industries 
Paradies M., Unger L., Haas P., 
& Terranova M. (1993)  
Development of the NRC’s 
Human Performance 
Investigation Process, Vol. 1-3.  
Report # NUREG/CR-5455.  
Washington, DC:  Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission.   
Paradies M., Unger L., & Busch 
D. (199x).  Root Cause Tree 
User’s Manual, Revision 3.   
Influence Networks UK Maritime and Coastguard 
Agency (MCA); UK Health and 
Safety Executive (HSE); 
International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) 
Embrey, D (1992) Incorporating 
Management and Organisational 
Factors into Probalistic Safety 
Assessment. Reliability 
Engineering, 38, 199-208. 
BOMEL Limited (2001) FSA of 
Bulk Carriers – Develop-ment 
and Quantification 
of Influence Networks 
(undertaken for MCA, UK). 
International Maritime 
Information Safety System 
(IMISS) 
prototype system developed by a 
SNAME working group, sponsored 
by US Coast Guard and US 
Maritime Administration 
Rothblum A., Chaderjian M., and 
Mercier K. (2000).  Development 
and Evaluation of the 
International Maritime 
Information Safety System 
(IMISS).  Presented at the 
Society of Naval Architects and 
Marine Engineers, IMISS Public 
Meeting, May 2000. 
Marine Safety Reporting 
System (MSRS) 
Human Factors Group Safe Marine Transportation 
(SMART) Forum of Puget 
Sound, 1997.  Marine Reporting:  
The Development of a Northwest 
Marine Safety Reporting 
System.  Seattle, WA:  Author.  
(see App. D) 
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APPENDIX D.  HUMAN FACTORS TAXONOMY USED BY THE  
U.K. MARINE ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BRANCH 
 
 
 
External Bodies Liaison Non compliance 
 Communication 
 Equipment design - manufacturer 
 Training, skills, knowledge 
 Working environment/workplace 
 Incorrect installation/defective equipment 
 
 
Company & Organisation Company standing orders inadequate, insufficient, conflicting 
 Manufacturer's instructions 
 Communication 
 Pressures - organisational 
 Inadequate resources 
 Training, skills, knowledge 
 
 
Crew Factors Communication 
 Management and supervision inadequate 
 Allocation of responsibility inappropriate 
 Procedures inadequate 
 Manning (rotation/watches) 
 Training 
 Discipline - crew/passengers 
 Unsafe working practices 
 
 
Equipment Equipment misuse 
 Equipment not available as needed 
 Equipment poorly designed for operational use 
 Equipment badly maintained 
    Personnel unfamiliar with equipment/not trained in use 
    Automation means crew not trained in use of manual alternatives 
 
 
Working Environment Performance affected by noise 
 Performance affected by vibration 
 Performance affected by temperature 
 Performance affected by humidity 
 Performance affected by visual environment/visibility 
 Performance affected by ship movement/weather effects 
 Poor housekeeping 
 Layout unsuitable for task 
 Accommodation 
 
Individual Communication 
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 Competence and skill 
 Training, inexperience, knowledge 
 Violation of procedures 
 Health: drugs/alcohol 
 Health: medical condition 
 Domestic issues 
 Fatigue and vigilance 
 Perceptual abilities 
 Poor decision making/information use 
 Perception of risk 
 Workload 
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APPENDIX E.  ADAPTATION OF HFACS BY THE CALIFORNIA STATE LANDS COMMISSION,  
MARINE FACILITIES DIVISION 
 
This appendix shows how the Marine Facilities Division (MFD) of the California State Lands 
Commission has adapted the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) to 
their specific needs.  Below are the guides (job aids) provided to MFD inspectors for their use in 
investigating the human factors and other causes of oil spills.  The job aids contained herein 
include: 
• HFACS Terminology 
• HFACS Layer Guides 
• HFACS Event Data Form (filled out during a spill investigation) 
• Event Data Form Instructions 
Note that the term “Layer” refers to the “slice of cheese” being considered:  Layer 1 equates to 
Unsafe Acts; Layer 2 to Preconditions; Layer 3 to Unsafe Supervision; and Layer 4 to 
Organizational Influences.  The term “Tiers” is a short-hand notation for the levels of the 
taxonomy being considered.  For example, Tier 1 is the Layer or top level classification (e.g., 
unsafe act).  Tier 2 would be the next level of classification, such as an “Error” (unintentional) as 
the type of unsafe act.  Tier 3 would be the bottom or most specific level of classification, such 
as “Skill-based” errors.  “Pick-List” refers to the items or types of the Tier 3 factor, such as 
“omitted step in procedure” under Skill-Based Errors.   
As discussed in the report, MFD adapted HFACS to its needs by incorporating non-HF items 
into the investigation paradigm.  For example, in addition to Unsafe Acts under Layer 1, MFD 
included the category Structural/Mechanical Damage/Failure to help inspectors consider the 
equipment factors that contributed to the incident and how human factors caused or 
complemented the equipment factors in the evolving oil spill.   
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HFACS Terminology 
 
Accident: An unintended event which results in personal injury, illness, property damage, or 
environmental impairment. 
Near Miss: An unintended event which has the potential for causing personal injury, illness, 
property damage or environmental impairment. 
Incident: An unintended event which results in or has the potential for causing personal injury, 
property damage, or environmental impairment. 
Routine Violation (from Reason, 1990): Two factors, in particular appear to be important in 
shaping habitual violations: (a) the natural human tendency to take the path of least effort; and 
(b) a relatively indifferent environment (i.e., one that rarely punishes violations or rewards 
observance). Everyday observation shows that if the quickest and most convenient path 
between two task-related points involves transgressing an apparently trivial and rarely 
sanctioned safety procedure, then it will be violated routinely by the operators of the system. 
Such a principle suggests that routine violations could be minimized by designing systems with 
human beings in mind at the outset. 
Error: a generic term to encompass all those occasions in which a planned sequence of 
activities fails to achieve its intended outcome, and when these failures and when these failures 
cannot be attributed to some chance agency. 
Slip and lapse: errors which result from some failure in the execution and/or storage of an 
action sequence, regardless of whether or not the plan which guided them was adequate to 
achieve its objective. Slips are observable; lapses not. 
Mistake: deficiencies or failures in the judgemental and/or inferential processes involved in the 
selection of an objective or in the specification of the means to achieve it, irrespective of 
whether or not the actions directed by this decision-scheme run according to plan. 
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LAYER 1 GUIDE:  UNSAFE ACTS 
 
Unsafe Acts 
Errors 
Skill-based Perceptual Decision 
failed to prioritize attention misjudged distance/rate/time improper procedure or 
maneuver 
inadvertent use of controls misread dial or indicator misdiagnosed emergency 
omitted step in procedure, or 
executed step out-of-
sequence. 
failed to see/hear/otherwise 
sense 
wrong response to emergency
omitted checklist item or 
completed check list item out-
of sequence. 
 poor decision 
Violations 
Routine Exceptional 
(Fill in) Definition: Common or habitual 
instance of breaking the rules and 
regulations (taking a shortcut) that is part of 
a person’s behavior pattern and is often 
tolerated by the organization 
(Fill in) Definition: Isolated departure from 
authority, rules and regulations (taking a 
shortcut) that is typically not condoned by 
management 
 
 
Structural/Mechanical  Damage/Failure 
Vessel Control 
System 
Vessel Structural Terminal Control 
System 
Terminal Structural 
 containment  containment 
 flange/gasket  flange/gasket 
 hose  hose 
 inert gas system  loading arm  
 loading arm   pipeline 
 pipeline  pump 
 piping  shell plating 
 pump  valve 
 shell plating   
 stern tube   
 valve   
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LAYER 2 GUIDE:  PRECONDITIONS FOR ADVERSE EVENTS 
  
Preconditions For Adverse Events 
Substandard Conditions of Operators 
Adverse Mental States Adverse Physiological States Physical/Mental Limitations
channelized attention impaired physiological state insufficient reaction time 
complacency medical illness poor vision/hearing 
distraction physiological incapacitation lack of knowledge 
mental fatigue physical fatigue incompatible physical 
capability 
haste   
loss of situational awareness   
misplaced motivation   
task saturation   
Substandard Practices of Operators 
Crew Resource Mgt. Personal Readiness 
impaired communications due to language difference self-medicated 
interpersonal conflict among crew inadequate rest 
failed to use all available resources  
failure of leadership  
misinterpretation of traffic calls  
failed to conduct adequate brief  
impaired communication/conflict due to cultural difference  
Substandard Work Interface Adverse Environmental 
Conditions 
Substandard Design 
design 
inadequate for 
use 
design 
inadequate for 
maintenance 
Substandard 
Maintenance 
 
low visibility 
ambiguous instrumentation poorly maintained 
equipment storm 
inadequate layout or space poorly maintained 
workspace extreme temperature 
substandard illumination poorly maintained 
communications 
equipment 
extreme sea state 
substandard 
communications equipment 
  
equipment substandard for 
job 
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LAYER 3 GUIDE:  UNSAFE SUPERVISION 
 
Unsafe Supervision 
Inadequate Supervision Planned Inappropriate 
Operations 
Failed to Correct a 
Known Problem 
Supervisory 
Violations 
failed to provide 
guidance 
failed to provide correct 
data 
failed to correct 
document in error 
authorized an 
unnecessary 
hazard 
failed to provide 
operational doctrine 
failed to provide adequate 
brief time 
failed to identify an at-
risk behavior 
failed to 
enforce rules 
and regulations 
failed to provide 
oversight improper manning 
failed to initiate 
corrective action 
authorized 
unqualified 
crew  
failed to provide training adequacy of operational procedure or plan 
failed to report unsafe 
tendencies 
failed to track 
qualifications 
provided inadequate 
opportunity for crew rest 
failed to track 
performance 
 
 
 
LAYER 4 GUIDE:  ORGANIZATIONAL INFLUENCES 
 
Organizational Influences 
Resource Management Organizational Climate Organizational Process 
inadequate management of 
human resources 
adequacy of organizational 
structure 
adequacy of established 
conditions of work 
inadequate management of 
monetary resources 
adequacy of organizational 
policies 
adequacy of established 
procedures 
inadequate design and 
maintenance of facilities 
adequacy of safety culture adequacy of oversight 
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HFACS Event Data Form 
Control #: OES #: Event Date: Event Time: 
Facility WO #: Facility Name: 
Vessel Name: Reviewed by:     ____         ____         ____        ____ 
Substance: Quantity :                                               gallons 
Who/What Incident Causal Factor Tier 1  Tier 2  Tier 3  Pick-List 
  
Transfer- Related: ___ Yes   ___No Responsible Party: ___ Vessel   ___ Terminal   ___ Other Layer Completeness 1:  Y   N    2:  Y   N     3: Y   N    4: Y   N  
Updated Substance: Quantity:                                       gallons Date: 
Notes (Outside Influences; recommendations; contributors): 
    
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
Event Type 
 
___ Spill 
___ Class 3 Violation 
 
 
Evolution 
 
___ Ballasting/Deballasting 
___ Bunkering 
___ Fueling 
___ Idle 
___ Intra-Terminal 
___ Intra-Vessel 
___ Load/Discharge 
___ Maintenance 
___ Maneuvering 
___ Term/Term 
___ Testing 
___ Other 
 
 
Event  
 
___ Arrival 
___ Depart 
___ Disconnect 
___ Hook-up 
___ Start-Up 
___ Steady 
___ Stripping 
___ Topping off 
___ N/A 
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Event Data Form Instructions: 
Top Sections 
1. Control #:  The control # uniquely identifies the database record for this event. This number 
gets assigned at the point of computer data entry. It can be left blank by the 
inspector/specialist/analyst completing the form. 
2. OES#: This number is assigned by The Office of Emergency Services and can be found on 
the Hazardous Materials Spill Report associated with the spill event. For a class 3 violation, 
this section should be left blank. 
3. Event Date: Enter the month, day and year of the spill or violation event in mm-dd-yyyy 
format. 
4. Event Time: For spills, enter the time of day that the spill occurred. This time can usually be 
found on the Hazardous Materials Spill Report. For class 3 violations, enter the time of day 
the violation was noted. 
5. Facility WO #: Enter the work order number associated with the facility where the event 
occurred. 
6. Facility Name: Enter the name of the facility where the event occurred. 
7. Vessel Name: Enter the name of the vessel, if any, involved in the event. 
8. Reviewed by: Each staff member that produces or reviews the completed form should initial 
here. Each form should be produced by and reviewed by a specialist, inspector and human 
factors analyst at a minimum before it is ready for data entry. 
9. Substance: Enter the product(s) involved. For a violation, enter the product involved only if 
the violation occurred during a transfer event. 
10. Quantity: For a spill event, enter the amount of product spilled, in gallons. For a violation, 
this section should be left blank . 
Left Sections 
1. Event Type: Check the appropriate blank indicating whether the event is a spill or a class 3 
violation. 
2. Evolution: Check appropriate blank(s) indicating the type of operation that was in progress 
when the event occurred. 
3. Event: If the event occurred during a transfer, note the phase of the transfer by checking the 
appropriate phase. 
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Center Grid Sections 
1. Who/What: Indicate one of the following: 
• 
• 
• 
A person or group of persons associated with the incident causal factor identified identify 
in column two. Use job titles rather than names; For example, tankerman, dockworker, 
TPIC, VPIC, chief mate, operations manager, terminal manager, barge company, 
shipping company, etc. 
A damaged or malfunctioning facility structure or piece of equipment associated with the 
incident causal factor identified in column two.  
An environmental condition or event associated with the incident causal factor identified 
in column two. 
2. Incident Causal Factor: a prevailing condition, act, or omission that contributes to bringing 
about an adverse event. 
Note: For each row in the grid, The “Who/What” (column 1) entry and the “Incident 
Causal Factor” (column 2) entry should combine to form a sentence. 
Refer to the document Human Factors Analysis and Classification System – Marine 
Facilities: Definitions for a description of each tier & classification in HFACS. You can also 
use the HFACS Tier and Layer Chart  for a map of tiers and layers. 
3. Tier 1: Enter the most general category for the who/what & incident causal factor listed. 
4. Tier 2: Enter the subcategory for the who/what & incident causal factor listed.  
5. Tier 3: Enter the subtype for the who/what & incident causal factor listed. 
6. Pick-List: For subcategories and subtypes that have pick-list items listed in the HFACS 
Layer Guides, select a specific factor from the list that best describes the incident causal 
factor. 
Bottom Sections 
1. Transfer-Related: Check to indicate whether the spill or class 3 violation is transfer- related. 
2. Responsible Party: For spills, check to indicate the party responsible for the release. 
3. Layer Completeness: For each layer, circle yes if you believe all causal factors that 
contributed to the event were identified as a result of the inquiry. Circle no if you believe 
other causal factors could have been identified had you been able to get more information 
during the inquiry. 
4. Updated Substance:  If the product determined to be involved in the event changes over 
the course of the inquiry, note the change here. 
5. Quantity: enter the final estimate of the amount of product spilled. 
6. Date: Enter the date the HFACS EVENT DATA FORM is completed. 
7. Notes (Outside Influences; recommendations): If groups outside the terminal-vessel 
organizations contributed to the event, note it here. Examples of outside influences include 
government agencies, local public political pressure and economic pressures. Also, specific 
comments about the event, or recommendations that result from the inquiry should be 
added here. 
Working Group 1 - HFW2002 Page 112 of 141 Houston, Texas 
Human Factors in Incident Investigation and Analysis 
 
APPENDIX F  STOLT-NIELSEN ACCIDENT/INCIDENT INVESTIGATION 
  
SHIP: 
  
DATE, TIME & PLACE OF INCIDENT: CONT  
  
LOCATION ONBOARD: 
  
LOSS DESCRIPTION:  (check all applicable) 
 
___ DAMAGE ___ INJURY 
       ___  Property Damage                                      ___  Death 
          ___  System/Equipment Damage                  ___  Serious    
         ___  Cargo Loss/Damage/Contamination          ___  Minor 
        ___  Ship Damage                                      ___ ADMINISTRATIVE  
___ POLLUTION      ___ Operational Delay 
    ___  Contained                                              ___ Regulatory Violation 
        ___ Water Pollution     ___  Inspection Deficiency 
  ___ Air Pollution     ___ FIRE/EXPLOSION 
       ___ Personnel Exposure         ___ COLLISION 
___ GROUNDING                                                     ___ PIRACY/THEFT 
 
___ OTHER (describe):________________________________________________________________ 
 
LOSS SEVERITY:  (check) 
__  Major      __ Serious       __ Minor  
PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE:  (check) 
__  Frequent      __  Occasional      __ Seldom 
DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT:  
 
 
 
 
IMMEDIATE CAUSES:  (What substandard actions and conditions caused or could cause the 
event?) 
 
 
 
UNDERLYING CAUSES:  (What specific personal or job factors caused or could cause the event?) 
 
 
 
REMEDIAL ACTIONS/RECOMMENDED CHANGES:  (To control the causes listed) 
 
 
 
 
   Rev 9/9/99     (Cont'd...)       
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 Page 2:          
RESPONSIBILITY (For remedial action/changes): 
 
 
 
CODING OF IMMEDIATE CAUSES:  (check all applicable) 
SUBSTANDARD ACTIONS: 
__ 1. Operating equipment without authority 
__ 2. Failure to warn 
__ 3. Failure to secure 
__ 4. Operating at improper speed 
__ 5. Making safety devices inoperable 
__ 6. Removing safety devices 
__ 7. Using defective equipment 
__ 8. Using equipment improperly 
__ 9. Failing to use proper personal protective               
 equipment 
__10. Improper loading 
__11. Improper placement 
__12. Improper lifting 
__13. Improper position for task 
__14. Servicing equipment in operation 
__15. Horseplay 
__16. Drugs/Alcohol 
__17. Fatigue 
__18. Procedural error 
 
SUBSTANDARD CONDITIONS: 
__ 1. Inadequate guards or barriers 
__ 2. Inadequate or improper protective equipment 
__ 3. Defective tools, equipment or materials 
__ 4. Congestion or restricted action 
__ 5. Inadequate warning systems 
__ 6. Fire or explosion hazards 
__ 7. Poor housekeeping; disorder 
__ 8. Hazardous environmental conditions 
__ 9. Noise exposure 
__10. Radiation exposure 
__11. High/low temperature exposure 
__12. Inadequate or excess illumination 
__13. Inadequate ventilation 
__14. Installation failure 
__15. Equipment failure 
__16. System failure 
 
CODING OF UNDERLYING CAUSE:  (check all applicable) 
PERSONAL FACTORS: 
__ 1. Fatigue 
__ 2. Inadequate capability 
__ 3. Lack of knowledge 
__ 4. Lack of skill 
__ 5. Stress 
__ 6. Improper motivation  
 
 
JOB FACTORS: 
__ 1. Inadequate Leadership/Supervision  
__ 2. Inadequate Personnel 
__ 3. Inadequate Engineering 
__ 4. Inadequate Maintenance 
__ 5. Inadequate Tools/Equipment 
__ 6. Inadequate Work Standards 
__ 7. Wear and Tear 
__ 8. Abuse or Misuse 
 
     
SUBMITTED BY (print name):  _____________          DATE OF REPORT: ____________ 
  
SAFETY COORDINATOR  SIGNATURE:  ______________________________________ 
  
SHIPS CAPTAIN CONCURRENCE: _________________________________ 
 
FLEET MANAGERS APPROVAL:  _________________________________ 
(Please provide any additional comments on additional sheets and attach.) 
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Appendix G.  Sample Taxonomies for Investigating for Fatigue,  
Communications Problems, and Inadequate Skills and Knowledge 
 
The U.S. Coast Guard Research and Development Center has performed three studies of the 
roles of specific human errors in marine casualties:  fatigue, communications problems, and 
inadequate skills and knowledge.  These studies focused on “critical” casualties, that is, 
casualties which resulted in significant damage to the vessel, cargo, or the environment, or 
which resulted in significant injury to personnel. 
The first two pages (following this introduction) represent data that were found useful for 
determining whether or not fatigue played a role in the incident (McCallum, Raby, & Rothblum, 
1996).  Earlier studies (Marine Transportation Research Board, 1976; National Research 
Council, 1990) had found fatigue to be the “number one” concern of mariners.  This study 
corroborated that concern, finding that fatigue played a role in 16% of critical vessel casualties 
(groundings, collisions, allisions, etc.) and in 33% of critical personnel injuries (lacerations, 
amputations, crushings, etc.).  The types of data reflected in the Fatigue Information form focus 
on scientifically validated causes, symptoms, and effects of fatigue.  This form is recommended 
for use by organizations interested in controlling crew fatigue and reducing the casualties 
fatigue can cause. 
As mentioned in Section 6 in the discussion of statistical analysis, the data from the fatigue 
investigations were submitted to a multiple regression analysis.  The analysis showed that the 
Coast Guard could significantly streamline its initial investigation of fatigue to just three 
questions:  how many hours did the person sleep during the 24-hour period prior to the 
casualty; how many hours did the person work during the 24-hour period prior to the casualty; 
and how many fatigue symptoms did the person experience while on duty prior to the casualty?  
The answers to these questions are put into an equation, as shown on the Fatigue 
Investigations Worksheet (third page of this Appendix), and the result was found to correctly 
identify whether fatigue was a causal factor in 80% of the cases.  Please note that the Fatigue 
Index Score is offered only as an example of the use of statistical analysis of incident data, and 
it is not recommended for use by anyone other than the Coast Guard.  The selection and 
weightings of the variables in the Fatigue Index equation may well reflect the somewhat 
guarded atmosphere of a USCG investigation (i.e., since one’s license could be on the line, one 
is less likely to be open and forthright about one’s condition and everything that occurred).  We 
would anticipate that in the “open, blame-free culture” recommended for safety-conscious 
companies, a very different set of weighting factors (and maybe a different set of variables 
altogether) would apply.   
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Inadequate communications was found to play a role in 18% of critical vessel casualties and in 
28% of critical personnel injuries (McCallum, Raby, Rothblum, Forsythe, Slavich, & Smith, 2000, 
unpublished).  The communications investigation procedures provided in this appendix are 
based on a scientific model of communications (described in the Instructions for Investigating 
Communications Problems in Marine Casualties).  The gist of the procedure is to identify under 
what types of situations communication is normally required – a list that can easily be modified 
to suit any company’s operations – then to determine whether necessary communications were 
absent or ineffective and why.  As described in Section 6, this investigation protocol was not 
only sufficient to identify casualties in which inadequate communications were a contributing 
cause, it also supported a meta-analysis to illuminate underlying causes of the communications 
failures.  In addition, it was found that the five screening questions (Step 1 on the 
communications investigation form) captured 76% of the casualties in which communications 
errors were involved, making it a simple and effective way to determine whether the complete 
communications investigation needs to be performed. 
The final set of investigation forms assess whether skill and knowledge limitations may have 
contributed to the incident.  A study of skill and knowledge errors showed that they played a role 
in 22% of critical vessel casualties and in 32% of critical personnel injuries (McCallum, 
Forsythe, Raby, Barnes, Rothblum, & Smith, 2000, unpublished).  Step 4 of the Mariner Skill & 
Knowledge Limitations Investigation Screening form essentially seeks to distinguish errors of 
knowledge and skilled performance (Decision Errors in HFACS) from slips and lapses (Skill-
based and Perceptual errors in HFACS) and from violations.  If it appears that the individual did 
not intentionally break a rule (violation) and failed to perform an action properly given an honest 
effort, it is assumed that a lack of knowledge or skill is the cause.  The remainder of the skill and 
knowledge forms provide lists of common skill and knowledge areas relevant to different types 
of activities (bridge, deck, engineering, and safety & emergency operations) – obviously, these 
forms can be modified to suit any type of operation.  The crux of the forms is to identify the type 
of error (skill or knowledge that was lacking) and to determine whether the error resulted from a 
lack of training/experience on the part of the person or from a poorly designed standard 
operating procedure (SOP) or policy.  Note that while this analysis will determine whether 
insufficient training, experience, or a poor SOP was a contributing cause, that the best solution 
to such problems may turn out to be other types of interventions, such as a redesign of 
equipment, tasks, or work environment (see Sec. 8).   
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Fatigue Investigation Form 
 
Form should be completed for each individual who was directly linked to the casualty. 
 
Section 1:  Casualty Day 
 
1. Experience of involved individual         year(s) month(s)  
  a) in the industry     
  b) with this company     
  c) in present job or position     
  d) on present vessel     
2. Individual’s activity at time of casualty 
 
3. Specific location on vessel 
 
4. Number of hours on duty at time of casualty  5. Any break (awake) prior to casualty?  No break 
 Yes, when    
6. Time and last meal (breakfast, lunch, dinner) taken prior 
to casualty  
 
7.  Was the schedule on day of casualty different from usual? 
   No    Yes
 
a. What was the difference?     
 
b. How long had you been on this schedule?   
8. Did you experience any of these factors during the last 24 hours prior to the casualty?  (Check all that apply.) 
 Disruptive ship vibrations 
 Disruptive ship motion 
 High noise level 
 Stormy weather 
 Cold temperature  
 Hot temperature  
 Boredom    
    None 
 High stress    
   Other    
 Demanding task 
9. Did you experience any of the following  while you were on duty prior to the casualty?  (Check all that apply.) 
 Forgetful 
 Difficulty keeping eyes opened 
 Difficulty operating equipment 
 Sore muscles 
 Desire to sit or lay down 
 Distracted 
 Less motivated 
 None 
 Other       
 
Section 2:  Working Schedule 
 
 
10. Number of days on tour at time of casualty (including shipyard) 
 
11. Please shade the days on which you had 24 hours off in the previous 30 days 
Dayof
Casualty
123456789101112131415161718192021222324252627282930
 
 
 
(over) 
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Fatigue Information - Side 2 
12. 
Normal 
Schedule 
0 4 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 8 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 0 0
n o o n
1 4 0 0
2 pm
1 6 0 0
4 pm
1 8 0 0
6 pm
2 0 0 0
8 pm
2 2 0 0
10 pm
2 3 5 90 0 0 0
m id n ig ht
0 2 0 0
Work
Sleep
Rec
 
 very    very 
 low    high 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Workload level            
Fatigue level                
Sleep quality            
From the time of casualty, trace back the work, recreation, and sleep  periods for the last 72 hours (3 days) prior to the 
casualty.  Sleep also includes naps.  Please mark time of casualty with vertical line. 
13. 
 
  
Day of 
Casualty 
0 4 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 8 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 0 0
n o o n
1 4 0 0
2 pm
1 6 0 0
4 pm
1 8 0 0
6 pm
2 0 0 0
8 pm
2 2 0 0
10 pm
2 3 5 90 0 0 0
m id n ig ht
0 2 0 0
Work
Sleep
Rec
 
 very    very 
 low    high 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Workload level            
Fatigue level          
Sleep quality          
14. 
Day 1  
Prior to 
Casualty 
0 4 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 8 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 0 0
n o o n
1 4 0 0
2 pm
1 6 0 0
4 pm
1 8 0 0
6 pm
2 0 0 0
8 pm
2 2 0 0
10 pm
2 3 5 90 0 0 0
m id n ig ht
0 2 0 0
Work
leep
Rec
S
 
 very    very 
 low    high 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Workload level          
Fatigue level          
Sleep quality                
15. 
Day 2 
Prior to 
Casualty 
0 4 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 8 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 0 0
n o o n
1 4 0 0
2 pm
1 6 0 0
4 pm
1 8 0 0
6 pm
2 0 0 0
8 pm
2 2 0 0
10 pm
2 3 5 90 0 0 0
m id n ig ht
0 2 0 0
Work
leep
Rec
S
 
 very    very 
 low    high 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Workload level            
Fatigue level          
Sleep quality          
16. 
Day 3 
Prior to 
Casualty 0 4 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 8 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 0 0
n o o n
1 4 0 0
2 pm
1 6 0 0
4 pm
1 8 0 0
6 pm
2 0 0 0
8 pm
2 2 0 0
10 pm
2 3 5 90 0 0 0
m id n ig ht
0 2 0 0
Work
leep
c
S
Re
 
 very    very 
 low    high 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Workload level          
Fatigue level          
Sleep quality          
17. Are there any company or union policies regarding work 
hour limits?  
  No        Yes     Maximum hours:          
18. In the involved individual’s opinion, was fatigue a contributing factor to this 
casualty? 
  No        Yes  Why:    
 
Section 3:  For the Investigator Only 
 
19. What was the decision/action that was considered improper given the existing circumstances? 
 Failure to secure equipment 
 Failure to notice something 
important 
 Failure to take action at proper 
time 
 
 Failure to recognize code/symbol 
 Failure to decide on an action 
 Forgetting to accomplish task 
 Prone to take risks 
 
 Erroneous judgment of situation 
 Erroneous calculations 
 Improper procedures 
 Slow reaction to circumstance 
 Other      
20. a) Was alcohol/drug testing done?  Yes  No 
 b)Was the result:  Positive  Negative    No result  
21. In your opinion, was fatigue a contributing factor to this casualty? 
   No        Yes    Why   
22. On a scale of 1 to 5, do you feel that the mariner gave you true 
and accurate information? 
      
 1 2 3 4 5 
 not at all    extremely 
true & accurate   true & accurate 
Additional Comments 
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FATIGUE INVESTIGATION WORKSHEET 
 
The formula    s(21.4) + wh(6.1) - sh(4.5) = Fatigue Index Score     has been established to 
determine if fatigue may have affected an individual involved in a marine casualty.  It should 
only be used for examining cases in which direct human error contributions are present, i.e., 
those situations which involve an individual’s decisions, actions or inactions as casual factors 
occurring immediately before the casualty. 
Using the Formula 
s(21.4) + wh(6.1) - sh(4.5) = Fatigue Index Score 
 
s = total number of fatigue symptoms (0-7) experienced while on duty before  the casualty 
wh = total number of hours worked in the last 24 hours (to the nearest tenth) 
sh = total number of hours slept in the last 24 hours (to the nearest tenth) 
1.  Interview the individual whose errors directly contributed to the casualty (or another person 
who can verify the information) to determine the total number of fatigue symptoms (s) listed 
below, if any, that the individual experienced while on duty prior to the casualty.  
 
Fatigue Symptoms (s) 
 
- forgetful - desire to sit or lay down 
- distracted - difficulty keeping eyes opened 
- sore muscles - difficulty operating equipment 
- less motivated  
 
2.  Obtain the individual’s total work hours (wh) and sleep hours (sh) for the 24 hour period 
before the casualty.  Determine the Fatigue Index Score using the formula. 
3.  If the Fatigue Index Score is greater than 50, assume that fatigue was a contributing cause 
of the casualty.  Our research has shown that this formula will produce correct results 80% of 
the time. 
Example:  At 0130, the F/V SEA MONKEY ran aground while returning to port.  The mate on 
watch reported that he had slept 3.2 hours and worked 18.6 hours in the 24 hours preceding the 
casualty.  He also said that while on watch before the casualty, he had difficulty keeping his 
eyes opened and felt distracted.  The equation for this casualty would then read: 
 s(21.4) + wh(6.1) - sh(4.5) = Fatigue Index Score 
         2(21.4) + 18.6(6.1) - 3.2(4.5) = Fatigue Index Score 
    141.9 = Fatigue Index Score 
Since the results are greater than 50, fatigue is assumed as a contributing factor to the casualty. 
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Instructions for Investigating Communications Problems in Marine Casualties 
These instructions provide an aid in using the Communications Problems Screening and Investigation Procedures to 
investigate communications problems in vessel and personnel injury casualties. 
Background 
These procedures were developed as part of a Coas
Guard study of how best to investigate and report 
on communications problems.  As part of that 
study, a general model of communications 
problems was developed, shown in the adjacent 
figure.  This model divides communications into 
four Communications Processes (prepare and 
send message, message transmission, receive 
and interpret message, and act on message) and 
four corresponding Communications Problem 
Areas.  The model further identifies seven 
Contributing Factor Areas that can cause or 
contribute to communications problems. 
Receive
&
Interpret
Message
Act
Prepare
&
Send
Message
Problems Preparing
And Sending
Messages
Problems with
Message
Transmission
Problems
Acting on
Messages
Problems Receiving
And Interpreting
Messages
Communications Processes
Communications Problem Areas
Contributing Factor Areas
Knowledge or
Experience
Procedures Performance Assumptions
Environment Communication
Equipment
Management &
Government
Regulations
Vessel
Operations
Contributing Factor Areas
Message
Transmission
 
 
t
ses, 
Basis 
Investigation procedures based on this model 
were developed and then applied by Investigating 
Officers as part of the study.  During the study, 
investigators screened casualties to identify those 
that required effective communications to support 
safe operations.  Of those casualties identified as 
requiring effective communications, 76 percent 
were subsequently found to have a 
communications problem that contributed to the
casualty.   Following their initial screening of ca
investigators conducted in-depth investigations and analyses of selected casualties to identify specific 
communications problems and contributing factors.  Investigating Officers were able to use the procedures to reliably 
identify communications problem areas and specific factors contributing to the casualties.  Overall, the study found 
that 18 percent of critical vessel casualties and 28 percent of critical personnel injuries had a communications 
problem that contributed to the casualty.  
Instructions 
Step 1 is conducted to identify if there was a potential for a communications problem to have contributed to the 
casualty.  This step identifies casualties where there is a 76 percent probability that ineffective, inappropriate, or a 
lack of communications contributed to the casualty, according to the results of the research study. 
Step 1: Review the five conditions, check any that apply, and identify the type(s) of communications that should be 
further analyzed (vessel-vessel, bridge-pilot, vessel-shore authority, crew-crew, and vessel-shore worker). 
The remaining steps call for a further investigation of the specific communications causes that contributed to the 
casualty.  Complete Step 2 to identify the specific communications causes, if any.  Complete Step 3 to document your 
conclusions regarding the type of communications that contributed to the casualty.  Use Step 4 as an aid in 
investigating and reporting any communication types identified in Step 3. 
Step 2: For each communication type identified in Step 1, consider the actions in which ineffective, inappropriate, or 
a lack of needed communications could have contributed to the casualty.  
Step 3: Check the types of communications that likely contributed to this casualty and complete Step 4 for each type 
checked.  
Step 4: For this step, it will typically be necessary to contact individuals involved in the casualty to determine the 
events leading up to the casualty, specific communications problems that occurred, and the factors that 
contributed to these problems.   
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Communications Problem Screening and Investigation Procedures 
 
Please refer to the Instructions for Investigating Communications Problems in Marine Casualties for a summary 
of the background and basis for these procedures, as well as general instructions for their use. 
 
Step 1: Was there a potential for a communications problem contributing to the casualty? 
Review the following casualty conditions, check ; all that apply, and note the corresponding communication 
type(s) for further review in Step 2.  If no conditions apply, communications were likely not required in the 
situation. 
 Casualty Condition Communication Type 
 Two or more vessels were involved in this casualty. Vessel-Vessel 
 There was a pilot (other than a member of the vessel’s crew) responsible for 
navigation of the ship. Bridge-Pilot 
 The vessel was navigating in an area under the supervision of a VTS operator, a 
bridge tender, a lockmaster, or a light operator. Vessel-Shore Authority 
 Two or more crewmembers who were directly involved in this casualty were 
working together, or this casualty could have been prevented if someone had 
shared additional information with another crewmember. 
Crew-Crew 
 The casualty occurred during coordination of activities between the vessel and 
shore-based personnel (e.g., dock worker, crane operator, or vessel agent). Vessel-Shore Workers 
 
Step 2: What specific communications actions contributed to the casualty? 
Check ; all actions in which ineffective, inappropriate, or a lack of needed communications may have contributed 
to the casualty.  Note any other causes not listed.  If any potential causes are identified, continue with Steps 3 and 4. 
Vessel-Vessel Communication Problems 
 Vessel communication using a VHF radio system 
 Vessel communication using sound signals 
 Other: 
 Vessel communication using visual signals 
 Vessel communication using some other means 
Bridge-Pilot Communication Problems 
 Pilot request for vessel and situation information 
 Bridge crew warned pilot of equipment malfunction 
 Pilot brief to bridge crew on navigation plan 
 Other:   
 Pilot brief to bridge crew on operating conditions 
 Pilot update to bridge crew on change in plans 
 Crew update to pilot of change in situation 
Vessel-Shore Authority Communication Problems 
 Vessel call to shore authority 
 Shore authority advisory to vessel of situation 
 Other: 
 Vessel statement of intentions to shore authority  
 Shore authority acknowledgement of vsl intentions 
Crew-Crew Communication Problems 
 Use of direct and  verbal conversation 
 Use of hand signals 
 Other: 
 Use of communications devices 
 Use of written communications 
Vessel-Shore Worker Communication Problems 
 Use of direct and  verbal conversation 
 Use of hand signals 
 Other: 
 Use of communications devices 
 Use of written communications 
No Potential Communication Problems Identified 
 Further investigation failed to support communications as a causal factor 
 
Step 3: Which of the following types of communication contributed to this casualty? 
Based on the response to Step 2, check ; the types of communication, if any, that likely contributed to this casualty 
and complete Step 4 for each type checked.  
 Vessel-Vessel Communications 
 Bridge-Pilot Communications 
 Vessel-Shore Authority Communications 
 Crew-Crew Communications 
 Vessel-Shore Worker Communications 
 N/A--no communication problems identified 
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Step 4: What specific communications problems and factors contributed to this casualty? 
For each type of communication checked in Step 3, check ; all communications problems that contributed to the 
casualty.  For each problem identified below, list at least one contributing factor from the list below by indicating 
its corresponding identification number (#1-41).  For example, ; Did not request information…3 , 15 , 28. 
Communications 
Process 
Communications Problem Contributing Factor 
(see 1 – 41 below) 
Prepare & Send Message 
(includes spoken and 
written communications, 
hand and sound signals) 
U Did not communicate ................................................................................
U Communicated ambiguous, incorrect, or incomplete information .............
U Did not question others’ actions or assert own interpretation of situation .
U Did not request information .......................................................................
U Did not send information in a timely manner .............................................
U Sent different information than intended ....................................................
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
Message Transmission U Message was not transmitted ...................................................................
U Message was interrupted ..........................................................................
U Message was incomprehensible ...............................................................
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
Receive & Interpret 
Message 
U Did not monitor communications ...............................................................
U Did not listen to complete message ..........................................................
U Did not acknowledge information reception ..............................................
U Did not interpret the information correctly .................................................
U Did not verify the validity or accuracy of the information............................
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
Act on Message U Took no action............................................................................................
U Action was not in accordance with agreement ..........................................
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
Others:  ___ ___ ___ 
Knowledge or Experience 
1. Improper use of signaling techniques (hand, light, flag) 
2. Improper use of standard marine technical vocabulary 
3. Inadequate knowledge of company procedures or policies 
4. Inadequate knowledge of correct communications protocol 
5. Inadequate knowledge of regulatory requirements 
6. Limited English skills or knowledge 
7. Language difficulty (e.g., enunciation, strong accent) 
8. Lack of common language 
9. Other:   
Procedures 
10. Did not carry communications equipment on person 
11. Did not operate the communications equipment correctly 
12. Selected incorrect communications channel or frequency 
13. Selected incorrect communications device 
14. Other:   
Performance 
15. Distracted or interrupted by other tasks (e.g., high 
workload) 
16. Forgot information or intended actions 
17. Tired or sleepy 
18. Individual not at work station 
19. Not willing to challenge authority 
20. Not willing to communicate 
21. Other:   
Assumptions  
22. Assumed that there was no need to communicate 
23. Assumed lack of response as implicit (silent) confirmation 
24. Assumed incorrectly that other party knew the information 
25. Assumed that individual in charge recognized the problem 
26. Confusion regarding who was communicating 
27. Confusion regarding who was in charge of situation 
28. Incorrect interpretation of the situation 
29. Other:   
Environment 
30. Excessive ambient noise 
31. Excessive electronic or atmospheric disruption of signal 
32. Excessive traffic (i.e., too many users, too lengthy) on the 
assigned communications channel 
33. Other:   
Communications Equipment 
34. Communications equipment malfunction 
35. Communications equipment not available 
36. Communications equipment turned off 
37. Other:   
Management and Government Regulations 
38. No regulatory requirement to communicate 
39. Not part of individual’s job description or responsibilities 
40. Inadequate Standard Operating Procedures 
41. Other:   
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COMMUNICATIONS REPORTING FORM 
 
Section 1.  Reference Information 
 
1. Name of Investigator 
 
2. Office 
 
3. Case Number 4. Vessel Name 
 
Section 2.  Individuals Contacted 
 
5. Name & Job Position of Individual 
Name  
Job  
6. Individual contacted 
‘ By phone ‘ By deposition 
‘ In person ‘ Unable to contact 
7. Individual’s Fluency in English Language 
‘ a. No English ‘ b. Standard maritime phrases 
‘ c. Limited conversation ‘ d. Fluent ‘ e. Unknown 
8. Name & Job Position of Individual  
Name  
Job  
9. Individual contacted 
‘ By phone ‘ By deposition 
‘ In person ‘ Unable to contact 
10. Individual’s Fluency in English Language 
‘ a. No English ‘ b. Standard maritime phrases 
‘ c. Limited conversation ‘ d. Fluent ‘ e. Unknown 
11. Name & Job Position of Individual  
Name  
Job  
12. Individual contacted 
‘ By phone ‘ By deposition 
‘ In person ‘ Unable to contact 
13. Individual’s Fluency in English Language 
‘ a. No English ‘ b. Standard maritime phrases 
‘ c. Limited conversation ‘ d. Fluent ‘ e. Unknown 
 
Section 3.  Communications Contribution 
This form relates to which type of communications problem? (check only one – use separate form for each type) 
 
 ‘ bridge-pilot  ‘  vessel-vessel  ‘ crew-crew   ‘ vessel-shore workers  ‘ vessel-shore authority 
 
 
14. Were communications or coordination between (the groups checked above) advisable during the events leading up to the casualty?  
 ‘ Yes ‘ No 
 If Yes, briefly describe activities (e.g., course change, passing, line handling, cargo transfer, locking) or situation requiring 
communications: 
 
15. Describe any needed communications that were either not done or done ineffectively. 
 
 
 
16. In the Investigator’s opinion, were communications a contributing factor to this casualty? 
 ‘ Yes.  Describe the specific type of communications problems checked above (i.e., Who? What? How?). 
   
 ‘ No.  Indicate the apparent cause(s) of the casualty  
 If No is checked, proceed with Section 4, but skip Section 5 (Communications Analysis), otherwise complete both sections 4 & 5. 
 
Section 4.  Conclusions and Comments 
 
17. On a scale of 1 to 5, do you feel that the individual(s) gave you true and accurate information? 
 Not at all true 
& accurate 
   Extremely true 
& accurate 
‘ N/A since nobody 
was contacted 
Individual’s initials ______ 
Individual’s initials ______ 
Individual’s initials ______ 
1. ‘ 
1. ‘ 
1. ‘ 
2. ‘ 
2. ‘ 
2. ‘ 
3. ‘ 
3. ‘ 
3. ‘ 
4. ‘ 
4. ‘ 
4. ‘ 
5. ‘ 
5. ‘ 
5. ‘ 
18. To what extent was there a discrepancy in the information received from the various individuals contacted? 
Complete 
disagreement 
   Complete 
agreement 
 ‘ N/A since only 1 individual was 
contacted 
1. ‘ 2. ‘ 3. ‘ 4. ‘ 5. ‘ 
19. Safety recommendations to prevent similar communications-related casualties 
 
 
20. Additional Comments 
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Section 5.  Communications Analysis 
Please complete this section if bridge-pilot communications is a contributing factor to this casualty.  Check ; all bridge–pilot 
communications process problems that apply.  For each process problem identified, list at least one contributing factor from the 
list below by indicating its corresponding identification number (#1-41). (e.g., ; Did not request information  6 ,  8 ,  11) 
21. Process Problems Contributing Factors 
Communications Process Process Problems (see 1 – 41 below) 
Prepare & Send Message 
(includes spoken and written 
communications) 
‘ Did not communicate ............................................................................. 
‘ Communicated ambiguous, incorrect, or incomplete information ........... 
‘ Did not question others’ actions or assert own interpretation of situation. 
‘ Did not request information .................................................................... 
‘ Did not send information in a timely manner .......................................... 
‘ Sent different information than intended ................................................. 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
Message Transmission ‘ Message was not transmitted ................................................................. 
‘ Message was interrupted ....................................................................... 
‘ Message was incomprehensible ............................................................ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
Receive & Interpret Message ‘ Did not monitor communications ............................................................ 
‘ Did not listen to complete message ........................................................ 
‘ Did not acknowledge information reception ............................................ 
‘ Did not interpret the information correctly ............................................... 
‘ Did not verify the validity or accuracy of the information ......................... 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
Act on Message ‘ Took no action ....................................................................................... 
‘ Action was not in accordance with agreement ........................................ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
___ 
Others:  ___ ___ ___ ___ 
Contributing Factors   
Knowledge or Experience 
1. Improper use of signaling techniques (hand, light, flag, Morse) 
2. Improper use of standard marine technical vocabulary 
3. Inadequate knowledge of company procedures or policies 
4. Inadequate knowledge of correct communications protocol 
5. Inadequate knowledge of regulatory requirements 
6. Limited English skills or knowledge 
7. Language difficulty (e.g., enunciation, strong accent) 
8. Lack of common language 
9. Other:_____________________________________________ 
Procedures 
10. Did not carry communications equipment on person 
11. Did not operate the communications equipment correctly 
12. Selected incorrect communications channel or frequency 
13. Selected incorrect communications device 
14. Other: ____________________________________________ 
Performance 
15. Distracted or interrupted by other tasks (e.g., high workload) 
16. Forgot information or intended actions 
17. Tired or sleepy 
18. Individual not at work station 
19. Not willing to challenge authority 
20. Not willing to communicate 
21. Other: ____________________________________________ 
Assumptions  
22. Assumed that there was no need to communicate 
23. Assumed lack of response as implicit (silent) confirmation 
24. Assumed incorrectly that other party knew the information 
25. Assumed that individual in charge recognized the problem 
26. Confusion regarding who was communicating 
27. Confusion regarding who was in charge of situation 
28. Incorrect interpretation of the situation 
29. Other: ____________________________________________ 
Environment 
30. Excessive ambient noise 
31. Excessive electronic or atmospheric disruption of signal 
32. Excessive traffic (i.e., too many users, too lengthy) on the 
assigned communications channel 
33. Other: ____________________________________________ 
Communications Equipment 
34. Communications equipment malfunction 
35. Communications equipment not available 
36. Communications equipment turned off 
37. Other: ____________________________________________ 
Management and Government Regulations 
38. No regulatory requirement to communicate 
41. Not part of individual’s job description or responsibilities 
42. Inadequate Standard Operating Procedures 
41. Other: ____________________________________________ 
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MARINER SKILL & KNOWLEDGE LIMITATIONS INVESTIGATION SCREENING 
 
Step 1:  Human Factors Involvement 
Did at least one person’s actions, inaction, or decisions directly contributed to the casualty or its severity? 
 YES  –  Go to Step 2. 
 NO  –  Human factors are likely not involved and further investigation of mariner skill and knowledge limitations is unwarranted. 
Step 2:  Contributing Individuals 
List the names and job positions of up to three persons whose actions, inaction, or decisions most directly contributed to the 
casualty.  For each person, identify the general area(s) of vessel operations that contributed to the casualty, then go to Step 3. 
Mariner’s Name Job Position Vessel Operations Contributing to Casualty  
(Bridge, Deck, Engineering, Safety & Emergency) 
1.    
2.   
3.   
Step 3:  Contributing Activities 
Briefly describe each person’s actions, inaction, and/or decisions that contributed to the casualty. 
Mariner 1: 
Mariner 2: 
Mariner 3: 
Step 4:  Potential for Skill and Knowledge Limitations 
For each mariner, respond to the following questions.  If possible, interview the 
mariner(s) in-person or by telephone to address these questions. Mariner 1 Mariner 2 Mariner 3 
a. Did this person’s action or inaction result in their knowing violation of an 
applicable law, rule, policy or standard operating procedure? 
If NO for any involved mariner, go to b. 
If YES for all involved mariners, end report.  This casualty is likely a violation, not 
the result of skill and knowledge limitations. 
 YES 
 NO 
 YES 
 NO 
 YES 
 NO 
b. Has each person successfully demonstrated the contributing activities many times 
before under similar circumstances and within the last five years? 
If NO for any involved mariner, go to Step 5. 
If YES for all involved mariners, end report.  This casualty is likely either a slip or 
a lapse, not the result of skill and knowledge limitations. 
 YES 
 NO 
 YES 
 NO 
 YES 
 NO 
Step 5:  Completion of Operations Form(s) 
Complete applicable operational area investigation form(s) for Bridge, Deck, Engineering, and/or Safety & 
Emergency Operations, for each mariner with NO answers to Questions 4a and 4b. 
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Please complete a separate copy of this form for each person whose bridge activities contributed to the casualty. 
 
Step 5.1:  Maritime Work History of Contributing Mariner 
1.  Mariner’s name: 2.  Job position at time of casualty: 
3.  _____ years _____ months in this industry. 4.  _____ years _____ months with this company. 
5.  _____ years _____ months in present position. 6.  _____ years _____ months on present vessel or facility. 
7.  _____ years _____ months on present route. 8.  Current licenses/documents (N/A if not applicable): 
Step 5.2:  Mariner’s Actions, Inaction, or Decisions Contributing to the Casualty 
9. Briefly describe how this person’s specific bridge actions, inaction, or decisions contributed to the casualty: 
Now, check ; all bridge activities (10-17) that directly contributed to the casualty. 
10. Did changing bridge watch activities contribute?  YES Check all activities that apply.  NO Go to 11. 
 a. Check and acknowledge passage plan, orders, and 
special information 
 b. Assess traffic and weather conditions 
 c. Check status of ship’s equipment 
 d. Ensure that watch is relieved 
11. Did visual monitoring and lookout activities contribute?  YES Check all activities that apply.  NO Go to 12. 
 a. Instruct Lookout as to duties and ensure Lookout is 
prepared to assume the watch 
 b. Maintain lookout to detect objects, traffic, or 
navigational aids and assess visibility 
 c. Determine type, aspect, and relative motion of other 
vessels 
 d. Receive and verify reports of visual contact 
12. Did collision avoidance activities contribute?  YES Check all activities that apply.  NO Go to 13. 
 a. Adjust and operate radar/ARPA 
 b. Monitor radar/ARPA and radar contacts 
 c. Assess collision threat and determine avoidance 
maneuver 
 d. Recognize and apply COLREGS 
13. Did grounding avoidance and navigation contribute?  YES Check all activities that apply.  NO Go to 14. 
 a. Establish a passage plan based on navigation 
information and knowledge of are 
 b Determine vessel position using available systems 
 c. Calculate course changes based on navigation 
information, local conditions, and local regulation 
 d. Check and update navigation charts and publications  
14. Did shiphandling activities contribute?  YES Check all activities that apply.  NO Go to 15. 
 a. Maneuver in accordance with sea/river/weather 
conditions 
 b. Maneuver in accordance with vessel and/or tow 
handling characteristics 
 c. Maneuver vessel in accordance with conning orders 
 d. Maneuver vessel during docking, anchoring, and 
mooring 
 e. Manage and coordinate assist vessels 
15. Did bridge communications contribute?  YES Check all activities that apply.  NO Go to 16. 
 a. Communicate and coordinate effectively among the 
vessel’s crew (Bridge, Engine, and Deck)  
 b. Communicate and coordinate between the bridge 
watch team and the federal/state pilot 
 c. Interpret and reply to signals (flag signals, flashing 
light, and ship’s whistle)  
 d. Establish and maintain VHF radio communications 
with other vessels and appropriate shore authorities 
16. Did port or anchor watch activities contribute?  YES Check all activities that apply.  NO Go to 17. 
 a. Inspect for leaks, loose or weak mooring lines, and 
smoke or fire 
 b. Monitor vessel position to determine if anchor is 
dragging 
17. Did a bridge activity not listed above contribute?  YES Briefly describe activity below.  NO Go to 18. 
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Step 5.3:  Training and Procedures 
Write the identification numbers of up to three bridge activities checked in Step 5.2 that most contributed to the 
casualty.  (Example:  Activity 1: 10a, Activity 2:  13b, Activity 3: 16a.)  Then, complete the remaining items under each 
listed activity. 
18. Activity 1: 23.   Activity 2: 28.   Activity 3: 
19. What training has the mariner had 
to prepare for Activity 1?           
(Check all that apply.) 
 No training of any kind 
 Informal on-the-job training 
 Formal, structured on-the-job 
training and supervision 
 Coast Guard-approved course 
 Maritime trade school training 
 Maritime college or academy 
training 
 Other training 
 
 
24. What training has the mariner had 
to prepare for Activity 2?           
(Check all that apply.) 
 No training of any kind 
 Informal on-the-job training 
 Formal, structured on-the-job 
training and supervision 
 Coast Guard-approved course 
 Maritime trade school training 
 Maritime college or academy 
training 
 Other training 
 
29. What training has the mariner had 
to prepare for Activity 3?           
(Check all that apply.) 
 No training of any kind 
 Informal on-the-job training 
 Formal, structured on-the-job 
training and supervision 
 Coast Guard-approved course 
 Maritime trade school training 
 Maritime college or academy 
training 
 Other training 
 
20. Briefly describe the mariner’s most 
relevant training for Activity 1. 
 
 
 
25. Briefly describe the mariner’s most 
relevant training for Activity 2. 
 
30. Briefly describe the mariner’s most 
relevant training for Activity 3. 
 
21. How long has it been since the 
mariner received this Activity 1 
training?  
_____ years and _____ months 
26. How long has it been since the 
mariner received this Activity 2 
training?  
_____ years and _____ months 
31. How long has it been since the 
mariner received this Activity 3 
training?  
_____ years and _____ months 
22. Briefly describe established vessel 
procedures, regulations, or 
common practices that guide 
mariner performance of Activity 1.  
 
 
 
Are procedures adequate? YES  NO 
27. Briefly describe established vessel 
procedures, regulations, or 
common practices that guide 
mariner performance of Activity 2.  
 
 
 
Are procedures adequate? YES  NO 
32. Briefly describe established vessel 
procedures, regulations, or 
common practices that guide 
mariner performance of Activity 3.  
 
 
 
Are procedures adequate? YES  NO 
 
Step 5.4:  Conclusions and Recommendations 
Respond to items 33-34 after completing Step 5.3. 
33. If the mariner lacks skill or knowledge in any activity 
(1 to 3), complete 33 and 34; otherwise, end this 
report (NOT skill or knowledge related). 
Activity 1 Activity 2 Activity 3 
a. The mariner most likely lacks skill in this 
activity. 
 TRUE     FALSE  TRUE     FALSE  TRUE     FALSE 
b. The mariner most likely lacks knowledge in 
this activity. 
 TRUE     FALSE  TRUE     FALSE  TRUE     FALSE 
34. What could be done to improve this mariner’s skill and/or knowledge, or to improve established procedures and reduce 
casualties?  
Minimum: 
Ideal: 
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Deck Operations – Mariner Skill & Knowledge Limitations 
Step 5.1:  Maritime Work History of Contributing Mariner 
1.  Mariner’s name: 2.  Job position at time of casualty: 
3.  _____ years _____ months in this industry. 4.  _____ years _____ months with this company. 
5.  _____ years _____ months in present position. 6.  _____ years _____ months on present vessel or facility. 
7.  _____ years _____ months on present route. 8.  Current licenses/documents (N/A if not applicable): 
Step 5.2:  Mariner’s Actions, Inaction, or Decisions Contributing to the Casualty 
9. Briefly describe how this person’s specific deck actions, inaction, or decisions contributed to the casualty: 
 
Now, check ; all deck activities (10-21) ) that directly contributed to the casualty. 
10. Did vessel stability and integrity management activities 
contribute? 
 YES Check all activities that apply.  NO Go to 11. 
 a. Load and unload a vessel taking into account load 
lines, stability, trim, and stress principles and 
calculations 
 b. Adjust ballast as required to maintain stability 
 c. Operate vessel in compliance with Stability Letter 
 d. Ensure vessel’s water tight integrity 
11. Did deck equipment operations activities contribute?  YES Check all activities that apply.  NO Go to 12. 
 a. Board pilot 
 b. Conduct docking, anchoring, and mooring operations 
 c. Assist in tug/escort vessel tie-up operations 
 d. Prepare and stow cargo handling equipment 
12. Did container cargo operations activities contribute?  YES Check all activities that apply.  NO Go to 13. 
 a. Establish container stowage plan 
 b. Load and unload containers 
 c. Lash all containers 
 d. Monitor and maintain cargo security 
13. Did bulk cargo operations contribute?  YES Check all activities that apply.  NO Go to 14. 
 a. Establish bulk cargo loading plan 
 b. Load and unload bulk cargo 
 c. Monitor and maintain cargo security 
 d. Handle dangerous and hazardous cargo 
14. Did petroleum cargo activities contribute?  YES Check all activities that apply.  NO Go to 15. 
 a. Operate pumping equipment 
 b. Monitor piping and pumping systems 
 c. Clean petroleum cargo tanks 
 d. Conduct inert gas and gas-free operations 
15. Did towing and fleeting operations contribute?  YES Check all activities that apply.  NO Go to 16. 
 a. Establish a tow diagram 
 b. Make up, check, and tighten towlines and headwires 
 c. Check tow for water and pump barges 
 d. Conduct locking and lock assist operations 
16. Did fishing operations activities contribute?  YES Check all activities that apply.  NO Go to 17. 
 a. Set, retrieve, and handle fishing gear 
 b. Bring aboard and load catch 
 c. Unload or transfer catch 
 d. Process catch 
17. Did deck communications activities contribute?  YES Check all activities that apply.  NO Go to 18. 
 a. Communicate effectively between deck and bridge 
 b. Communicate effectively among deck crew 
 c. Coordinate between deck and assist vessels 
 d. Coordinate between deck and dock crew 
18. Did deck maintenance activities contribute?  YES Check all activities that apply.  NO Go to 19. 
 a. Perform deck, hull, and surface chipping, painting 
 b. Maintain deck equipment 
 c. Work in confined spaces 
 d. Perform hot work 
19. Did general activities on deck activities contribute?  YES Check all activities that apply.  NO Go to 20. 
 a. Embarking or disembarking vessel  
 b. Moving around the vessel 
 c. General off-duty activities onboard vessel 
 
20. Did passenger safety activities contribute?  YES Check all activities that apply.  NO Go to 21. 
 a. Ensure the safety of passengers during embarkation 
and disembarkation 
 b. Ensure the safety of passengers when underway and 
during ship operations 
 c. Inspect passenger spaces for hazards and take 
appropriate action 
 d. Confine passenger access to safe vessel spaces only 
21. Did a deck activity not listed above contribute?  YES Briefly describe activity below.  NO Go to 22. 
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Step 5.3:  Training and Procedures 
Write the identification numbers of up to three deck activities checked in Step 5.2 that most contributed to the casualty.  
(Example:  Activity 1: 10a, Activity 2:  13b, Activity 3: 16a.)  Then, complete the remaining items under each listed activity. 
22. Activity 1: 27.   Activity 2: 32.   Activity 3: 
23. What training has the mariner had 
to prepare for Activity 1?           
(Check all that apply.) 
 No training of any kind 
 Informal on-the-job training 
 Formal, structured on-the-job 
training and supervision 
 Coast Guard-approved course 
 Maritime trade school training 
 Maritime college or academy 
training 
 Other training 
 
 
28. What training has the mariner had 
to prepare for Activity 2?           
(Check all that apply.) 
 No training of any kind 
 Informal on-the-job training 
 Formal, structured on-the-job 
training and supervision 
 Coast Guard-approved course 
 Maritime trade school training 
 Maritime college or academy 
training 
 Other training 
 
33. What training has the mariner had 
to prepare for Activity 3?           
(Check all that apply.) 
 No training of any kind 
 Informal on-the-job training 
 Formal, structured on-the-job 
training and supervision 
 Coast Guard-approved course 
 Maritime trade school training 
 Maritime college or academy 
training 
 Other training 
 
24. Briefly describe the mariner’s most 
relevant training for Activity 1. 
 
 
 
 
29. Briefly describe the mariner’s most 
relevant training for Activity 2. 
 
 
 
 
34. Briefly describe the mariner’s most 
relevant training for Activity 3. 
 
 
 
 
25. How long has it been since the 
mariner received this Activity 1 
training?  
_____ years and _____ months 
30. How long has it been since the 
mariner received this Activity 2 
training?  
_____ years and _____ months 
35. How long has it been since the 
mariner received this Activity 3 
training?  
_____ years and _____ months 
26. Briefly describe established vessel 
procedures, regulations, or 
common practices that guide 
mariner performance of Activity 1.  
 
 
 
Are procedures adequate? YES  NO 
31. Briefly describe established vessel 
procedures, regulations, or 
common practices that guide 
mariner performance of Activity 2.  
 
 
 
Are procedures adequate? YES  NO 
36. Briefly describe established vessel 
procedures, regulations, or 
common practices that guide 
mariner performance of Activity 3.  
 
 
 
Are procedures adequate? YES  NO 
 
Step 5.4:  Conclusions and Recommendations 
Respond to items 37-38 after completing Step 5.3. 
37. If the mariner lacks skill or knowledge in any activity 
(1 to 3), complete 37 and 38; otherwise, end this 
report (NOT skill or knowledge related). 
 
Activity 1 Activity 2 Activity 3 
a. The mariner most likely lacks skill in this 
activity. 
 TRUE     FALSE  TRUE     FALSE  TRUE     FALSE 
b. The mariner most likely lacks knowledge in 
this activity. 
 TRUE     FALSE  TRUE     FALSE  TRUE     FALSE 
38. What could be done to improve this mariner’s skill and/or knowledge, or to improve established procedures and reduce 
casualties?  
Minimum: 
Ideal: 
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Please complete this form separately for each person whose engineering activities contributed to the casualty. 
Step 5.1:  Maritime Work History of Contributing Mariner 
1.  Mariner’s name: 2.  Job position at time of casualty: 
3.  _____ years _____ months in this industry. 4.  _____ years _____ months with this company. 
5.  _____ years _____ months in present position. 6.  _____ years _____ months on present vessel or facility. 
7.  _____ years _____ months on present route. 8.  Current licenses/documents (N/A if not applicable): 
Step 5.2:  Mariner’s Actions, Inaction, or Decisions Contributing to the Casualty 
9. Briefly describe how this person’s specific engineering actions, inaction, or decisions contributed to the casualty: 
 
 
 
Now, check ; all engineering activities (10-16) ) that directly contributed to the casualty. 
10. Did changing engineering watch activities contribute to 
casualty? 
 YES Check all activities that apply.  NO Go to 11. 
 a. Check and acknowledge standing orders, night 
orders, and special information 
 b. Check status of ship’s equipment 
 c. Assess traffic and weather conditions 
 d. Ensure that watch is relieved 
11. Did engineering systems operations activities 
contribute to casualty? 
 YES Check all activities that apply.  NO Go to 12. 
 a. Operate main propulsion system (engines, boilers, 
fuel and steering 
 b. Operate generating and electrical systems 
 c. Operate motors, pumps, and lubrication systems 
 d. Operate service equipment (evaporators, refrigeration, 
heating, AC, sewage, and garbage treatment)  
 e. Load, discharge, or transfer fuel between tanks 
12. Did engineering systems inspection and testing 
activities contribute to casualty? 
 YES Check all activities that apply.  NO Go to 13. 
 a. Inspect and test main propulsion system (engines, 
boilers, fuel, and steering)  
 b. Inspect and test generating and electrical systems 
 c. Inspect and test motors, pumps, and lubrication 
systems 
 d. Inspect and test service equipment (evaporators, 
refrigeration, heating, AC, sewage, and garbage 
treatment) 
13. Did routine, scheduled, and preventive maintenance 
activities contribute to casualty? 
 YES Check all activities that apply.  NO Go to 14. 
 a. Maintain main propulsion system (engines, boilers, 
fuel, and steering) 
 b. Maintain generating and electrical systems 
 c. Maintain motors, pumps, and lubrication systems 
 d. Maintain service equipment (evaporators, 
refrigeration, heating, AC, sewage, and garbage 
treatment) 
14. Did unscheduled, corrective repair activities contribute 
to casualty? 
 YES Check all activities that apply.  NO Go to 15. 
 a. Repair main propulsion system (engines, boilers, fuel, 
and steering)  
 b. Repair generating and electrical systems 
 c. Repair motors, pumps, and lubrication systems 
 d. Repair service equipment (evaporators, refrigeration, 
heating, AC, sewage, and garbage treatment)  
15. Did engineering communications activities contribute to 
casualty? 
 YES Check all activities that apply.  NO Go to 16. 
 a. Communicate and coordinate effectively among the 
vessel’s crew (Bridge, Engine, and Deck) 
 b. Communicate and coordinate effectively among the 
engineering crew 
16. Did engineering activity not listed above contribute to 
casualty? 
 YES Briefly describe activity below.  NO Go to 17. 
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Step 5.3:  Training and Procedures 
Write the identification numbers of up to three engineering activities checked in Step 5.2 that most contributed to the casualty.  
(Example:  Activity 1: 10a,  Activity 2: 13b,  Activity 3: 16a.)  Then, complete the remaining items under each listed activity. 
17. Activity 1: 22.   Activity 2: 27.   Activity 3: 
18. What training has the mariner had 
to prepare for Activity 1?           
(Check all that apply.) 
 No training of any kind 
 Informal on-the-job training 
 Formal, structured on-the-job 
training and supervision 
 Coast Guard-approved course 
 Maritime trade school training 
 Maritime college or academy 
training 
 Other training 
 
 
23. What training has the mariner had 
to prepare for Activity 2?           
(Check all that apply.) 
 No training of any kind 
 Informal on-the-job training 
 Formal, structured on-the-job 
training and supervision 
 Coast Guard-approved course 
 Maritime trade school training 
 Maritime college or academy 
training 
 Other training 
 
28. What training has the mariner had 
to prepare for Activity 3?           
(Check all that apply.) 
 No training of any kind 
 Informal on-the-job training 
 Formal, structured on-the-job 
training and supervision 
 Coast Guard-approved course 
 Maritime trade school training 
 Maritime college or academy 
training 
 Other training 
 
19. Briefly describe the mariner’s most 
relevant training for Activity 1. 
 
 
 
 
24. Briefly describe the mariner’s most 
relevant training for Activity 2. 
 
 
 
 
29. Briefly describe the mariner’s most 
relevant training for Activity 3. 
 
 
 
 
20. How long has it been since the 
mariner received this Activity 1 
training?  
_____ years and _____ months 
25. How long has it been since the 
mariner received this Activity 2 
training?  
_____ years and _____ months 
30. How long has it been since the 
mariner received this Activity 3 
training?  
_____ years and _____ months 
21. Briefly describe established vessel 
procedures, regulations, or 
common practices that guide 
mariner performance of Activity 1.  
 
 
 
Are procedures adequate? YES  NO 
26. Briefly describe established vessel 
procedures, regulations, or 
common practices that guide 
mariner performance of Activity 2.  
 
 
 
Are procedures adequate? YES  NO 
31. Briefly describe established vessel 
procedures, regulations, or 
common practices that guide 
mariner performance of Activity 3.  
 
 
 
Are procedures adequate? YES  NO 
 
Step 5.4:  Conclusions and Recommendations 
Respond to items 32-33 after completing Step 5.3. 
32. If the mariner lacks skill or knowledge in any activity 
(1 to 3), complete 32 and 33; otherwise, end this 
report (NOT skill or knowledge related). 
Activity 1 Activity 2 Activity 3 
a. The mariner most likely lacks skill in this 
activity. 
 TRUE     FALSE  TRUE     FALSE  TRUE     FALSE 
b. The mariner most likely lacks knowledge in 
this activity. 
 TRUE     FALSE  TRUE     FALSE  TRUE     FALSE 
33. What could be done to improve this mariner’s skill and/or knowledge, or to improve established procedures and reduce 
casualties?  
Minimum: 
Ideal: 
Working Group 1 - HFW2002 Page 131 of 141 Houston, Texas 
Human Factors in Incident Investigation and Analysis 
Safety & Emergency Operations – Mariner Skill & Knowledge Limitations 
Please complete this form separately for each person whose safety and emergency activities contributed to the casualty. 
Step 5.1:  Maritime Work History of Contributing Mariner 
1.  Mariner’s name: 2.  Job position at time of casualty: 
3.  _____ years _____ months in this industry. 4.  _____ years _____ months with this company. 
5.  _____ years _____ months in present position. 6.  _____ years _____ months on present vessel or facility. 
7.  _____ years _____ months on present route. 8.  Current licenses/documents (N/A if not applicable): 
Step 5.2:  Mariner’s Actions, Inaction, or Decisions Contributing to the Casualty 
9. Briefly describe how this person’s specific safety and emergency actions, inaction, or decisions contributed to the casualty: 
 
 
Now, check ; all safety and emergency activities (10-18) ) that directly contributed to the casualty. 
10. Did general safety activities contribute to casualty?  YES Check all activities that apply.  NO Go to 11. 
 a. Embark and disembark vessel safely 
 b. Walk about vessel safely 
 c. Perform off-duty activities safely 
11. Did safety equipment inspection and service activities 
contribute to casualty? 
 YES Check all activities that apply.  NO Go to 12. 
 a. Inspect and service fire detection equipment 
 b. Inspect and service fire extinguishing equipment 
 c. Inspect and service lifesaving equipment, locating 
devices, and flotation devices 
 d. Inspect and service survival craft 
 e. Inspect and service emergency generator, batteries, 
etc.  
12. Did controlling and fighting fires activities contribute to 
casualty? 
 YES Check all activities that apply.  NO Go to 13. 
 a. Establish and maintain a Fire Safety Plan 
 b. Organize and conduct fire drills 
 c. Identify the type of fire 
 d. Use fire-fighting equipment and procedures 
 e. Maintain escape routes 
13. Did confined space rescue activities contribute to 
casualty? 
 YES Check all activities that apply.  NO Go to 14. 
 a. Locate individual(s)  
 b. Establish a rescue plan 
 c. Use breathing apparatus and other required 
equipment 
 d. Maintain back-up personnel and escape routes 
14. Did person overboard procedures contribute?  YES Check all activities that apply.  NO Go to 15. 
 a. Initiate warning 
 b. Locate person overboard 
 c. Maneuver vessel 
 d. Bring person aboard 
15. Did abandon vessel operations contribute to casualty?  YES Check all activities that apply.  NO Go to 16. 
 a. Don survival suits and personal flotation devices 
 b. Launch, load, and maneuver lifeboats and life rafts 
 c. Employ locating devices properly 
16. Did emergency medical and life-saving procedures 
activities contribute to casualty? 
 YES Check all activities that apply.  NO Go to 17. 
 a. Use medical chest and first aid items  b. Apply First Aid/CPR 
17. Did emergency communications activities contribute?  YES Check all activities that apply.  NO Go to 18. 
 a. Establish and maintain communications with crew 
 b. Establish and maintain communications with 
passengers 
 c. Establish and maintain emergency communications 
with other vessels 
 d. Establish emergency communications with shore 
authorities 
 e. Monitor GMDSS and other emergency frequencies as 
required 
18. Did safety and emergency activity not listed above 
contribute to casualty? 
 YES Briefly describe activity below.  NO Go to 19. 
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Step 5.3:  Training and Procedures 
Write the identification numbers of up to three safety and emergency activities checked in Step 5.2 that most 
contributed to the casualty.  (Example:  Activity 1: 10a,  Activity 2: 13b,  Activity 3: 16a.)  Then, complete the items 
under each listed activity. 
19. Activity 1: 24.   Activity 2: 29.   Activity 3: 
20. What training has the mariner had 
to prepare for Activity 1?           
(Check all that apply.) 
 No training of any kind 
 Informal on-the-job training 
 Formal, structured on-the-job 
training and supervision 
 Coast Guard-approved course 
 Maritime trade school training 
 Maritime college or academy 
training 
 Other training 
 
 
25. What training has the mariner had 
to prepare for Activity 2?           
(Check all that apply.) 
 No training of any kind 
 Informal on-the-job training 
 Formal, structured on-the-job 
training and supervision 
 Coast Guard-approved course 
 Maritime trade school training 
 Maritime college or academy 
training 
 Other training 
 
30. What training has the mariner had 
to prepare for Activity 3?           
(Check all that apply.) 
 No training of any kind 
 Informal on-the-job training 
 Formal, structured on-the-job 
training and supervision 
 Coast Guard-approved course 
 Maritime trade school training 
 Maritime college or academy 
training 
 Other training 
 
21. Briefly describe the mariner’s most 
relevant training for Activity 1. 
 
 
 
 
26. Briefly describe the mariner’s most 
relevant training for Activity 2. 
 
 
 
 
31. Briefly describe the mariner’s most 
relevant training for Activity 3. 
 
 
 
 
22. How long has it been since the 
mariner received this Activity 1 
training?  
_____ years and _____ months 
27. How long has it been since the 
mariner received this Activity 2 
training?  
_____ years and _____ months 
32. How long has it been since the 
mariner received this Activity 3 
training?  
_____ years and _____ months 
23. Briefly describe established vessel 
procedures, regulations, or 
common practices that guide 
mariner performance of Activity 1.  
 
 
 
Are procedures adequate? YES  NO 
28. Briefly describe established vessel 
procedures, regulations, or 
common practices that guide 
mariner performance of Activity 2.  
 
 
 
Are procedures adequate? YES  NO 
33. Briefly describe established vessel 
procedures, regulations, or 
common practices that guide 
mariner performance of Activity 3.  
 
 
 
Are procedures adequate? YES  NO 
 
Step 5.4:  Conclusions and Recommendations 
Respond to items 34-35 after completing Step 5.3. 
34. If the mariner lacks skill or knowledge in any activity 
(1 to 3), complete 34 and 35; otherwise, end this 
report (NOT skill or knowledge related). 
Activity 1 Activity 2 Activity 3 
a. The mariner most likely lacks skill in this 
activity. 
 TRUE     FALSE  TRUE     FALSE  TRUE     FALSE 
b. The mariner most likely lacks knowledge in 
this activity. 
 TRUE     FALSE  TRUE     FALSE  TRUE     FALSE 
35. What could be done to improve this mariner’s skill and/or knowledge, or to improve established procedures and reduce 
casualties? 
Minimum: 
Ideal: 
Working Group 1 - HFW2002 Page 133 of 141 Houston, Texas 
Human Factors in Incident Investigation and Analysis 
 
Appendix H.  Human Factors Investigation Questions  
 
The following is taken from “Role of the Human Element in Maritime Casualties,” by the Joint 
ILO/IMO adhoc Working Group on Investigation of Human Factors in Maritime Casualties, 
Maritime Safety Committee, MSC 69/13/1 ([MSC], 1998, Annex 4, Appendix 2).  These are 
questions designed to help the casualty investigator ask questions appropriate to discovering 
human errors which may have contributed to an incident.  While no list of questions can be 
comprehensive, this one provides a good set of initial inquiries into the events and underlying 
causes.  Investigators can use these to explore many facets surrounding the incident, choosing 
relevant areas for follow-up.  Even though the questions below assume an accident to a 
commercial ship, the questions can easily be tailored to investigate incidents on any type of 
facility or vessel.  The text of the MSC document is provided below. 
 
-------------------- 
 
Note:  The following questions are designed to aid the investigator while investigating for 
human factors, particularly fatigue.  Skilful [sic] questioning can help the investigator eliminate 
irrelevant lines of inquiry and focus on areas of greater potential significance. 
 
 The order in which the questions should be asked will depend on who is being 
interviewed and on his or her willingness and ability to describe personal behaviour and 
personal impressions.  Also, it may be necessary to verify, cross-check or augment information 
received from one person by interviewing others on the same points. 
 
 These areas of inquiry can be used in training investigators as well as in planning 
interviews.  The following questions are not intended as a checklist, and some may not be 
relevant in the investigation of a particular accident. 
 
1 Safety Policy 
 
.1 Does the company have a written safety policy? 
.2 Is there a designated person for shipboard safety matters in the company? 
.3 When did a company Representative last visit the vessel or when were you last in 
contact with the company? 
.4 When were you last provided safety training?  What was the training and how was it 
provided? 
.5 When was the last emergency drill (e.g., fire, abandon ship, man-overboard, 
pollution response, etc) and what did you do during the drill? 
.6 Was appropriate personal protective equipment provided and did you use it? 
.7 Are you aware of any personal accidents which occurred on board in the period 
prior to the accident? 
 
2 Activities prior to incident 
 
.1 (If the ship was leaving port at the time of the accident)  In general, how did you 
spend your time while the ship was in port? 
.2 (If the ship was approaching port or at sea at the time of the accident)  How long 
has the ship been on passage since its last port or terminal operation? 
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.3 What were you doing immediately prior to coming on watch or reporting for duty, 
and for how long?  Recreational activity?  Physical exercise?  Sleeping?  Reading?  
Watching T.V.?  Eating?  Paperwork?  Travelling to vessel? 
.4 Specifically what were you doing approximately 4 hours ........   1 hour ........  30 
minutes  .......  before the accident? 
.5 What evolution was the ship involved in when the accident occurred?  What was 
your role during that evolution? 
.6 Immediately prior to the accident, what were you thinking about? 
.7 At any time before the accident, did you have any indication that anyone was tired 
or unable to perform their duty? 
 
3 Duties at the time of accident 
 
.1 Where were you on the ship when the accident occurred? 
.2 What specific job or duty were you assigned at the time?  By whom?  Did you 
understand your assignment?  Did you receive any conflicting orders? 
.3 How often have you performed this job in the past (on the specific ship involved in 
the accident)? 
 
4 Actual behaviour at time of accident 
 
.1 Precisely where were you located at the time of the accident? 
.2 What specific task were you performing at the time of the accident? 
.3 Had you at any time since reporting for duty found that you could not concentrate 
(focus your attention/keep your mind) on a task you were trying to perform? 
 
5 Training/Education/Certification/Professional Experience 
 
.1 How long have you been assigned to this ship?  Have you requested that your 
assignment be lengthened or shortened? 
.2 How long have you filled your crew position?  What other crew positions have you 
held on this ship? 
.3 How long have you held the certificate indicating your qualifications? 
.4 Before being assigned to this ship, did you work on other ships?  If so, what crew 
positions have you held? 
.5 What is the longest time you have been to sea in a single voyage?  How long have 
you been at sea on this passage?  What was your longest single passage? 
 
6 Physical condition 
 
.1 Were you feeling ill or sick at any time in the 24 hours immediately before the 
accident?  If so, what symptoms did you have?  Did you have a fever, vomit, feel 
dizzy, other?  Also, did you tell anyone?  What do you believe the cause was? 
.2 When was the last meal you had prior [to] the accident?  What did you eat?  Was it 
adequate? 
.3 Do you exercise regularly while onboard?  When did you last exercise (before the 
accident)?  How long was the session? 
 
 
 
7 Psychological, emotional, mental condition and employment conditions 
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.1 When was the last time you felt cheerful or elated onboard the ship, and what were 
the circumstances that generated this emotion? 
.2 When was the last time you were sad or depressed or dejected, on board the ship?  
Why?  Did you talk about it with anyone else? 
.3 Have you had to make any difficult personal decisions recently?  Have you had any 
financial or family worries on your mind recently? 
.4 Have you been criticized for how you are doing your work lately?  By whom?  Was it 
justified? 
.5 What was the most stressful situation you had to deal with on the voyage (prior to 
the accident)?  When did the situation occur?  How was it resolved? 
.6 What are the contractual arrangements for all crewmembers? 
.7 Have there been any complaints or industrial action in the last (12) months? 
 
8 Workload/Complexity of Tasks 
 
.1 What is the shipboard organization? 
.2 Is the shipboard organization effective? 
.3 What is your position in the shipboard organization (i.e., who do you work for, report 
to or assign duties to)? 
.4 What is the nature of your work?  Sedentary?  Physically demanding? 
.5 Was anyone involved in the accident impaired due to heavy workload? 
 
9 Work-period/rest-period/recreation pattern 
 
.1 What is your normal duty schedule? 
.2 Are you a day worker or a watchstander? 
.3 What was your duty schedule on the day before the accident and during the week 
before the accident? 
.4 Were you on overtime at the time of the accident? 
.5 How long had you been on duty, or awake performing other work, at the time of the 
accident? 
.6 When was your lat period of sleep?  How long did it last?  How often did you 
awaken during your last sleep period?  Did you awaken refreshed?  If not, what 
would have made your sleep period more restful? 
.7 How do you normally spend your off-duty time while on board?  Play cars?  Read?  
Listen to music?  Watch T.V.?  Other? 
.8 When was your last extended period of off duty time when you were able to rest? 
 
10 Relationship with other crewmembers and superiors/subordinates 
 
.1 Who among the crew would you consider to be a friend? 
.2 Do you find any members of the crew unpleasant to be with? 
.3 Do you have difficulty talking with any of the crewmembers because of language 
barriers? 
.4 Have any new crewmembers recently joined the ship?  Have you had a chance to 
get acquainted with them? 
.5 Did you have any argument recently with another crewmember? 
.6 In an emergency, would you trust your fellow crewmembers to come to your 
assistance? 
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.7 Has another crewmember ever offered to take your place on watch or perform a 
duty for you to let you get some extra rest? 
.8 What was the subject of your last conversation with another crewmember before 
reporting for duty (when the accident occurred)? 
.9 Have you talked with any other crewmembers since the accident?  If so, what was 
the subject of your conversation?  Have you talked with anyone else about the 
accident prior to being interviewed? 
 
11 Living conditions and shipboard environment 
 
.1 Do you consider your personal area on board the ship to be comfortable?  If not, 
how would you like it to [be] improved? 
.2 Prior to the accident, did you have any difficulty resting as a result of sever weather, 
noise levels, heat/cold, ship’s motion, etc.? 
 
12 Manning levels 
 
.1 Is the manning level sufficient in your opinion for the operation of the vessel? 
 
13 Master’s standing orders 
 
.1 Are there written standing orders to the whole crew complement from the Master? 
.2 Did the Master/Chief Engineer provide written or verbal standing orders to the 
watchkeeping personnel? 
.3 Were the orders in conflict with the company safety policy? 
 
14 Level of automation/reliability of equipment 
 
.1 In your opinion, was the system reliable? 
.2 Were there earlier failures in the system? 
.3 Were the failures repaired by the crew or shore-based workers? 
 
15 Ship design, motion/cargo characteristics 
 
.1 Did you observe anything out of the ordinary on this passage concerning the ship 
design, or motion or cargo characteristics? 
 
Questions 16-24 [25] are EXAMPLES OF QUESTIONS THAT MAY BE DIRECTED TO 
SHORESIDE MANAGEMENT 
 
16 Scheduling of work and rest periods 
 
.1 What is the company’s work schedule and relief policy? 
 
17 Manning level 
 
.1 How is the manning level determined for your fleet? 
 
18 Watchkeeping practices 
 
.1 Do you require the Master to stand watch? 
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.2 Do you leave the watchkeeping practices to the discretion of the Master? 
 
19 Assignment of duties 
 
.1 Do you leave this matter to the Master? 
 
20 Shore-ship-shore support and communications 
 
.1 How do you support the vessel’s Master? 
 
21 Management policies 
 
.1 Does the company have a written safety policy? 
 
22 Voyage planning and port call schedules 
 
.1 How does the Master plan the voyages? 
 
23 Recreational facilities 
 
.1 Are welfare/recreational services and facilities provided on board? 
 
24 Contractual and/or industrial arrangements and agreements 
 
.1 What are the contractual agreements for all crewmembers? 
.2 Have there been any complaints or industrial action in the last (12) months? 
 
25 National/international requirements 
 
.1 Are the management/Master complying with the requirements and recommend-
ations of the applicable international conventions and Flag State regulations? 
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Appendix I.  Norwegian Petroleum Directorate Near-Miss System 
 
 
In 2000, Norway instituted a near-miss database to assess risk levels in the continental shelf 
offshore industry.  The database contains reports on major hazards, occupational injuries, 
occupational disease, cultural risk factors, and perceived risks.  The focus is on preventing risk 
to personnel on offshore facilities, such as production installations, mobile drilling units, and 
flotels.  A report, “Trends in Risk Levels on the Norwegian Continental Shelf,” gives an overview 
of the near-miss system and findings to date.  The report can be found on the Norwegian 
Petroleum Directorate (NPD) web site (http://www.npd.no ; click on the British flag for English, 
then go to the Health, Environment & Safety (HSE) page).  This appendix gives a brief 
presentation of the near-miss system and a couple examples of the data, courtesy of Professor 
Jan Erik Vinnem. 
The near-miss database is limited to incidents that may have the potential to cause major 
accidents, if multiple barrier failures occur.  Some other incidents that are essential for 
emergency preparedness planning are also covered.  The operators on the Norwegian 
Continental Shelf have a duty (enforced by NPD through regulations) to notify NPD about 
injuries, accidents and near-misses within a short time after the occurrence of these events.  
(For the most serious incidents, further investigation reports will be required for submission.)  
The cut-off limits for which incidents to report are somewhat loosely defined, and there are 
significant differences between the companies, with respect to reporting practices.  The 
database is based on a subset of these mandatory reports, and includes those which have been 
extensively reviewed and verified to ensure consistency and which have established exposure 
data (activity levels).   
The NPD classifies major hazards into eleven types (or DFUs), shown below.  Each DFU 
presents a specific, potentially-serious hazardous situation.   
 
DFU 
 
Event Scenario 
1 Unignited hydrocarbon leak 
2 Ignited hydrocarbon leak 
3 Kick/loss of well control 
4 Fire/explosion, excluding DFU#2 
5 Vessel on collision course 
6 Drifting object/vessel on collision course 
7 collision with field related traffic 
8 Structural damage 
9 Leak from subsea installation 
10 Damage to subsea installation 
11 Evacuation (precautionary/emergency) 
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Although the near-miss database was not formally brought on-line until 2000, the NPD had 
incident data from several prior years.  The NPD has analyzed yearly incident data in terms of 
the DFUs, as shown in the trend analysis presented in Figure I-1 (see Sec. 6.3 for information 
on trend analysis).  It is clear from the figure that unignited hydrocarbon leaks are a primary 
source of potential accidents.  These data have been further analyzed by size of leak in Figure 
I-2.  The NPD system demonstrates how near-miss data can be used to identify potential 
hazardous situations so that the industry can seek safety solutions before a significant accident 
results.   
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Figure I-1.  Norwegian Petroleum Directorate Near-Miss Data.  Six years of 
incident data for all major hazard DFUs, representing near-misses at 
all continental shelf offshore installations. 
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Figure I-2.  NPD Data on Unignited Hydrocarbon Leaks.  Data are segmented 
by size of the leak. 
 
 
 
 
 
